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ABSTRACT
Knowledge representation and reasoning is a prominent subject of study within the
eld of articial intelligence that is concerned with the symbolic representation of
knowledge in such a way to facilitate automated reasoning about this knowledge.
Often in real-world domains, it is necessary to perform defeasible reasoning when
representing default behaviors of systems. Answer Set Programming is a widely-
used knowledge representation framework that is well-suited for such reasoning tasks
and has been successfully applied to practical domains due to ecient computa-
tion through grounding{a process that replaces variables with variable-free terms{
and propositional solvers similar to SAT solvers. However, some domains provide a
challenge for grounding-based methods such as domains requiring reasoning about
continuous time or resources.
To address these domains, there have been several proposals to achieve eciency
through loose integrations with ecient declarative solvers such as constraint solvers
or satisability modulo theories solvers. While these approaches successfully avoid
substantial grounding, due to the loose integration, they are not suitable for per-
forming defeasible reasoning on functions. As a result, this expressive reasoning on
functions must either be performed using predicates to simulate the functions or in
a way that is not elaboration tolerant. Neither compromise is reasonable; the former
suers from the grounding bottleneck when domains are large as is often the case in
real-world domains while the latter necessitates encodings to be non-trivially modied
for elaborations.
This dissertation presents a novel framework called Answer Set Programming Mod-
ulo Theories (ASPMT) that is a tight integration of the stable model semantics and
i
satisability modulo theories. This framework both supports defeasible reasoning
about functions and alleviates the grounding bottleneck. Combining the strengths of
Answer Set Programming and satisability modulo theories enables ecient contin-
uous reasoning while still supporting rich reasoning features such as reasoning about
defaults and reasoning in domains with incomplete knowledge. This framework is
realized in two prototype implementations called MVSM and ASPMT2SMT, and
the latter was recently incorporated into a non-monotonic spatial reasoning system.
To dene the semantics of this framework, we extend the rst-order stable model
semantics by Ferraris, Lee and Lifschitz to allow \intensional functions" and provide
analyses of the theoretical properties of this new formalism and on the relationships
between this and existing approaches.
ii
Dedicated to my loving parents, who instilled in me a life-long sense of curiosity.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I want to thank my adviser, Joohyung Lee. Joohyung rekindled
my nearly-extinguished interest in Computer Science when I was an undergraduate.
He patiently mentored me as an undergraduate researcher and when I approached
him about my plans for after my undergraduate studies, he invited me to continue
research with him as a fully-supported Ph.D. student. Joohyung worked closely with
me throughout my time at ASU, encouraging me to work in collaboration with other
groups and suggesting courses of interest related to our reseach. I'm also grateful
for being given the opportunity to attend and present at conferences in interesting
places like Toronto, Rome, and Istanbul. I'm fortunate to have had such a generous,
patient, and dedicated adviser. Thanks, Joohyung.
I would also like to thank the members of Joohyung's research lab. Ravi Palla,
Yunsong Meng, and Michael Casolary were all seasoned members of Joohyung's lab
when I joined the group and provided plenty of useful comments and mentorship.
Possibly just as important, they also provided countless welcome distractions whether
through celebratory lab dinners or casual conversations in the lab. I also want to
thank the members of the lab that joined after I did{Sunjin Kim, Yu Zhang, Chao
Zheng, Yi Wang, Joseph Babb, and Mohammad Hekmatnejad. We discussed research,
exchanged suggestions for courses, and had our fun outside the lab as well. It was a
pleasure working with all of these bright minds. Thank you all.
Next, I would like to thank my close friend and college roommate Devon O'Brien.
We were either friendly rivals or project teammates in 10 courses at ASU and he even
taught me how to drive. Devon has always been incredibly insightful and made me
challenge my own world views. Devon provided much-needed words of encouragement
when I was on the brink of abandoning my Ph.D. Then, in one nal show of support
at the end of this road, Devon ew in from out of town to attend my nal Ph.D.
iv
defense. I'm sure I couldn't have nished this journey without your encouragement
and support. Thanks, Devon.
Finally, I want to thank my parents. Throughout my life, my parents have been
loving and encouraging. They somehow found a way to pique a young child's curiosity
and maintain this as I grew up without it ever feeling like they were pushing me. When
my mother introduced me to computer programming at age 10, I was completely
uninterested and she wisely backed o. Who could have guessed I would later undergo
such an extreme reversal to arrive at this point? My parents were more than happy
to have me move back in with them for what turned out to be my most productive
two years of research. I love you both so much. Thanks, Mom and Dad.
My dissertation work was partially supported by the NSF under Grants IIS-
1319794 and IIS-0916116, by the Oce of the Director of National Intelligence(ODNI),
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activities (IARPA), by the South Korea IT
R&D program MKE/KIAT 2010-TD-300404-001, and by the ASU Fulton Schools of
Engineering Dean's Fellowship.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Answer Set Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Constraint Answer Set Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Satisability Modulo Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Intensional Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1 Reduct Characterization of the Stable Model Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 First Order Stable Model Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Constraint Answer Set Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4 Satisability Modulo Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.5 Lifschitz Semantics of Intensional Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.6 Cabalar Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6.1 Partial Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6.2 Cabalar Semantics Denition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.7 Balduccini Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.8 Multi-valued Propositional Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.9 Partial Multi-valued Propositional Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4 FUNCTIONAL STABLE MODEL SEMANTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 Reduct-Based Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.1 Innitary Ground Formulas and Grounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
vi
CHAPTER Page
4.1.2 Reduct-Based Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2 Second-Order Logic Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3 HT Logic Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4.1 Proof of Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4.2 Proof of Theorem 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5 PROPERTIES OF THE FUNCTIONAL STABLE MODEL SEMANTICS 47
5.1 Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.2 Choice and Defaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.3 Strong Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.4 Splitting Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.5 Completion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.6 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.6.1 Proof of Theorem 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.6.2 Proof of Theorem 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.6.3 Proof of Theorem 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.6.4 Proof of Theorem 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.6.5 Proof of Theorem 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.6.6 Proof of Theorem 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6 ELIMINATING INTENSIONAL PREDICATES IN FAVOROF INTEN-
SIONAL FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.1 Embedding 1988 Denition of a Stable Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.2 Eliminating Intensional Predicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
vii
CHAPTER Page
6.3 Relating Strong Negation to Boolean Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.3.1 Representing Strong Negation in Multi-Valued Propositional
Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.3.2 Representing Strong Negation Using Boolean Functions in
the First-Order Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.4 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.4.1 Proof of Theorem 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.4.2 Proof of Theorem 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.4.3 Proof of Corollary 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.4.4 Proof of Theorem 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.4.5 Proof of Theorem 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.4.6 Proof of Corollary 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.4.7 Proof of Theorem 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.4.8 Proof of Corollary 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7 ELIMINATING INTENSIONAL FUNCTIONS IN FAVOR OF INTEN-
SIONAL PREDICATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.1 Multi-valued Propositional Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.2 Eliminating Intensional Functions from c-Plain Formulas . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.3 Non-c-plain formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.4 Unfolding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.5 Attempts at Generalizing Unfolding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.6 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.6.1 Proof of Theorem 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
viii
CHAPTER Page
7.6.2 Proof of Theorem 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.6.3 Proof of Corollary 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.6.4 Proof of Theorem 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.6.5 Proof of Corollary 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.6.6 Proof of Theorem 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8 MANY-SORTED FSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.1 Extending FSM to Many-sorted FSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.2 Reduct characterization of Many-sorted FSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.3 Relation to Multi-valued Propositional Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8.4 Reducing Many-sorted FSM to Nonsorted FSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.5 ASPMT as a Special Case of Many-Sorted FSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.6 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8.6.1 Proof of Theorem 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8.6.2 Proof of Theorem 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.6.3 Proof of Theorem 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
9 IMPLEMENTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.1 MVSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.2 ASPMT2SMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
9.2.1 Variable Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
9.2.2 Syntax of Input Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
9.2.3 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
9.2.4 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
9.3 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
ix
CHAPTER Page
9.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
10 CABALAR SEMANTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
10.1 Reduct Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
10.2 Second-Order Logic Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
10.3 Correspondence on Multi-valued Propositional Formulas . . . . . . . . . . . 208
10.4 Correspondence on f -plain Sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
10.4.1 Correspondence on non-f -plain Sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
10.5 Comparing the Cabalar Semantics and FSM for Partial Stable Models213
10.6 Capturing FSM in the Cabalar Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
10.7 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
10.7.1 Proof of Theorem 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
10.7.2 Proof of Theorem 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
10.7.3 Proof of Theorem 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
10.7.4 Proof of Corollary 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
10.7.5 Proof of Theorem 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
10.7.6 Proof of Theorem 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
10.7.7 Proof of Theorem 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
10.7.8 Proof of Theorem 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
10.7.9 Proof of Corollary 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
10.7.10Proof of Theorem 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
10.7.11Proof of Corollary 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
11 OTHER RELATED WORK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
11.1 Loose Integrations with other Declarative Paradigms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
x
CHAPTER Page
11.1.1 Clingcon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
11.1.2 Lin and Wang's Logic Programs with Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
11.1.3 Lin-Wang Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
11.1.4 ASP(LC) Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
11.2 Other Approaches to Intensional Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
11.2.1 Relation to Nonmonotonic Causal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
11.2.2 IF-Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
11.2.3 Balduccini Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
11.3 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
11.3.1 Proof of Theorem 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
11.3.2 Proof of Theorem 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
11.3.3 Proof of Theorem 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
11.3.4 Proof of Theorem 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
11.3.5 Proof of Theorem 33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
11.3.6 Proof of Theorem 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
11.3.7 Proof of Theorem 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
11.3.8 Proof of Theorem 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
12 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1.1 Dissertation Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1 Transition System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
9.1 Architecture of mvsm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.2 ASPMT2SMT System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
xii
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning is an area of study within the eld of
Articial Intelligence that is concerned with the symbolic representation of knowl-
edge in such a way to facilitate automated reasoning about this knowledge. Many
approaches in this area are based on formal logics, often having limitations that make
certain kinds of reasoning dicult or preclude ecient computation. In particular,
we often want to eciently reason about expressive functions.
While rst-order logic (FOL) is well-known and decidable fragments of FOL are
used in knowledge representation formalisms such as Description Logic and Boolean
Satisability (SAT), it is unsuitable for certain kinds of reasoning. One such reason-
ing is defeasible reasoning such as reasoning about inertia or the default behavior of
a system. This kind of reasoning is important for systems that do not always have
complete information about the domain, but should still make decisions based on
default assumptions of the world. However, such reasoning cannot be naturally ex-
pressed in FOL due to its monotonic nature. For instance, FOL is not well-structured
for representing defaults such as that by default, a box will remain at its previous
location. Due to this limitation, there has been extensive work in developing and
studying non-monotonic formalisms.
One successful nonmonotonic formalism that has been successfully applied to a
number of real world domains is the stable model semantics Gelfond and Lifschitz
(1988). The Answer Set Programming (ASP) framework is based on this formalism
and has successfully been applied to domains such as Automated Product Congura-
1
tion Tiihonen et al. (2003), Space Shuttle Decision Support Balduccini et al. (2001),
and Phylogenetic Tree Inference Brooks et al. (2007) 1 . The success of these appli-
cations of ASP is largely due to ecient grounders{tools that replace variables with
ground terms{and ecient solvers, which are based on SAT solvers.
However, grounding-based methods suer when the domain contains many values
as is the case in many real-world settings requiring reasoning about continuous time
or resources. For example, we consider a simple domain in which a tank of water
has some current water level that remains the same by default but can increase at a
constant rate when an input valve is open and decrease at a constant rate when on
output valve is open. The reasoning task of determining the current water level of
the tank requires reasoning about continuous time but any grounding based method
will need to discretize this and to achieve reasonable approximations, the discretized
domain must be quite large.
To address this grounding bottleneck, several formalisms have been proposed that
avoid extensive grounding. This is achieved by loosely integrating Answer Set Pro-
gramming with other declarative formalisms such as constraint processing Gebser
et al. (2009a); Balduccini (2009), satisability modulo theories (SMT) Janhunen et al.
(2011), and mixed integer programming Liu et al. (2012). While these approaches
outperform standard ASP, due to the loose coupling, these approaches treat functions
as in First-order logic so that they are unsuitable for defeasible reasoning. Further,
except for Balduccini (2009), these approaches all consider integral domains, but are
not able to perform continuous reasoning.
Approaches such as Cabalar (2011); Lifschitz (2012); Balduccini (2012) have in-
corporated so-called \intensional functions" into the stable model semantics in order
1This list comes from Lifschitz (2008).
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to support defeasible reasoning about the value of functions (nonBoolean uents).
Intensional functions are intuitively functions that are dened in terms of other func-
tions and predicates as opposed to predened functions. For example, we can express
the speed of a car as an intensional function that relies on the applied acceleration
and previous speed of the car, whereas the function '+' is usually intended to be
dened as arithmetic addition.
However, these frameworks are not focused on ecient computation and do not
address the grounding bottleneck. In addition, the semantics described in Cabalar
(2011); Balduccini (2012) are dened using a more complex notion of satisfaction
than in the original stable model semantics while Lifschitz (2012) exhibits some be-
havior that is unexpected compared to typical extensions of the original stable model
semantics.
We propose a novel framework{Answer Set Programming Modulo Theories (ASPMT){
that addresses some deciencies in both groups of proposals. ASPMT is a tight in-
tegration of ASP and SMT that addresses the grounding bottleneck present in ASP
and the restricted reasoning about functions present in SMT, resulting in a framework
that is able to perform defeasible reasoning on continuous domains. To give the for-
mal semantics of this framework, we introduce the functional stable model semantics
(FSM), dened similarly to the rst-order stable model semantics by Ferraris, Lee
and Lifschitz Ferraris et al. (2011) but supporting the notion of intensional functions
so that we attain the ability to support defeasible reasoning on these functions. By
directly augmenting the rst-order stable model semantics, we are able to extend
some of the results established for the rst-order stable model semantics. With these
two newly introduced formalisms, we see a complete analogy between SAT, SMT,
and FOL and the nonmonotonic counterparts ASP, ASPMT, and FSM.
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Satis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Propositional Satisability Answer Set Programming
We provide two prototype implementations of the ASPMT system{MVSM and
ASPMT2SMT. System MVSM computes the stable models of ASPMT theories by
a reduction to ASP. While this approach still suers the grounding bottleneck, it
provides a more natural representation of functions while also adding basic typing to
ASP. System ASPMT2SMT computes the stable models of ASPMT theories by a
reduction to SMT. This approach partially addresses the grounding bottleneck and in
doing so, is able to perform ecient defeasible reasoning about continuous time and
resources. We formally compare the latter system to the state-of-the-art and show
that this approach is a promising one.
This document is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present background
material necessary to understand why the existing approaches are insucient in per-
forming ecient defeasible reasoning about continuous resources. In Chapter 3, we
formally present the stable model semantics and the notion of intensional functions.
In Chapter 4, we present the functional stable model (FSM) semantics and provide
two alternate reformulations of this semantics. Chapter 5 discusses several properties
of FSM that are of both theoretical and practical interest. In Chapter 6, we detail how
to eliminate intensional predicates in favor of intensional functions and in Chapter 7,
we detail how to eliminate intensional functions in favor of intensional predicates. In
Chapter 8, we present the many-sorted generalization of FSM, a practical generaliza-
tion that allows dierent functions to have dierent ranges and domains. Chapter 9
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Figure 1.1: Dissertation Outline
describes the ASPMT framework and presents two prototype implementations of this
framework. In Chapter 10, we discuss in detail the relationship between FSM and
the Cabalar Semantics. Chapter 11 provides a comparison of FSM and ASPMT to
several other related approaches. We then conclude in Chapter 12.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Answer Set Programming
Answer Set Programming is a declarative programming paradigm especially well-
suited for solving NP-hard combinatorial search problems. Among the applications
that ASP has been successfully used are Automated Product Conguration Tiihonen
et al. (2003), Space Shuttle Decision Support Balduccini et al. (2001), and Phylo-
genetic Tree Inference Brooks et al. (2007). The syntax of traditional ASP pro-
grams is similar to that of Prolog programs but the computation is based instead
on the idea of grounding and search techniques similar to those used in SAT solvers.
However, modern systems have augmented the language with rich features including
aggregates, external predicates, and preferences. The ecient implementations of
intelligent grounders and developments in SAT solvers have enabled the successful
application of ASP to these domains.
The semantics of ASP is the stable model semantics originally dened in Gel-
fond and Lifschitz (1988) which is presented in terms of a notion called a reduct
that will be detailed in Section 3.2. This semantics is non-monotonic which makes
representation in this framework appealing because encoded domains are elaboration
tolerant in sense of McCarthy (1998){that is, it is convenient to modify a description
to accommodate new behavior. It is possible to simply add the new domain speci-
cations without amending existing formulas. This is particularly useful in defeasible
reasoning, examples of which include reasoning about inertia and default behaviors
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of systems.
Example 1 Consider the following running example from a Texas Action Group
discussion, posted by Vladimir Lifschitz 1 .
A car is on a road of length l. If the accelerator is activated, the car
will speed up with constant acceleration a until the accelerator is released
or the car reaches its maximum speed ms, whichever comes rst. If the
brake is activated, the car will slow down with acceleration  a until the
brake is released or the car stops, whichever comes rst. Otherwise, the
speed of the car remains constant. Give a formal representation of this
domain, and write a program that uses your representation to generate a
plan satisfying the following conditions: at duration 0, the car is at rest
at one end of the road; at duration t, it should be at rest at the other end.
We can represent the property that by default, the speed of the car will stay the
same as in the previous timestep with the ASP rule 2
fspeed(1; Y )g  speed(0; Y ): (2.1)
which intuitively reads \If the speed is Y at timestep 0, then by default, the speed is
Y at time 1". The exceptions to this default behavior can then simply be added to the
description
speed(1; Y )  accel(0) ^ speed(0; X) ^ duration(0; D) ^ (Y = X + aD):
speed(1; Y )  decel(0) ^ speed(0; X) ^ duration(0; D) ^ (Y = X   aD):
1http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/vl/tag/continuous problem
2Rather than presenting the native syntax of the various formalisms, many descriptions will be
given in this syntax similar to predicate logic but where free variables are capitalized to distinguish
these from lower-case constants. Further, unless otherwise stated, formulas with free variables are
to be understood as the universal closure of the formula.
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which intuitively reads \If the speed is X at timestep 0 and the agent accelerates (or
decelerates) for a duration of D, then the speed at timestep 1 is Y = X + aD (or
Y = X   aD)".
Any number of elaborations to the default behavior can be added to the domain
description in this manner. This is unlike in classical logic where either the original
rules must be revised to explicitly exclude situations according to these new elabo-
rations or must include auxiliary abnormality constants that these new elaborations
trigger.
However, due to the grounding-based computation of ASP, this encoding cannot
be eciently processed by standard solvers when the domain becomes too large.
Further, when the domain becomes innite, such as in the case of reasoning about
continuous time, distance, or speed, ASP systems cannot compute solutions at all.
In addition, uents in this domain such as speed and duration are functional in
nature but are represented using relations and therefore must have the uniqueness
and existence of these relations explicitly expressed in the encoding. These challenges
have led to research into alternative formalisms that partially address these issues.
2.2 Constraint Answer Set Programming
While Answer Set Programming addressed the problem of performing defeasible
reasoning on predicates, two issues that still challenge ASP are that defeasible rea-
soning cannot be performed on functions and ecient computation is not achievable
when domains grow too large due to the grounding-based computation of ASP.
By loosely integrating constraint processing with ASP, Constraint Answer Set
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Program (CASP) has been able to partially address the latter issue. At the same
time, CASP allows for more general functions; while in ASP, functions are taken to
be Herbrand (so that they must be mapped to themselves in any interpretation so
that f(1) = 1 can never be true), in CASP, this is relaxed by processing functions
using constraint solving rather than ASP. CASP has been implemented in solvers
including ACSOLVER Mellarkod et al. (2008), CLINGCON Gebser et al. (2009b),
EZCSP Balduccini (2009), IDP Marien et al. (2008), and MINGO Liu et al. (2012).
However, CASP is unsuitable for performing defeasible reasoning on functions.
CASP employs loose integration of ASP and CSP solvers. Consequently, functions
are treated as in classical logic and so defeasible reasoning reasoning must either be
performed by representing functions as predicates or by representing the defeasible
reasoning as it is represented in classical logic{by modifying the existing rules for new
elaborations or dening abnormality atoms that can be triggered by new elaborations.
For example, representing the rule (2.1) from the car example can be expressed
using functions but would have to be modied with explicit exceptions like
speed(1)=Y  speed(0)=Y ^ :accel(0) ^ :decel(0)
or require auxiliary abnormality atoms as in
speed(1)=Y  speed(0)=Y ^ :abnormal(0)
and then elaborations would trigger the abnormality with the rules
abnormal(0)  accel(0)
abnormal(0)  decel(0):
Representing functions as predicates encounters the same issue as ASP that large
domains will encounter a grounding bottleneck, while representing the defeasible rea-
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soning as in classical logic either requires auxiliary constants or is not tolerant to
elaborations.
2.3 Satisability Modulo Theories
The Boolean Satisability Problem, or SAT, is a well-studied logical formalism and
while the restriction to propositional constants is inconvenient, SAT solver technology
has been successfully applied to Answer Set Programming through the process of
grounding into atoms that amount to propositional constants. However, SAT lacks the
ability to represent information about functions. To enable more expressive reasoning,
boolean satisability modulo theories, or SMT, considers the satisability of a formula
subject to some background theory. Common background theories include the theory
of arithmetic over reals or integers but background theories are very general and so
complex concepts such as bit vectors, lists, and arrays can be represented in SMT.
For example, we can consider a simple formula which SAT solvers cannot handle
but SMT solvers equipped with the background theories of integer arithmetic can:
a _ b _ 2  f  g
An SMT solver will nd many models among which are fb; f = 3; g = 8g and ff =
4; g = 4g.
Ecient SMT solvers such as iSAT (https://projects.avacs.org/projects/isat/)
and Z3 (http://z3.codeplex.com/releases) have built-in background theories including
linear arithmetic, non-linear arithmetic, bit vectors, and quantiers, among others;
they have been successfully applied to challenging domains such as software verica-
tion, planning, model checking, and automated test generation. In addition, annual
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SMT competitions promote further improvements to SMT solvers. However, functions
here are still viewed under classical logic so SMT, too, is unsuitable for performing
defeasible reasoning on functions.
2.4 Intensional Functions
To address the problem of performing defeasible reasoning on functions, several
formalisms have been introduced that extend the stable model semantics to include
the notion of intensional functions Cabalar (2011); Lifschitz (2012); Balduccini (2012).
For example, the rule (2.1) can now be expressed using functions as
speed(1)=Y _ :(speed(1)=Y )  speed(0)=Y:
While this is a tautology in classical logic, under these extensions we can use rules
like this to express default behavior that can be superseded in the presence of other
knowledge.
However, these approaches focused on the modeling aspect and so the grounding
bottleneck still poses a challenge to these formalisms. Additionally, the semantics
described in Cabalar (2011); Balduccini (2012) are dened using a more complex
notion of satisfaction than in the original stable model semantics while Lifschitz (2012)
exhibits some unintuitive behavior that was not present in the original stable model
semantics. These are explained in further detail in chapter 3
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Chapter 3
TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Reduct Characterization of the Stable Model Semantics
For a ground formula (i.e., a rst-order formula with no variables), we dene the
answer sets in terms of a reduct. This denition is similar to the one given in Ferraris
(2005) for propositional formulas that generalizes the original denition in Gelfond
and Lifschitz (1988).
For two interpretations I, J of the same signature and a list c of distinct predicate
constants, which we refer to as the \intensional predicates", we write J <c I if
 J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants not in c,
 pJ  pI for all predicates p in c, and
 J and I do not agree on c.
Example 2 Consider four interpretations I; J;K; L with universe f1; 2g and signa-
ture  = fp; qg where p and q are unary predicates. Let c be fpg (so that q is
non-intensional). When
pI = f1g; qI = f1g
pJ = ;; qJ = f1g
pK = f2g; qK = f1g
pL = f1g; qL = f2g
we can see that J <c I holds since pJ  pI (the former has an empty extent while the
latter has extent f1g) and J and I do not agree on c since J and I disagree on p. On
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the other hand, K <c I does not hold since pK 6 pI (the former has extent f2g while
the latter has extent f1g). Finally, L <c I does not hold since L and I do not agree
on the constant q which is not in c.
The reduct F I of a formula F relative to an interpretation I is the formula obtained
from F by replacing every maximal subformula that is not satised by I with ?
(falsity).
Denition 1 For any interpretation I of , I is called an answer set of F if
 I satises F , and
 every interpretation J of  such that J <c I does not satisfy F I .
Example 3 For example, consider a box initially at l1 which stays at its current location
by default. This can be represented as (where L is a variable ranging over locations l1 and
l2)
at(box; 0; l1) ^ Choice(at(box; 1; L)) at(box; 0; L)):
where Choice(at(box; 1; L)) is an abbreviation for ((at(box; 1; L)_:at(box; 1; L)). Although
this is a tautology in classical logic, in the answer set semantics, this can be used to describe
default behaviors. This will be explained in more detail in Section 5.2. We consider the
ground version F of this:
at(box; 0; l1)^
((at(box; 1; l1) _ :at(box; 1; l1))  at(box; 0; l1))^
((at(box; 1; l2) _ :at(box; 1; l2))  at(box; 0; l2))
We consider the interpretation I1 such that at(box; 0; l1)
I1 = t and at(box; 1; l1)I1 = t (and
all other atoms are interpreted as f). Clearly I1 satises F so we then form the reduct F
I1:
at(box; 0; l1)^
((at(box; 1; l1) _ ?)  at(box; 0; l1))^
((? _ :?)  ?)
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If we take c to be fatg, we can see that there is no interpretation J <c I1 that satises F I1.
Thus, I1 is an answer set.
On the other hand, if we consider I2 such that at(box; 0; l1)
I2 = t and at(box; 1; l2)I2 = t
(and all other atoms are interpreted as f), we can see that I2 satises F . We then form
the reduct F I2:
at(box; 0; l1)^
((? _ :?)  at(box; 0; l1))^
((at(box; 1; l2) _ ?)  ?)
and then we can see that the interpretation J such that at(box; 0; l1)J = t (and all other
atoms are interpreted as f) is an interpretation such that J <c I2 and J satises F
I2.
Thus, I2 is not an answer set.
3.2 First Order Stable Model Semantics
We review the stable model semantics as dened in Ferraris et al. (2011) which
presents an extension to the stable model semantics to rst-order logic. This extension
is dened in terms of second-order logic, where we have quantiers over function and
predicate variables in addition to the quantiers over object variables as in rst-order
logic.
Formulas are built the same as in rst-order logic. A signature consists of function
constants and predicate constants. Function constants of arity 0 are called object
constants. We assume the following set of primitive propositional connectives and
quantiers:
? (falsity); ^; _; !; 8; 9 :
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We understand :F as an abbreviation of F ! ?; symbol > stands for ? ! ?, and
F $ G stands for (F ! G) ^ (G! F ).
For predicate symbols (constants or variables) u and c, we dene u  c as
8x(u(x) ! c(x)). For two lists of predicate symbols u and c, we dene u  c
as the conjunction of u  c for each u 2 u and the corresponding c 2 c. We then
dene u < c as u  c ^ :(c  u).
Let c be a list of distinct predicate constants and let bc be a list of distinct predicate
variables corresponding to c 1 . We call members of c intensional predicates. We
dene SM[F ; c] as
F ^ :9bc(bc < c ^ F (bc));
where F (bc) is dened as follows:
 When F is an atomic formula, F  is F 0, where F 0 is obtained from F by replacing
every intensional predicate in it with the corresponding predicate variables;
 (F ^G) = F  ^G; (F _G) = F  _G;
 (F ! G) = (F  ! G) ^ (F ! G);
 (8xF ) = 8xF ; (9xF ) = 9xF .
Example 3 continued For example, when F is
at(box; 0; l1) ^ ((at(box; 1; L) _ :at(box; 1; L)) at(box; 0; L));
1That is to say, d and bc have the same length and the corresponding members have the same
arity.
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as before, then F (bat) is 2
bat(box; 0; l1) ^ (
( (at(box; 1; L) _ :at(box; 1; L)) at(box; 0; L) )^
( (bat(box; 1; L) _ (:at(box; 1; L) ^ :bat(box; 1; L))) bat(box; 0; L) ) ):
When F is a sentence, the models of SM[F ; c] are called the c-stable models of F .
They are the models of F that are \stable" on c. We often drop the list of constants
when c is the entire signature.
Example 3 continued Consider I1 and I2 from before. I1 j= SM[F ; at] while
I2 6j= SM[F ; at]. Thus, I1 is a stable model of F but I2 is not.
3.3 Constraint Answer Set Programming
A constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) is a tuple (V;D;C), where V is a set of
constraint variables with the respective domains D, and C is a set of constraints that
specify legal assignments of values in the domains to the constraint variables.
A constraint answer set program with a constraint satisfaction problem (V;D;C)
is a set of rules of the form
a B;N;Cn; (3.1)
where a is a propositional atom or ?, B is a set of positive propositional literals, N is
a set of negative propositional literals, and Cn is a set of constraints from C, possibly
preceded by not.
2 Recall :at(box; 1; L) is an abbreviation for at(box; 1; L) ! ? so that (:at(box; 1; L))( bat) is
(at(box; 1; L)! ?)^ ( bat(box; 1; L)! ?), which we then abbreviate as :at(box; 1; L)^: bat(box; 1; L)
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For any signature  that consists of object constants and propositional constants,
we identify an interpretation I of  as the tuple hIf ; Xi, where If is the restriction
of I on the object constants in , and X is a set of propositional constants in  that
are true under I.
Given a constraint answer set program  with (V;D;C), and an interpretation
I = hIf ; Xi, we dene the constraint reduct of  relative to X and If (denoted by
X
If
) as the set of rules a  B for each rule (11.1) is in  such that If j= Cn, and
X j= N . We say that a set X of propositional atoms is a constraint answer set of 
relative to If if X is a minimal model of X
If
.
Consider the water level example mentioned in the introduction. By default, the
water level will stay the same but if the input valve is open, the water level will
increase by 1 unit per time unit and if the output valve is open, the water level will
decrease by 2 units per time unit (and if both are open, the water level will decrease
by 1 unit per time unit).
Notice that object constants cannot appear in the heads of rules. In addition, the
notion of answer set is dened using minimality only w.r.t. propositional atoms. Due
to these restrictions, representing this domain using functions must be done either
in a way that is not elaboration tolerant or using auxiliary abnormality atoms. The
former is illustrated below:
?  : inputOpen;: outputOpen;:(amount1=amount0)
?  inputOpen;: outputOpen;:(amount1+1=amount0)
?  : inputOpen; outputOpen;:(amount1+2=amount0)
?  inputOpen; outputOpen;:(amount1 1=amount0)
Now if we wanted to elaborate on this domain by introducing a second input valve,
this would require modifying all four of these rules and adding four more rules to
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handle all eight congurations of the valves.
3.4 Satisability Modulo Theories
Formally, an SMT instance is a formula in many-sorted rst-order logic, where
some designated function and predicate constants are constrained by some xed back-
ground interpretation. SMT is the problem of determining whether such a formula
has a model that expands the background interpretation Barrett et al. (2009).
Let bg be the (many-sorted) signature of the background theory bg. An interpre-
tation of bg is called a background interpretation if it satises the background theory.
For instance, in the theory of reals, we assume that bg contains the set R of sym-
bols for all real numbers, the set of arithmetic functions over real numbers, and the
set f<;>;;g of binary predicates over real numbers. Background interpretations
interpret these symbols in the standard way.
Let  be a signature that is disjoint from bg. We say that an interpretation I
of  satises F w.r.t. the background theory bg, denoted by I j=bg F , if there is a
background interpretation J of bg that has the same universe as I, and I[J satises
F . For any SMT sentence F with background theory bg, interpretation I is a model
of F (w.r.t. background theory bg) if I j=bg F .
Example 4 Consider the formula F
8x(f = x! 9y(y  y = x))
and consider the interpretations I1 and I2 such that f
I1 = 1 and f I2 = 2 and where
the universe is the set of real numbers. Now consider the background theory real that
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is dened as standard arithmetic over reals. We have I1 j=real F and I2 j=real F
(since
p
2  p2 = 2).
Now, take interpretations J1 and J2 such that f
J1 = 1 and fJ2 = 2 where the
universe is the set of integers. Now consider the background theory integer that is
dened as standard arithmetic over reals. We have I1 j=integer F but I2 6j=integer F .
It should be stressed that these background theories can be quite general; aside
from integers, rationals, and reals, SMT can have background theories over bit-
vectors, lists, and arrays to name a few. This generality has led to the use of SMT
solvers in software engineering applications such as static program analysis Moy et al.
(2009), fuzz testing Bounimova et al. (2013), and program verication Ge et al. (2007).
3.5 Lifschitz Semantics of Intensional Functions
We consider rules of the form
H  B; (3.2)
where H and B are formulas that do not contain !. We identify a rule with the
universal closure of the implication B ! H. An IF-program is a nite list of those
rules.
An occurrence of a symbol in a formula F is negated if it belongs to a subformula
of F that begins with negation, and is non-negated otherwise. Let F be a formula,
let f be a list of distinct function constants, and let bf be a list of distinct function
variables corresponding to f .
By F (bf) we denote the formula obtained from F by replacing each non-negated
occurrence of a member of f with the corresponding function variable in bf . By
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IF[F ;f ] we denote the second-order sentence
F ^ :9bf(bf 6= f ^ F (bf)):
According to Lifschitz (2012), the f -stable models of an IF-program  are dened as
the models of IF[F ;f ], where F is the FOL-representation of .
An unexpected property of this extension is that stable models may map functions
to constants not occurring anywhere in the formula. This is unexpected in the light
of the rationality principle Gelfond and Kahl (2014) of the stable model semantics
which states \Believe nothing you are not forced to believe". For example, consider
the formula c = 1! ?. The interpretation I of signature fcg such that jIj = f1; 2g
and cI = 2 is a stable model under the Lifschitz semantics despite 2 not occurring in
the formula.
3.6 Cabalar Semantics
3.6.1 Partial Interpretations
Before formally reviewing the semantics for intensional functions from Cabalar
(2011), we rst dene the notions of partial interpretations and partial satisfaction.
We dene the notion of a partial interpretation as follows. Given a rst-order
signature  comprised of function and predicate constants, a partial interpretation I
of  consists of
 a non-empty set jIj, called the universe of I;
 for every function constant f of arity n, a function f I from (jIj [ fug)n to
jIj [ fug, where u is not in jIj (\u" stands for undened);
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 for every predicate constant p of arity n, a function pI from (jIj [ fug)n to
f1; 0g.
For each term f(t1; : : : ; tn), we dene
f(t1; : : : ; tn)
I =
8><>: u if t
I
i = u for some i 2 f1; : : : ; ng;
f I(tI1; : : : ; t
I
n) otherwise.
The satisfaction relation j=
p
between a partial interpretation I and a rst-order
formula F is the same as the one for rst-order logic except for the following base
cases:
 For each atomic formula p(t1; : : : ; tn),
p(t1; : : : ; tn)
I =
8><>: 0 if t
I
i = u for some i 2 f1; : : : ; ng;
pI(tI1; : : : ; t
I
n) otherwise.
 For each atomic formula t1 = t2,
(t1 = t2)
I =
8><>: 1 if t
I
1 6= u, tI2 6= u, and tI1 = tI2;
0 otherwise.
We say that I j=
p
F if F I = 1.
Observe that under a partial interpretation, t = t is not necessarily true: I 6j=
p
t = t
i tI = u. On the other hand, :(t1 = t2), also denoted by t1 6= t2, is true under I
even when both tI1 and t
I
2 are mapped to the same u.
3.6.2 Cabalar Semantics Denition
The Cabalar semantics was originally dened in Cabalar (2011) in terms of a
modication to equilibrium logic.
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Given any two partial interpretations J and I of the same signature , and a set
of constants c, we write J c I if
 J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants not in c;
 pJ  pI for all predicate constants in c; and
 fJ() = u or fJ() = f I() for all function constants in c and all lists  of
elements in the universe.
We write J c I if J c I but not I c J . Note that J c I is dened similar
to J <c I (Section 3.1) except for the treatment of functions. Note that the third
condition means essentially undened functions are \smaller" than dened functions.
Example 5 Consider four partial interpretations I; J;K; L with universe f1; 2g and
signature  = fp; q; fg where p and q are unary predicates and f is a unary function.
Let c be fp; fg. When
pI = f1g; qI = f1g; f I = 1
pJ = ;; qJ = f1g; fJ = u
pK = f1g; qK = f1g; fK = 2
pL = f1g; qL = f2g; fL = 1
we can see that J c I holds since pK  pI (the former has an empty extent while
the latter has extent f1g) and fJ = u. However, I c J does not hold since f I 6= fJ
and f I 6= u. Thus J c I. Similarly, K c I does not hold since fJ 6= f I and
fJ 6= u. On the other hand, L c I does not hold since L and I do not agree on the
constant q which is not in c.
A PHT-interpretation (\Partial HT-interpretation") I of signature  is a tuple
hIh; Iti such that Ih and It are partial interpretations of  that have the same
universe.
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The satisfaction relation j=
pht
between a PHT-interpretation I, a world w 2 fh; tg
ordered by h < t , and a rst-order sentence F of the signature  is dened recursively:
 If F is an atomic formula, I; w j=
pht
F if Iw j=
p
F ;
 I; w j=
pht
F ^G if I; w j=
pht
F and I; w j=
pht
G;
 I; w j=
pht
F _G if I; w j=
pht
F or I; w j=
pht
G;
 I; w j=
pht
F ! G if, for every world w0 such that w  w0, I; w0 6j=
pht
F or I; w0 j=
pht
G;
 I; w j=
pht
8xF (x) if, for every  2 jIj; I; w j=
pht
F ();
 I; w j=
pht
9xF (x) if, for some  2 jIj; I; w j=
pht
F ().
We say that an HT-interpretation I satises F , written as I j=
pht
F , if I; h j=
pht
F .
A PHT-interpretation I = hI; Ii of signature  is a partial equilibrium model of a
sentence F relative to c if
 hI; Ii j=
pht
F , and
 for every partial interpretation J such that J c I, we have hJ; Ii 6j=
pht
F .
Example 3 continued Consider again the formula describing the inertia of a box.
Take I1 = hI1; I1i and I2 = hI2; I2i where I1 and I2 are from before. Relative to at,
we can see that I1 is a partial equilibrium model while I2 is not. To show that I1
is a partial equilibrium model we consider the three partial interpretation J1, J2, J3
that are such that Ji at I1. These interpretations agree with I1 except
 at(box; 0; l1)J1 = u;
 at(box; 1; l1)J2 = u;
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 at(box; 0; l1)J3 = u and at(box; 1; l1)J3 = u.
hJ1; I1i and hJ3; I1i both fail to satisfy at(box; 0; l1) while hJ2; I1i fails to satisfy
((at(box; 1; l1) _ :at(box; 1; l1))  at(box; 0; l1)). Thus, I1 is a partial equilibrium
model.
On the other hand, if we consider J4 that agrees with I2 except that at(box; 1; l2)
J4 =
u (so that J4 at I2), then we see that hI2; J4i j=pht F and so I2 is not a partial equi-
librium model.
3.7 Balduccini Semantics
Let us restrict a signature  to be comprised of a set of intensional function and
predicate constants denoted c as well as a set of non-intensional object constants
 n c.
In Balduccini (2012), Balduccini considered terms to have the form f(c1; : : : ; ck)
where f is an intensional function constant (in c), and each ci is a non-intensional
object constant (in  n c). He considered an atom to be an expression p(c1; : : : ; ck)
where p is an intensional predicate constant, and each ci is a non-intensional object
constant; a t-atom is an expression of the form f=g where f is a term and g is either
a term or a non-intensional object constant; a seed t-atom is a t-atom of the form
f = c where c is a non-intensional object constant. A t-literal is a t-atom f = g or
(f = g), where  denotes strong negation 3 . A seed literal is an atom a, or a,
or a seed t-atom. A literal is an atom a, or a, or a t-literal. An ASPffg program
3The concept of strong negation is dierent from default negation. Intuitively, A represents
that A is false while :A represents that A is not known to be true. This will be explained in greater
detail in Section 6.3.
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consists of rules of the form
h l1; : : : ; lm; not lm+1; : : : ; not ln ; (3.3)
where h is a seed literal or ?, and each li is a literal. An ASPffg program is a nite
set of rules. We identify rule (3.3) with an implication
l1 ^    ^ lm ^ :lm+1 ^    ^ :ln ! h ;
and an ASPffg program as the conjunction of each implication corresponding to a
rule in the program. Note that ASPffg programs do not contain variables.
A set I of seed literals is said to be consistent if it contains no pair of an atom a
and its strong negation a; and contains no pair of seed t-atoms t = c1 and t = c2
such that c1 6= c2. It is clear that any subset of a consistent set of seed literals is
consistent as well.
The notion of satisfaction between a consistent set I of seed literals and literals is
denoted by j=
b
and is dened as follows.
 For a seed literal l, I j=
b
l if l 2 I;
 For a non-seed literal f = g, I j=
b
f = g if I contains both f = c and g = c for
some object constant c;
 For a non-seed literal (f = g), I j=
b
(f = g) if I contains both f = c1 and
g=c2 for some object constants c1 and c2 such that c1 6= c2.
This notion of satisfaction is extended to formulas allowing ^, : and as in classical
logic.
The reduct of an ASPffg program  relative to a consistent set I of seed literals
is denoted I and is dened as
I = fh l1 : : : ; lm j (3.3) 2  and I j= :lm+1 ^    ^ :lng :
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I is called a Balduccini answer set of  if
 I j=
b
I , and,
 for every proper subset J of I, we have J 6j=
b
I .
Example 3 continued Consider again the example of describing the inertia of
a box. Since the head of a rule must be a seed literal or ?, we express this as the
program 
at(box; 0) = l1
at(box; 1) = l1 at(box; 0) = l1;: at(box; 1) = l1
at(box; 1) = l2 at(box; 0) = l2;: at(box; 1) = l2
Recall the interpretations I1 and I2 from before; I1 is such that at(box; 0; l1)
I1 = t and
at(box; 1; l1)I1 = t while I2 is such that at(box; 0; l1)
I2 = t and at(box; 1; l2)I2 = t.
So we consider the corresponding sets J1 = fat(box; 0) = l1; at(box; 1) = l1g and
J2 = fat(box; 0) = l1; at(box; 1) = l2g.
The reduct J1 is
at(box; 0) = l1
at(box; 1) = l1 at(box; 0) = l1:
It is clear that J1 j=b J1 . For any subset K of J1 we have that K 6j=b I1 so I1 is a
Balduccini answer set of .
The reduct J2 is
at(box; 0) = l1
at(box; 1) = l2 at(box; 0) = l2:
It is clear that J1 j=b J2 . However, if we take K = fat(box; 0) = l1g, we see that
there is a subset K of J2 such that K j=b J2 and so J2 is not a Balduccini answer set
of .
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3.8 Multi-valued Propositional Formulas
The convenience of multi-valued propositional formulas for knowledge represen-
tation is demonstrated in the context of nonmonotonic causal theories and action
language C+ Giunchiglia et al. (2004). Multi-valued formulas serve as a simple but
useful special case of rst-order formulas for use in establishing some results and serve
as the theoretical context for system MVSM described in Chapter 9.
A multi-valued signature is a set  of symbols called constants, along with a nite
set Dom(c) of symbols that is disjoint from  and contains at least two elements,
assigned to each constant c. We call Dom(c) the domain of c. A multi-valued atom
of  is ?, or an expression of the form c=v (\the value of c is v") where c 2 
and v 2 Dom(c). A multi-valued formula of  is a propositional combination of
multi-valued atoms.
A multi-valued interpretation of  is a function that maps every element of 
to an element in its domain. We often identify an interpretation with the set of
atoms of  that are satised by I. A multi-valued interpretation I satises an atom
c=v (symbolically, I j= c=v) if I(c) = v. The satisfaction relation is extended from
atoms to arbitrary formulas according to the usual truth tables for the propositional
connectives. We say that I is a model of F if it satises F .
An expression of the form c=d, where both c and d are constants, will be under-
stood as an abbreviation for the formula_
v2Dom(c)\Dom(d)
(c=v ^ d=v): (3.4)
Let F be a multi-valued formula of signature , and let I be a multi-valued
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interpretation of . The reduct of F relative to I (denoted F I ) is the formula obtained
from F by replacing each (maximal) subformula that is not satised by I with ?. We
call I a multi-valued stable model of F if I is the only multi-valued interpretation
of  that satises F I .
Example 6 Take  = fcg and Dom(c) = f1; 2; 3g, and let F be
c=1 _ :(c=1); (3.5)
and let Ii (i = 1; 2; 3) be the interpretation that maps c to i. All three interpretations
satisfy (3.5), but I1 is the only stable model of F : the reduct F
I1 is c= 1 _ ?, and
I1 is the only model of the reduct; the reduct of F1 relative to other interpretations is
? _ :?, which does not have a unique model.
If we conjoin c=2 with (3.5), we can check that the only stable model is fc=2g.
3.9 Partial Multi-valued Propositional Formulas
In this section we introduce a variant of the stable model semantics in the previous
section, which allows multi-valued propositional constants to be mapped to nothing.
This is essentially a simple special case of the semantics in Cabalar 2011, and later
in Balduccini 2013, which allows functions to be partially dened. In other words,
interpretations are allowed to leave some constants undened. By complete inter-
pretations, we mean a special case of partial interpretations where all constants are
dened. Complete interpretations can be identied with classical (\total") interpre-
tations.
We consider the same syntax of a multi-valued formula as in the previous section.
As with total interpretations, a partial interpretation I satises an atom c = v if I(c)
is dened and is mapped to v. This implies that an interpretation that is undened
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on c does not satisfy any atom of the form c = w for any w 2 Dom(c). As before,
it is convenient to identify a partial interpretation I with the set of atoms of  that
are satised by this interpretation. For instance, an interpretation of  = fcg which
is undened on c is identied with the empty set. Again, the satisfaction relation is
extended from atoms to arbitrary formulas according to the usual truth tables for the
propositional connectives. We call I a model of F if it satises F .
The reduct F I is dened to be the same as before. We say that a partial inter-
pretation I is a partial multi-valued stable model of F if I satises F and no proper
subset J of I satises F I .
Example 6 continued
In this context, c=1 _ :(c=1) does not mean that c is mapped to 1 by default.
Instead, it means that c can be mapped to 1 or nothing at all. As before, the reduct
F I1 relative to I1 where I1 is fc=1g is c=1 _ ?, and I1 is the minimal model of the
reduct. 4 Further, the reduct F I0 relative to I0 where I0 is ; is ? _ :?, and I0 is
the minimal model of the reduct.
4Minimality is understood in terms of set inclusion.
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Chapter 4
FUNCTIONAL STABLE MODEL SEMANTICS
4.1 Reduct-Based Characterization
4.1.1 Innitary Ground Formulas and Grounding
We rst present the reduct-based characterization of the functional stable model
semantics. However, since we allow the universe to be innite, grounding a quantied
sentence introduces innite conjunctions and disjunctions over the elements in the
universe. Here we rely on the concept of grounding relative to an interpretation
from Truszczynski (2012). The following is the denition of an innitary ground
formula, which is adapted from Truszczynski (2012). One dierence is that we do not
replace ground terms with their corresponding object names, leaving them unchanged
during grounding. This change is necessary in dening a reduct for functional stable
model semantics. For each element  in the universe jIj of I, we introduce a new
symbol , called an object name. By I we denote the signature obtained from 
by adding all object names  as additional object constants. We will identify an
interpretation I of signature  with its extension to I dened by I() = . 1
We assume the primary connectives to be ?, fg^, fg_, and!. Propositional con-
nectives ^;_;:;> are considered as shorthands: F ^G as fF;Gg^; F _G as fF;Gg_.
: and > are dened as before.
1For details, see Lifschitz et al. (2008).
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Let A be the set of all ground atomic formulas of signature I . The sets F0;F1; : : :
are dened recursively as follows:
 F0 = A [ f?g;
 Fi+1(i  0) consists of expressions H_ and H^, for all subsets H of F0[ : : :[Fi,
and of the expressions F ! G, where F;G 2 F0 [    [ Fi.
We dene LinfA =
S1
i=0Fi, and call elements of LinfA innitary ground formulas of 
w.r.t. I.
For any interpretation I of  and any innitary ground formula F w.r.t. I, the
denition of satisfaction, I j= F , is as follows:
 For atomic formulas, the denition of satisfaction is the same as in the standard
rst-order logic;
 I j= H_ if there is a formula G 2 H such that I j= G;
 I j= H^ if, for every formula G 2 H, I j= G;
 I j= G! H if I 6j= G or I j= H.
Example 7 Consider a domain that is comprised of a bucket that has a leak and ini-
tially contains some amount of water. By default, the bucket will lose one unit of water
at each timepoint. If we consider ten timepoints, then we have  = fbucket0; : : : ; bucket9g.
Let F be the innite set of ground formulas fbucket0 = i : i 2 Ng. By F_, we
can represent that the bucket initially contains some amount of water.
Let Gi be the innite set of ground formulas fbucketi = j+1! bucketi+1 = j : j 2
Ng. By G^i we can represent that from timepoint i to timepoint i+1, the bucket loses
one unit of water. Then, if we let H be the nite set of sets fGi : i 2 f0; : : : ; 8gg, we
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can represent this behavior for every timepoint by H^. Thus, we can represent this
domain as fF_;H^g^.
Consider the interpretation I such that jIj = N and bucket0 = 15, bucket1 = 14,
: : : , bucket9 = 6.
 First, we see that I j= F_ since I j= bucket0 = i where i = 15.
 Then, we can see that I j= G0 since I j= bucket0 = j + 1 ! bucket1 = j for
every j 2 N ; for every j 6= 14, I 6j= bucket0 = j+1 and so I vacuously satises
the implication, but when j = 14, we see that I j= bucket1 = 14 and so I j= G0.
 Similar arguments show that I j= Gi for each i 2 f1; : : : ; 8g and so we conclude
that I j= H^ and consequently, I j= fF_;H^g^.
Given a rst-order sentence F , and an interpretation I, by grI [F ] we denote the
innitary ground formula w.r.t. I that is obtained from F by the following process:
 If F is an atomic formula, grI [F ] is F ;
 grI [GH] = grI [G] grI [H] ( 2 f^;_;!g);
 grI [9xG(x)] = fgrI [G()] j  2 jIjg_;
 grI [8xG(x)] = fgrI [G()] j  2 jIjg^.
Example 7 continued Consider an elaboration to the bucket example where an
agent can ll up the bucket at time t where t 2 f0::8g with the action llUpt, which
restores the bucket to its maximum capacity{10{at the next timestep t+ 1. We can
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represent this domain with the rst-order formula F :
8y((amount1=y) _ :(amount1=y)  amount0=y+1)
8y((amount2=y) _ :(amount2=y)  amount1=y+1)
: : :
8y((amount9=y) _ :(amount9=y)  amount8=y+1)
amount1=10  llUp0
amount2=10  llUp1
: : :
amount9=10  llUp8
Now, consider an interpretation I such that the universe jIj = N . grI [F ] is the
following set of formulas.
(amount1=0) _ :(amount1=0)  amount0=0+1
(amount1=1) _ :(amount1=1)  amount0=1+1
(amount1=2) _ :(amount1=2)  amount0=2+1
: : :
(amount2=0) _ :(amount2=0)  amount1=0+1
(amount2=1) _ :(amount2=1)  amount1=1+1
(amount2=2) _ :(amount2=2)  amount1=2+1
: : :
amount1=10  llUp0
amount2=10  llUp1
: : :
amount9=10  llUp8
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4.1.2 Reduct-Based Characterization
Let F be any rst-order sentence of a signature , and let I be an interpretation
of .
For any two interpretations I, J of the same signature and any list c of distinct
predicate and function constants, we write J <c I if
 J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants not in c;
 pJ  pI for all predicate constants p in c; and
 J and I do not agree on c.
The dierence between the above denition and the denition in Section 3.1 is
only in that here, c is not restricted to contain only predicate constants.
Example 8 Consider four interpretations I; J;K; L with universe f1; 2g and signa-
ture  = fp; q; fg where p and q are unary predicates and f is a unary function. Let
c be fp; fg. When
pI = f1g; qI = f1g; f I = 1
pJ = f1g; qJ = f1g; fJ = 2
pK = ;; qK = f1g; fK = 1
pL = f1g; qL = f2g; fL = 1
we can see that J <c I holds since pJ  pI (both have an extent of f1g) and J and I
do not agree on c since f I 6= fJ . Similarly, K <c I holds since pK  pI (the former
has an empty extent while the latter has extent f1g) and K and I disagree on p. On
the other hand, L <c I does not hold since L and I do not agree on the constant q,
which is not in c.
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The reduct F I of an innitary ground formula F relative to an interpretation I is
dened as follows:
 For each atomic formula F , F I = F
 (H^)I = fGI j G 2 Hg^;
 (H_)I = fGI j G 2 Hg_;
 (G! H)I = ? if I 6j= G! H; otherwise (G! H)I = GI ! HI .
Similar to the denition in section 3.1, for any interpretation I of , I is an answer
set of of an innitary ground formula F i
 I satises F , and
 every interpretation J of  such that J <c I does not satisfy F I .
Example 7 continued For simplicity, let us consider the same domain but with
only two timesteps{0 and 1. Consider the interpretation I1 such that jI1j = N ,
amount I11 = 5, amount
I1
0 = 6, and llUp
I1
0 = f . The reduct (grI1 [F ])
I1 is
? _ :?  ?
? _ :?  ?
? _ :?  ?
: : :
(amount1=5) _ ?  amount0=5+1:
: : :
?  ?
which is equivalent to
(amount1=5) amount0=6: (4.1)
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No interpretation that is dierent from I1 only on amount1 satises the reduct.
On the other hand consider the interpretation I2 such that jI2j = N , amount I21 =
8, amount I20 = 6, and llUp
I2
0 = f , the reduct (grI2 [F ])
I2 is equivalent to
? _ :?  amount0=5+1;
or simply >, and we can nd another interpretation that is dierent from I2 only
on amount1 which satises the reduct. For example, take J such that jJ j = N ,
amountJ1 = 3, amount
J
0 = 6, and llUp
J
0 = f .
4.2 Second-Order Logic Characterization
We now present a characterization of the functional stable model semantics for
formulas which are built the same as in rst-order logic. A signature consists of
function constants and predicate constants. Function constants of arity 0 are called
object constants. We assume the following set of primitive propositional connectives
and quantiers:
? (falsity); ^; _; !; 8; 9 :
As before, we understand :F as an abbreviation of F ! ?, > as an abbreviation of
? ! ?, and F $ G as an abbreviation for (F ! G) ^ (G! F ).
Our characterization of these formulas uses second-order logic, where we have
quantiers over function and predicate variables in addition to the quantiers over
object variables as in rst-order logic. For predicate symbols (constants or variables)
u and c, we dene u  c as 8x(u(x) ! c(x)). We dene u = c as 8x(u(x) $ c(x))
if u and c are predicate symbols, and 8x(u(x) = c(x)) if they are function symbols.
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For lists of predicate symbols (constants or variables) u and c, we dene u  c
as the conjunction of u  c for each u 2 u and the corresponding c 2 c. We dene
u = c as the conjunction of u = c for each u 2 u and the corresponding c 2 c.
Let c be a list of distinct predicate and function constants and let bc be a list of
distinct predicate and function variables corresponding to c.
By cpred we mean the list of the predicate constants in c, and by bcpred the list of
the corresponding predicate variables in bc. We dene bc < c as
(bcpred  cpred) ^ :(bc = c)
and SM[F ; c] as
F ^ :9bc(bc < c ^ F (bc));
where F (bc) is dened as follows.
 When F is an atomic formula, F  is F 0 ^ F , where F 0 is obtained from F
by replacing all intensional (function and predicate) constants in it with the
corresponding (function and predicate) variables; 2
 (F ^G) = F  ^G; (F _G) = F  _G;
 (F ! G) = (F  ! G) ^ (F ! G);
 (8xF ) = 8xF ; (9xF ) = 9xF .
Example 7 continued If F is the formula
(amount1=Y ) _ :(amount1=Y )  amount0=Y +1
amount1=10  llUp
2If an atomic formula F contains no intensional function constants, then F  can be dened as
F 0, as in Ferraris et al. (2011).
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and c is famount1g then F (\amount1) is equivalent to 3
(amount1=Y ) _ :(amount1=Y )  amount0=Y +1
((amount1=Y ) ^ (\amount1)=Y )) _ :(amount1=Y )  amount0=Y +1
amount1=10  llUp
amount1=10 ^ \amount1=10  llUp
When F is a sentence, the models of SM[F ; c] are called the c-stable models of F .
They are the models of F that are \stable" on c.
Example 7 continued Consider interpretation I and I1 from before:
jI1j = N , amount I11 = 5, amount I10 = 6, llUpI1 = f , and
jI2j = N , amount I21 = 8, amount I20 = 6, llUpI2 = f .
I1 j= SM[F ; amount1] but I2 6j= SM[F ; amount1]:
The following theorem states the equivalence between this formulation and the
formulation in terms of grounding and reduct from the previous section.
Theorem 1 Let F be a rst-order sentence of signature  and let c be a list of
intensional constants. For any interpretation I of , I j= SM[F ; c] i
 I satises F , and
 every interpretation J such that J <c I does not satisfy (grI [F ])I .
If c contains predicate constants only, this denition of a stable model reduces to
the one in Ferraris et al. (2011). The denition of F  above is the same as in Ferraris
et al. (2011) except for the case when F is an atomic formula.
3Recall :(amount1 = Y ) is an abbreviation for amount1 = Y ! ? so that (:(amount1 =
Y ))(\amount1) is (amount1 = Y ! ?) ^ (amount1 = Y ^ \amount1 = Y ! ?) which is equiva-
lent to :(amount1=Y ) ^ (:(amount1=Y ) _ :(\amount1=Y )) or simply :( amount1=Y ).
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4.3 HT Logic Characterization
The functional stable model semantics can be reformulated in terms of a modi-
cation to equilibrium logic, similar to the way the Cabalar semantics Cabalar (2011)
is dened, which is reviewed in Section 3.6.2. Recharacterizing the semantics in a
way similar to the Cabalar semantics helps to see the relationship between the two
semantics, which is explored in detail in Chapter 10.
An FHT-interpretation (\Functional HT-interpretation") I of signature  is a
tuple hIh; Iti such that Ih and It are classical interpretations of  that have the
same universe. The satisfaction relation j=
fht
between an FHT-interpretation I, a
world w 2 fh; tg ordered by h < t, and a rst-order sentence of signature  is dened
in the same way as j=
pht
for PHT-interpretations in Section 3.6.2 except for the base
case:
 If F is an atomic formula, I; w j=
fht
F if, for every world w0 such that w  w0,
Iw0 j= F ;
 I; w j=
fht
F ^G if I; w j=
fht
F and I; w j=
fht
G;
 I; w j=
pht
F _G if I; w j=
fht
F or I; w j=
fht
G;
 I; w j=
fht
F ! G if, for every world w0 such that w  w0, we have I; w0 6j=
fht
F or I; w0 j=
fht
G;
 I; w j=
fht
8xF (x) if for each  2 jIj, we have I; w j=
fht
F ();
 I; w j=
fht
9xF (x) if for some  2 jIj, we have I; w j=
fht
F ().
We say that FHT-interpretation I satises F , written as I j=
fht
F , if I; h j=
fht
F .
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Example 9 Consider the formula F that is 8x(p(x)! q(x)). Now take an interpre-
tation I = hIh; Iti such that
p(1)I
h
= t p(1)I
t
= f
p(2)I
h
= f p(2)I
t
= t
q(1)I
h
= t q(1)I
t
= t
q(2)I
h
= f q(2)I
t
= t
We will see that I j=
fht
F or rather, I; h j=
fht
F . We must show both
 I; h j=
fht
p(1)! q(1). To verify this, we must show both
{ I; h 6j=
fht
p(1) or I; h j=
fht
q(1). This holds since It j= q(1) and Ih j= q(1)
and so we have I; h j=
fht
q(1).
{ I; t 6j=
fht
p(1) or I; t j=
fht
q(1) (recall h < t). This holds since It j= q(1) and
so we have I; t j=
fht
q(1).
 I; h j=
fht
p(2)! q(2). To verify this, we must show both
{ I; h 6j=
fht
p(2) or I; h j=
fht
q(2). This holds since Ih 6j= p(2) and so we
have I; h 6j=
fht
p(2). Note, in this case, we do not have I; h j=
fht
q(2) since
Ih 6j= q(2).
{ I; t 6j=
fht
p(2) or I; t j=
fht
q(2). This holds since It j= q(2) and so we
have I; t j=
fht
q(2). Note, in this case, we do not have I; t 6j=
fht
p(2) since
It j= p(2).
The following theorem 4 asserts the correctness of the reformulation of the Func-
4Recall the denition of J <c I from section 4.1
 J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants not in c;
 pJ  pI for all predicate constants p in c; and
 J and I do not agree on c.
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tional Stable Model semantics in terms of equilibrium logic style.
Theorem 2 Let F be a rst-order sentence of signature  and let c be a list of
predicate and function constants. For any interpretation I of , I j= SM[F ; c] i
 hI; Ii j=
fht
F , and
 for every interpretation J of  such that J <c I, we have hJ; Ii 6j=
fht
F .
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4.4 Proofs
4.4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We will often use the following notation throughout this section. Let  be a rst-
order signature, let c be a set of constants that is a subset of , and let d be a set
of constants not belonging to  corresponding to c. 5 Jcd denotes the interpretation
of signature ( n c) [ d obtained from J by replacing every constant from c with the
corresponding constant from d. For two interpretations I and J of  that agree on
all constants in  n c, we dene Jcd [ I to be the interpretation from the extended
signature  [ d such that
 Jcd [ I agrees with I on all constants in c;
 Jcd [ I agrees with Jcd on all constants in d;
 Jcd [ I agrees with both I and J on all constants in  n c.
Lemma 1 For any sentence F of signature  and any interpretations I and J of ,
(a) if Jcd [ I j= F (d), then I j= F .
(b) if hJ; Ii j=
fht
F , then hI; Ii j=
fht
F .
Proof. by induction on F .
Lemma 2 Let F be a sentence of signature , and let I and J be interpretations of
 such that J <c I. We have Jcd [ I j= F (d) i J j= grI [F ]I .
5That is to say, d and c have the same length and the corresponding members are either predicate
constants of the same arity or function constants of the same arity.
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Proof. By induction on F .
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. Then F (d) is F (d) ^ F , where F (d) is obtained
from F by replacing the members of c with the corresponding members of d. Consider
the following subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j= F . Then Jcd[I 6j= F (d). Further, grI [F ]I = ?, so J 6j= grI [F ]I .
 Subcase 2: I j= F . Then Jcd [ I j= F (d) i Jcd j= F (d) i J j= F . Further,
grI [F ]
I = F , so J j= grI [F ]I i J j= F .
Case 2: F is G^H or G_H. The claim follows immediately from I.H. on G and H.
Case 3: F is G ! H. Then F (d) = (G(d) ! H(d)) ^ (G ! H). Consider the
following subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j= G! H. Then Jcd [ I 6j= F (d). Further, grI [F ]I = ?, which J
does not satisfy.
 Subcase 2: I j= G ! H. Then Jcd [ I j= F (d) i Jcd [ I j= G(d) ! H(d).
On the other hand, grI [F ]
I = grI [G]
I ! grI [H]I so this case holds by I.H. on
G and H.
Case 4: F is 9xG(x). By I.H., Jcd[I j= G()(d) i J j= grI [G()]I for each  2 jIj.
The claim follows immediately.
Case 5: F is 8xG(x). Similar to Case 4.
Lemma 3 For any interpretations I and J of signature , we have Jcd [ I j= d < c
i J <c I.
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Proof. Recall that by denition, d < c is
(dpred  cpred) ^ :(d = c);
and by denition, J <c I is
 J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants not in c;
 pJ  pI for all predicate constants p in c; and
 J and I do not agree on c.
First, by denition of Jcd [ I, J and I have the same universe and agree on all
constants in  n c.
Second, by denition, Jcd [ I j= dpred  cpred i, for every predicate constant p in
c,
Jcd [ I j= 8x(p(x)cd ! p(x)); 6
which is equivalent to saying that (pcd)
Jcd[I  pJcd[I . Since I does not interpret any
constant from d, and Jcd does not interpret any constant from c, this is equivalent to
(pcd)
Jcd  pI and further to pJ  pI .
Third, since I does not interpret any constant from d and Jcd does not interpret
any constant from c, Jcd [ I j= :(d = c) is equivalent to saying J and I do not agree
on c.
Theorem 1 Let F be a rst-order sentence of signature  and c be a list of intensional
constants. For any interpretation I of , I j= SM[F ; c] i
 I satises F , and
6p(x)cd means the atom that is obtained from p(x) by replacing p with the corresponding member
of d if p 2 c, and no change otherwise.
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 every interpretation J such that J <c I does not satisfy (grI [F ])I .
Proof. I j= SM[F ; c] is by denition
I j= F ^ :9bc(bc < c ^ F (bc)): (4.2)
The rst item, \I satises F", is equivalent to the rst conjunctive term of (4.2).
By Lemma 16 and Lemma 3, the second item, \no interpretation J of  such that
J <c I satises grI [F ]
I", is equivalent to the second conjunctive term in (4.2).
4.4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 4 Let F be a sentence of signature  and let I and J be interpretations of 
such that J <c I. We have J j= grI [F ]I i hJ; Ii j=fht F .
Proof. By induction on F .
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. grI [F ] is F .
 Subcase 1: I 6j= F . Then grI [F ]I is ?, which J does not satisfy. Further, since
hJ; Ii; t 6j=
fht
F , hJ; Ii 6j=
fht
F .
 Subcase 2: I j= F . Then grI [F ]I is F , and hJ; Ii; t j=fht F . It is clear that J j= F
i hJ; Ii; h j=
fht
F .
Case 2: F is G^H or G_H. The claim follows immediately from I.H. on G and H.
Case 3: F is G! H. Consider the following subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j= G ! H. Then grI [G ! H]I is ?, which J does not satisfy.
Further, hI; Ii 6j=
fht
G! H. By Lemma 1 (b), hJ; Ii 6j=
fht
G! H.
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 Subcase 2: I j= G! H. Then grI [G! H]I is equivalent to grI [G]I ! grI [H]I .
Further, hJ; Ii j=
fht
G ! H is equivalent to hJ; Ii 6j=
fht
G or hJ; Ii j=
fht
H. Then
the claim follows from I.H. on G and H.
Case 4: F is 8xG(x), or 9xG(x). By induction on G() for each  in the universe.
Theorem 2 Let F be a rst-order sentence of signature  and c be a list of predicate
and function constants. For any interpretation I of , I j= SM[F ; c] i
 hI; Ii j=
fht
F , and
 for any interpretation J of  such that J <c I, we have hJ; Ii 6j=
fht
F .
Proof. We use Theorem 1 to refer to the reduct-based reformulation and instead
show
 I satises F , and
 every interpretation J such that J <c I does not satisfy (grI [F ])I .
i
 hI; Ii j=
fht
F , and
 for any interpretation J of  such that J <c I, we have hJ; Ii 6j=
fht
F .
Clearly, I j= F i hI; Ii j=
fht
F . By Lemma 4, for every interpretation J such that
J <c I, we have J 6j= (grI [F ])I i hJ; Ii 6j=fht F .
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Chapter 5
PROPERTIES OF THE FUNCTIONAL STABLE MODEL SEMANTICS
5.1 Constraints
Following Ferraris et al. (2009), we say that an occurrence of a constant, or any
other subexpression, in a formula F is positive if the number of implications containing
that occurrence in the antecedent is even, and negative otherwise. We say that the
occurrence is strictly positive if the number of implications in F containing that
occurrence in the antecedent is 0. For example, in :(f = 1)! g = 1, the occurrences
of f and g are both positive 1 , but only the occurrence of g is strictly positive.
We say that a formula F is negative on a list c of predicate and function con-
stants if members of c have no strictly positive occurrences in F . We say that F
is a constraint if it has no strictly positive occurrences of any constant. Clearly, a
constraint is negative on any list of constants. For instance, a formula of the form
:H is a constraint.
Theorem 3 For any rst-order formulas F and G, if G is negative on c, SM[F ^G; c]
is equivalent to SM[F ; c] ^G.
Example 10 Consider a formula F
(f = 1 _ g = 1) ^ (f = 2 _ g = 2)
whose stable models are ff = 1; g = 2g and ff = 2; g = 1g. Now, to nd the
stable models of F ^ :(f = 1), we observe that since :(f = 1) is negative on ff; gg,
1Recall that :(f = 1) is an abbreviation for f = 1! ?.
47
according to Theorem 3, SM[F ^:(f = 1); fg] is equivalent to SM[F ; fg]^:(f = 1),
which leaves only ff = 2; g = 1g as a stable model.
5.2 Choice and Defaults
Similar to Theorem 2 from Ferraris et al. (2011), the theorem below shows that
making the set of intensional constants smaller can only make the result of applying
SM weaker, and that this can be compensated by adding \choice formulas." For any
predicate constant p, by Choice(p) we denote the formula 8x(p(x) _ :p(x)), where
x is a list of distinct object variables. For any function constant f , by Choice(f) we
denote the formula 8xy((f(x) = y) _ :(f(x) = y)), where y is an object variable that
is distinct from x. For any nite list of predicate and function constants c, Choice(c)
stands for the conjunction of the formulas Choice(c) for all members c of c.
Theorem 4 For any rst-order formula F and any disjoint lists c, d of distinct
constants, the following formulas are logically valid:
SM[F ; cd]! SM[F ; c];
SM[F ^ Choice(d); cd]$ SM[F ; c]:
For example, the formula g=1! f =1 has only one f -stable model{ff = 1; g =
1g. By Theorem 4, SM[g=1! f=1; f ] is equivalent to
SM[(g=1! f=1) ^ Choice(g); fg]
or rather
SM[(g=1! f=1) ^ 8y(g=y _ :(g=y)); fg]
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which has only ff = 1; g = 1g as a model. This allows capturing the notion of the
c-stable models without having to refer to the list of intensional constants, instead
encoding this notion in the formula directly.
5.3 Strong Equivalence
Strong equivalence Lifschitz et al. (2001) is an important notion that allows us to
substitute one subformula for another subformula without aecting the stable models.
The theorem on strong equivalence can be extended to formulas with intensional
functions as follows.
About rst-order formulas F and G we say that F is strongly equivalent to G if,
for any formula H, any occurrence of F in H, and any list c of distinct predicate and
function constants, SM[H; c] is equivalent to SM[H 0; c], where H 0 is obtained from H
by replacing the occurrence of F by G. In this denition, H is allowed to contain
function and predicate constants that do not occur in F , G; Theorem 5 below shows,
however, that this is not essential.
Theorem 5 Let F and G be rst-order formulas, let c be the list of all constants
occurring in F or G and let bc be a list of distinct predicate and function variables
corresponding to c. The following conditions are equivalent to each other.
 F and G are strongly equivalent to each other;
 Formula
(F $ G) ^ (bc < c! (F (bc)$ G(bc)))
is logically valid.
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According to the theorem, formula fFg (shorthand for F _:F ) is strongly equiv-
alent to ::F ! F . This allows us to rewrite the formula representing inertia in
Example 7
(amount1=Y ) _ :(amount1=Y )  amount0=Y +1
as
(amount1=Y ) ::(amount1=Y ) ^ amount0=Y +1:
This is useful for putting formulas in a standard form called Clark Normal Form,
which is necessary for extending the Theorem on Completion from Ferraris et al.
(2011) to our semantics. This is discussed in detail later in Section 5.5.
5.4 Splitting Theorem
For more complex formulas, it would be convenient to break the formula into sep-
arate smaller formulas for readability, modularity, and even eciency of computation.
However, arbitrarily breaking up a formula does not necessarily result in stable mod-
els that can then be composed to obtain the stable models of the original formula.
Example 11 We will consider two possibilities:
 Simply taking the stable models with respect to all function constants in the
signature common to both of the smaller formulas, and
 Taking the common stable models with respect to only function constants in the
signature that appear in the head of a rule common.
Consider the formula F that is
(f = 1 g = 1) ^ g = 1
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which has one stable model: ff = 1; g = 1g. However, if we utilize the rst option
and break the formula into
(f = 1 g = 1)
and
g = 1
The former has no stable models w.r.t. f; g and so there are no common stable models.
This demonstrates that the rst method is incorrect.
Consider the formula G that is
(f = 1 g = 1) ^ (g = 1 f = 1)
which has no stable models w.r.t. f; g. However, if we utilize the second option and
break the formula into
(f = 1 g = 1)
and
(g = 1 f = 1)
we obtain a common stable model (w.r.t. f for the rst and g for the second): ff =
1; g = 1g. This illustrates that the second method is incorrect.
The second approach described in the example does work for the rst example
where there is no cyclic dependency among the function constants. In fact, it is
precisely this notion that we will formally capture to ensure that the second approach
will allow splitting the formula.
Denition 2 Let f be a function constant. A rst-order formula is called f -plain 2
if each atomic formula
2The notion of f -plain comes from Lifschitz and Yang (2011).
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 does not contain f , or
 is of the form f(t) = u where t is a tuple of terms not containing f , and u is a
term not containing f .
For example, f=1 is f -plain, but each of p(f), g(f) = 1, and 1=f are not f -plain.
For a list c of predicate and function constants, we say that F is c-plain if F
is f -plain for each function constant f in c. Roughly speaking, c-plain formulas do
not allow the functions in c to be nested in another predicate or function, and at
most one function in c is allowed in each atomic formula. For example, f = g is not
(f; g)-plain, and neither is f(g) = 1! g = 1.
A rule of a rst-order formula F is a strictly positive occurrence of an implication
in F .
Let F be a c-plain formula. The dependency graph of F (relative to c), denoted
by DGc[F ], is the directed graph that
 has all members of c as its vertices, and
 has an edge from c to d if, for some rule G! H of F ,
{ c has a strictly positive occurrence in H, and
{ d has a positive occurrence in G that does not belong to any subformula
of G that is negative on c.
A loop of F (relative to a list c of intensional predicates) is a nonempty subset l
of c such that the subgraph of DGc[F ] induced by l is strongly connected.
The following theorem extends the Splitting Lemma from Ferraris et al. (2009) to
allow intensional functions.
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Theorem 6 Let F be a c-plain formula, and let c be a list of constants. If l1; : : : ; ln
are all the loops of F relative to c then
SM[F ; c] is equivalent to SM[F ; l1] ^    ^ SM[F ; ln]:
The following theorem extends the splitting theorem from Ferraris et al. (2009)
to allow intensional functions.
Theorem 7 Let c, d be nite disjoint lists of distinct constants and let F , G be
cd-plain rst-order sentences. If
(a) each strongly connected component of the dependency graph of F ^G relative to
c, d is either a subset of c or a subset of d,
(b) F is negative on d, and
(c) G is negative on c
then
SM[F ^G; c [ d]$ SM[F ; c] ^ SM[G; d]
is logically valid.
It is clear that Theorem 3 is a special case of Theorem 7, when d is empty.
5.5 Completion
In Section 4.2, we presented a characterization of the functional stable model
semantics in terms of second order logic. However, this does not provide much clarity
of the relationship between classical logic and this formalism. As mentioned earlier,
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simple axioms from classical logic such as F _:F being a tautology do not necessarily
hold in the functional stable model semantics so it is natural to consider a formal
relationship between this semantics and classical logic. This section extends the
Theorem on Completion from Ferraris et al. (2011) to the functional stable models
semantics, providing a method to capture a class of formulas under our semantics in
classical logic.
We say that a formula F is in Clark normal form (relative to the list c of intensional
constants) if it is a conjunction of sentences of the form
8x(G! p(x)) (5.1)
and
8xy(G! f(x)=y) (5.2)
one for each intensional predicate p and each intensional function f , where x is a list
of distinct object variables, y is an object variable, and G is an arbitrary formula that
has no free variables other than those in x and y.
The completion of a formula F in Clark normal form (relative to c) is obtained
from F by replacing each conjunctive term (5.1) with
8x(p(x)$ G)
and each conjunctive term (5.2) with
8xy(f(x)=y $ G):
An occurrence of a symbol or a subformula in a formula F is called strictly positive
in F if that occurrence is not in the antecedent of any implication in F . The t-
dependency graph of F (relative to c) is the directed graph that
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 has all members of c as its vertices, and
 has an edge from c to d if, for some strictly positive occurrence of G! H in F ,
{ c has a strictly positive occurrence in H, and
{ d has a strictly positive occurrence in G.
We say that F is tight (on c) if the t-dependency graph of F (relative to c) is
acyclic. For example,
((p! q)! r)! p
is tight on fp; q; rg because its t-dependency graph has only one edge, which goes
from p to r. On the other hand, the formula is not tight according to Ferraris et al.
(2011) because, according to the denition of a dependency graph in that paper, there
is an additional edge that goes from p to itself.
The following theorem is similar to the main theorem of Lifschitz and Yang (2013),
which describes functional completion in nonmonotonic causal logic. Due to our more
general denition of tightness, this theorem generalizes the Theorem on Completion
in Ferraris et al. (2011) even when only predicates are allowed to be intensional.
Theorem 8 For any formula F in Clark normal form that is tight on c, an inter-
pretation I that satises 9xy(x 6= y) is a model of SM[F ; c] i I is a model of the
completion of F relative to c.
Example 1 continued
We can represent the factors that aect the speed of the car at time point 1 (the
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full description of this domain will be shown in 9.2.2) as
speed(1)=Y  accel(0)=t ^ speed(0)=X ^ duration(0)=D
^ (Y = X + aD)
speed(1)=Y  decel(0)=t ^ speed(0)=X ^ duration(0)=D
^ (Y = X   aD)
speed(1)=Y  speed(0)=Y ^ ::(speed(1)=Y )
(recall that c=v _:(c=v) G is strongly equivalent to c=v  G^::(c=v)) and
the completion with respect to the function speed(1) will be the following equivalence.
speed(1) = Y $ 9XD( (accel(0)=t ^ speed(0)=X ^ duration(0)=D
^ (Y = X + aD))
_ (decel(0)=t ^ speed(0)=X ^ duration(0)=D
^ (Y = X   aD))
_ (speed(0) = Y ) )
The assumption 9xy(x 6= y) in the statement of Theorem 8 is essential. For
instance, take F to be > and c to be an intensional function constant f . If the
universe jIj of an interpretation I is a singleton, then I satises SM[F ], but does not
satisfy the completion of F , which is 8xy(f(x) = y $ ?).
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5.6 Proofs
5.6.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 5 The formula
(bc < c) ^ F (bc)! F
is logically valid.
Proof: by induction on F .
Lemma 6 Formula
bc < c! ((:F )(bc)$ :F )
is logically valid.
Proof: immediate from Lemma 5.
Theorem 3 For any rst-order formulas F andG, ifG is negative on c, SM[F ^G; c]
is equivalent to SM[F ; c] ^G.
Proof. By Lemma 6,
SM[F ^ :G; c]
= F ^ :G ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ (F ^ :G)(bc))
, F ^ :G ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ F (bc) ^ :G)
, F ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ F (bc)) ^ :G
= SM[F ; c] ^ :G:
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Lemma 7 Choice(c)(bc) is equivalent to
(cpred  bcpred) ^ (cfunc = bcfunc):
Proof. Choice(c) is the conjunction for each predicate p in cpred of 8x(p(x)_:p(x))
and for each function f in cfunc of 8xy(f(x) = y _ :f(x) = y).
Now,
[8x(p(x) _ :p(x))](bc)
is equivalent to
8x(bp(x) _ :p(x));
which is further equivalent to
8x(p(x)! bp(x));
or simply p  bp.
Next,
[8xy(f(x) = y _ :(f(x) = y))](bc)
is equivalent to
8xy((f(x) = y ^ ( bf(x) = y)) _ :(f(x) = y));
which is further equivalent to
8xy(f(x) = y ! bf(x) = y);
or simply f = bf .
Thus, Choice(c)(bc) is the conjunction for each predicate p in cpred of p  bp and
for each function f in cfunc of f = bf , or simply Choice(c)(c) is
(cpred  bcpred) ^ (cfunc = bcfunc):
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5.6.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 For any rst-order formula F and any disjoint lists c, d of distinct
constants, the following formulas are logically valid:
(i) SM[F ; cd]! SM[F ; c]
(ii) SM[F ^ Choice(d); cd]$ SM[F ; c]:
Proof. The proof is not long, but there is a notational diculty that we need to
overcome before we can present it. The notation F (bc) does not take into account
the fact that the construction of this formula depends on the choice of the list c
of intensional predicates. Since the dependence on c is essential in the proof of
Theorem 4, we use here the more elaborate notation F [c](bc). For instance, if F
is p(x) ^ q(x) then
F [p](bp) is bp(x) ^ q(x);
F [pq](bp; bq) is bp(x) ^ bq(x):
It is easy to verify by induction on F that for any disjoint lists c, d of distinct
predicate constants,
F [c](bc) = F [cd](bc;d): (5.3)
(i) In the notation introduced above, SM[F ; c] is
F ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ F [c](bc)):
By (5.3), this formula can be written also as
F ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ F [cd](bc;d));
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which is equivalent to
F ^ :9bc(((bc;d) < (c;d)) ^ F [cd](bc;d)):
On the other hand, SM[F ; cd] is
F ^ :9bcbd(((bc; bd) < (c;d)) ^ F [cd](bc; bd)):
To prove (ii), note that, by (5.3) and Lemma 7, the formula
9bcbd(((bc; bd) < (c; d)) ^ F [cd](bc; bd) ^ Choice(d)[cd](bc; bd))
is equivalent to
9bcbd(((bc; bd) < (c; d)) ^ F [cd](bc; bd) ^ (d = bd)):
It follows that it can be also equivalently rewritten as
9bc((bc < c) ^ F [cd](bc;d)):
By (5.3), the last formula can be represented as
9bc((bc < c) ^ F [c](bc)):
5.6.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Recall that about rst-order formulas F and G we say that F is strongly equivalent
to G if, for any formula H, any occurrence of F in H, and any list c of distinct
predicate and function constants, SM[H; c] is equivalent to SM[H 0; c], where H 0 is
obtained from H by replacing the occurrence of F by G.
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Lemma 8 Formula
(F $ G) ^ ((F (bc)$ G(bc))! (H(bc)$ (H 0)(bc)))
is logically valid.
Proof. By induction on H.
The following lemma is equivalent to the \only if" part of the theorem. In these
proofs, we will refer to the following formula
(F $ G) ^ (bc < c! (F (bc)$ G(bc))) (5.4)
Lemma 9 If the formula (5.4) is logically valid, then F is strongly equivalent to G.
Proof. Assume that (5.4) is logically valid. We need to show that
H ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^H(bc)) (5.5)
is equivalent to
H 0 ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ (H 0)(bc)): (5.6)
Since (5.4) is logically valid, the rst conjunctive term of (5.5) is equivalent to the
rst conjunctive term of (5.6). By Lemma 8 it also follows that the same relationship
holds between the two second conjunctive terms of the same formulas.
Lemma 10 If F is strongly equivalent to G then (5.4) is logically valid.
Proof. Let C be the formula Choice(c). Let E stand for F $ G, and E 0 be F $
F . Since F is strongly equivalent to G, the formula SM[E $ C] is equivalent to
SM[E 0 $ C].
61
Note that by Lemma 7, Choice(c)(bc), which we abbreviate as C, is equivalent
to
(cpred  bcpred) ^ (cfunc = bcfunc):
On the other hand, bc < c can be equivalently written as
(bcpred < cpred) _ ((bcpred = cpred) ^ (bcfunc 6= cfunc)):
It follows that
bc < c! (C $ ?)
is logically valid.
It is easy to see that (E $ C) can be rewritten as
E ^ (E(bc)$ C);
and that E(bc) is equivalent to
E ^ (F (bc)$ G(bc)):
Using these two facts and Lemma 5, we can simplify SM[E $ C] as follows:
SM[E $ C]
, (E $ C) ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ E ^ (E(bc)$ C))
, E ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ (E(bc)$ ?))
, E ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ :E(bc))
, E ^ :9bc((bc < c) ^ :(F (bc)$ G(bc)))
= (F $ G) ^ 8bc((bc < c)! (F (bc)$ G(bc)))
Similarly, SM[E 0 $ C] is equivalent to
(F $ F ) ^ 8bc((bc < c)! (F (bc)$ F (bc)));
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which is logically valid. Consequently, (5.4) is logically valid also.
Theorem 5 Let F and G be rst-order formulas, let c be the list of all constants
occurring in F or G and let bc be a list of distinct predicate/function variables corre-
sponding to c The following conditions are equivalent to each other.
 F and G are strongly equivalent to each other;
 Formula (5.4) is logically valid.
Proof.
Immediate from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10.
5.6.4 Proof of Theorem 6
The proof of this theorem uses a reduction from functional SM to predicate SM.
This is the topic of Chapter 7 but the necessary terminology and results required for
this proof are presented here.
Lemma 11 Given two lists of predicate and function constants c and d whose ele-
ments are in one-to-one correspondence, a formula F of signature   c [ ffg that
is f -plain, and an interpretation I over a signature 0  [d[fp; q; gg that satises
8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y); (5.7)
I j= F (gd) i I j= (F fp )(qd).
Proof. By induction on F .
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Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing f .
F fp is exactly F thus F
(gd) is exactly (F fp )
(qd) so certainly the claim holds.
Case 2: F is f(t) = c.
F (gd) is f(t) = c ^ g(t) = c.
F fp is p(t; c).
(F fp )
(qd) is q(t; c).
Since I j= (5:7), it immediately follows that I j= F (gd) i I j= (F fp )(qd).
Case 3: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 4: F is G! H.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
By I.H. on G.
Lemma 12 Given two lists of predicate and function constants c and d whose ele-
ments are in one-to-one correspondence, two functions f and g and an interpretation
I over a signature 0  c [ d [ fp; q; f; gg that satises
8xy(p(x; y)$ f(x) = y) (5.8)
and
8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y); (5.9)
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I j= gd < fc i I j= qd < pc.
Proof. ()) Assume I j= gd < fc. By denition, it follows that I j= (gd)pred 
(fc)pred and since g and f are not predicates, we have I j= dpred  cpred. Since we
assume I j= (5:9), it follows that I j= 8xy(q(x; y) ! f(x) = y). Then from the
assumption that I j= (5:8), it follows that I j= 8xy(q(x; y)! p(x; y)) or simply that
I j= q  p, from which it follows that I j= (qd)pred  (pc)pred.
Now since I j= gd < fc, it follows that I j= :(gd = fc). We consider two cases
 If I j= :(d = c) for some corresponding d and c in d and c respectively, then
we have I j= :(d = c) and further, I j= :(qd = pc).
 Otherwise, it must be that I j= :(g = f). That is, for some  and , I 6j=
f() =  $ g() = . For a given , I maps f() to exactly one  and similarly
for g() and so it follows that I 6j= f() =  ^ g() =  for every . Since
I j= (5:9), I 6j= q(; ) for every . However, since I j= f() =  for some ,
from I j= (5:8), we know I j= p(; ) for some . Thus, I j= :(q = p) and
further I j= :(qd = pc).
From either case, we then conclude that I j= qd < pc.
(() Assume I j= qd < pc. By denition, it follows that I j= (qd)pred  (pc)pred and
further, we have I j= dpred  cpred. Then, since f and g are not predicates, we have
I j= (gd)pred  (fc)pred.
Now since I j= qd < pc, it follows that I j= :(qd = pc). We consider two cases
 If I j= :(d = c) for some corresponding d and c in d and c respectively, then
we have I j= :(d = c) and further, I j= :(gd = fc)
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 Otherwise, it must be that I j= :(q = p). That is, for some  and , I 6j=
q(; ) $ p(; ). Since I j= (5:8), there is exactly one  and  such that
I j= p(; ), which further means that I j= f() = . Thus since I j= q < p,
it must be that I 6j= q(; ), and since I j= (5:9), it follows that I 6j= g() = .
Thus, I j= :(g = f) and further I j= :(gd = fc).
From either case, we then conclude that I j= gd < fc.
Lemma 13 For any f -plain formula F ,
8xy(p(x; y)$ f(x) = y) (5.10)
and 9xy(x 6= y) entail
SM[F ; fc]$ SM[F fp ; pc]:
Proof.
For any interpretation I = hI;Xi of signature   ff; p; cg satisfying (5.10),
it is clear that I j= F i I j= F fp since F fp is simply the result of replacing all
f(x) = y with p(x; y). Thus it only remains to be shown that I j= :9 bfbc(( bfbc <
fc) ^ F ( bfbc)) i I j= :9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ (F fp )(bpbc)) or equivalently, I j= 9 bfbc(( bfbc <
fc) ^ F ( bfbc)) i I j= 9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ (F fp )(bpbc)).
()) Assume I j= 9 bfbc(( bfbc < fc)^F ( bf;bc)). We wish to show that I j= 9bpbc((bpbc <
pc) ^ (F fp )(bpbc))
That is, take any function g of the same arity as f and any list of predicates
and functions d of the same length c. Now let I 0 = hI [ Jfcgd ; X [ Y cd i be from an
extended signature 0 = [fg; q;dg where J is an interpretation of functions from the
signature  and I and J agree on all symbols not occurring in ff; cg. Jfcgd denotes the
interpretation from fcgd (the signature obtained from  by replacing f with g and all
66
elements of c with all elements of d) obtained from the interpretation J by replacing
f with g and the functions in c with the corresponding functions in d. Similarly, Y cd is
the interpretation from 0 obtained from the interpretation Y by replacing predicates
from c by the corresponding predicates from d. We assume
I 0 j= (gd < fc ^ F (gd))
and wish to show that there is a predicate q of the same arity as p such that
I 0 j= (qd < pc ^ (F fp )(qd)):
We dene the new predicate q in terms of f and g as follows:
qI
0
(~; 0) =
8><>: 1 if I
0 j= f(~) = 0 ^ g(~) = 0
0 otherwise:
Clearly I 0 j= 8xy(q(x; y) $ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y) and we assumed I 0 j= (5:10)
so by Lemma 12, it follows that I 0 j= qd < pc. By Lemma 11, it follows that
I 0 j= (F fp )(qd).
(() Assume I j= 9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ (F fp )(bpbc)). We wish to show that I j=
9 bfbc(( bfbc < fc) ^ F ( bfbc))
That is, take any predicate q of the same arity as p and any list of predicates and
functions d the same length as c and let I 0 = hI [ Jfcgd ; X [ Y cd i is dened as before.
We assume
I 0 j= (qd < pc ^ (F fp )(qd))
and wish to show that there is a function g of the same arity as f such that
I 0 j= (gd < fc ^ F (gd)):
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We dene the new function g in terms of p and q as follows:
gI
0
(~) =
8><>: 
0 if I 0 j= p(~; 0) ^ q(~; 0)
00 if I 0 j= p(~; 0) ^ :q(~; 0) where 0 6= 00:
Note that the assumption that there are at least two elements in the universe is essen-
tial to this denition. This is a well-dened function by (5:10) entailing 8~90(p(~; 0)).
We show that I 0 j= 8xy(q(x; y) $ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y). Since we assume
I 0 j= (5:10), it follows that for any given , there is only one  such that I 0 j= p(; ).
Then, since we assume I 0 j= q  p, we know I 0 6j= q(; 0) for any 0 6= . If
I 0 j= q(; ), then I 0 j= g() = . Otherwise, I 0 j= g() = 0 for some 0 6= . Since
this is true for any , it follows that I 0 j= 8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y).
We assumed I 0 j= (5:10) so by Lemma 12, it follows that I 0 j= qd < pc. By
Lemma 11, it follows that I 0 j= (F fp )(qd).
Lemma 14 Let F be an f -plain sentence. (a) An interpretation I of the signature
of F that satises 9xy(x 6= y) is a model of SM[F ; fc] i Ifp is a model of SM[F fp ; pc].
(b) An interpretation J of the signature of F fp that satises 9xy(x 6= y) is a model of
SM[F fp ^ UEC p; pc] i J = Ifp for some model I of SM[F ; fc].
Proof.
For two interpretations I of signature 1 and J of signature 2, by I[J we denote
the interpretation of signature 1[2 and universe jIj[jJ j that interprets all symbols
occurring only in 1 in the same way I does and similarly for 2 and J . For symbols
appearing in both 1 and 2, I must interpret these the same as J does, in which
case I [ J also interprets the symbol in this way.
(a)) Assume I j= SM[F ; fc]^9xy(x 6= y). Since I j= 9xy(x 6= y), I [ Ifp j= 9xy(x 6=
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y) since by denition of Ifp , I and I
f
p share the same universe. By denition of I
f
p ,
I [ Ifp j= (5:10). Thus by Lemma 13, I [ Ifp j= SM[F ; fc]$ SM[F fp ; pc].
(a() Assume I j= 9xy(x 6= y) and Ifp j= SM[F fp ; pc]. Since I j= 9xy(x 6= y),
I [ Ifp j= 9xy(x 6= y) since by denition of Ifp , I and Ifp share the same universe.
By denition of Ifp , I [ Ifp j= (5:10). Thus by Lemma 13, I [ Ifp j= SM[F ; fc] $
SM[F fp ; pc].
Since we assume Ifp j= SM[F fp ; pc], it is the case that I [ Ifp j= SM[F fp ; pc] and
thus it must be the case that I [ Ifp j= SM[F ; fc]. Therefore since the signature of Ifp
does contain f , we conclude I j= SM[F ; fc].
(b)) Assume J j= 9xy(x 6= y) and J j= SM[F fp ^ UECp; pc]. Let I = Jpf where Jpf
denotes the interpretation of the signature of F obtained from J by replacing the set
pJ with the function f such that f I(1; : : : ; k) = k+1 for all tuples h1; : : : ; k; k+1i
in pJ . This is a valid denition of a function since we assume J j= SM[F fp ^UECp; pc],
from which we obtain by Theoreom 3 that J j= SM[F fp ; pc] ^ UECp and specically,
J j= UECp. Clearly, J = Ifp so it only remains to be shown that I j= SM[F ; fc].
Since I and J have the same universe and J j= 9xy(x 6= y), it follows that
I [J j= 9xy(x 6= y). Also by the denition of Jpf I [J j= (5:10). Thus by Lemma 13,
I [ J j= SM[F ; fc]$ SM[F fp ; pc].
Since we assume J j= SM[F fp ; pc], it is the case that I [ J j= SM[F fp ; pc] and thus
it must be the case that I [ J j= SM[F ; fc]. Now since the signature of J does not
contain f , we conclude I j= SM[F ; fc].
(b()Take any I such that J = Ifp and I j= SM[F ; fc]. Since J j= 9xy(x 6= y) and
I and J share the same universe, I [ J j= 9xy(x 6= y). By denition of J = Ifp ,
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I [ J j= (5:10). Thus by Lemma 13, I [ J j= SM[F ; fc]$ SM[F fp ; pc].
Since we assume I j= SM[F ; fc], it is the case that I [ J j= SM[F ; fc] and thus it
must be the case that I [ J j= SM[F fp ; pc]. Further, due to the nature of functions,
(5.10) entails UECp so I [ J j= UECp. However since the signature of I does not
contain p, we conclude J j= SM[F fp ; pc] ^ UECp and since UECp is comprised of
constraints, by Theorem 3 J j= SM[F fp ^ UECp; pc].
Theorem 6 Let F be a c-plain formula, and let c be a list of constants. If l1; : : : ; ln
are all the loops of F relative to c then
SM[F ; c] is equivalent to SM[F ; l1] ^    ^ SM[F ; ln]:
Proof.
The proof is by reduction to predicate SM.
By repeated applications of Lemma 14 we can obtain F fp ^UECp where f are all
the functions in c and p is a list of new predicates and the stable models of F fp ^UECp
will coincide with the stable models of F .
The dependency graph of F is isomorphic to the dependency graph of F fp ^UECp
by the obvious isomorphism that maps p to p for each predicate p 2 c and maps f to
q for each function f 2 f and the corresponding q 2 p.
Then the claims follow by Splitting Lemma, Version 1 in Ferraris et al. (2009).
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5.6.5 Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7 Let c, d be nite disjoint lists of distinct constants and let F , G be
cd-plain rst-order sentences. If
(a) each strongly connected component of the predicate dependency graph of F ^G
relative to c, d is either a subset of c or a subset of d,
(b) F is negative on d, and
(c) G is negative on c
then
SM[F ^G; c [ d]$ SM[F ; c] ^ SM[G; d]
is logically valid.
Proof.
The proof is by reduction to predicate SM.
By repeated applications of Lemma 14, we can obtain (F ^G)fgpq ^ UECpq where
f are all the functions in c and p is a list of new predicates of the same length and
g are all the functions in d and q is a list of new predicates of the same length. The
stable models of (F ^G)fgpq ^ UECpq will coincide with the stable models of F ^G.
Similarly, by repeated applications of Lemma 14, we can obtain F fgpq ^ UECpq
whose stable models will coincide with those of F . Again, by repeated applications
of Lemma 14, we can obtain Gfgpq ^ UECpq whose stable models will coincide with
those of G.
The dependency graph of F ^ G is isomorphic to the dependency graph of (F ^
G)fgpq ^ UECpq by the obvious isomorphism that maps p to p for each predicate
p 2 c [ d and maps f to q for each function f 2 f [ g and the corresponding
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q 2 p[q. Similar for the dependency graphs of F and F fgpq ^UECpq as well as those
of G and Gfgpq ^ UECpq. In particular, we note that since UECpq is negative on pq,
we have that F fgpq ^ UECpq is negative on dgq and that Gfgpq ^ UECpq is negative on
cfp
Then the claims follow by Splitting Lemma, Version 2 in Ferraris et al. (2009).
5.6.6 Proof of Theorem 8
Lemma 15 For an innitary ground formula F , a set of constants c and two inter-
pretations I and J such that J <c I, if I j= grI(F )I and J 6j= grI(F )I , then there is
some constant d occurring strictly positively in grI(F )
I such that d()I 6= d()J for
some tuple  of elements from jIj.
Proof.
The proof of this claim is by induction:
 Case 1: F is an atomic formula. In this case grI(F )I = F since I j= grI(F )I .
And since J 6j= grI(F )I , there must be at least one constant in grI(F )I that
I and J disagree on and since grI(F )
I is an atomic formula, this is a strictly
positively occurrence.
 Case 2: F is H^. Since I j= grI(F )I , grI(F )I is H0^ (and not ?) where
H0 = fgrI(G)I jG 2 Hg. Since J 6j= grI(F )I , J 6j= grI(G)I for at least one
G 2 H so the claim follows by induction on whichever subformula J does not
satisfy since in any case, the subformula occurs strictly positively.
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 Case 3: F is H_. Since I j= grI(F )I , grI(F )I is H0_ (and not ?) where
H0 = fgrI(G)I jG 2 Hg. Since J 6j= grI(F )I , J 6j= grI(G)I for every G 2 H.
Now it could be that I 6j= grI(G)I for some G 2 H but not all of them. In
such a case grI(G)
I would be ?, which I also does not satisfy. Thus the claim
follows by induction on whichever of G 2 H whose reduct I satises.
 Case 4: F is G ! H. grI(F )I is grI(G)I ! grI(H)I (and not ?). Since
J 6j= grI(F )I , J j= grI(G)I and J 6j= grI(H)I . Note that it must be the case
then that I j= grI(G)I since if not, it must be that grI(G)I is ? and thus it
is impossible for it to be that J j= grI(G)I . Consequently, it also follows that
I j= grI(H)I since I j= grI(F )I so the claim follows by induction on H since
the subformula occurs strictly positively.
Theorem 8 For any sentence F in Clark normal form that is tight on c, an
interpretation I that satises 9xy(x 6= y) is a model of SM[F ; c] i I is a model of
the completion of F relative to c.
Proof.
In this proof, we use Theorem 1 and refer to the reduct characterization.
(() Take an interpretation I that is a model of the completion of F . We wish to
show that for any interpretation J where J <c I, J 6j= grI [F ]I . Let S be a subset
of c such that I and J disagree on all constants in S{that is, those constants c for
which there exists some tuple  such that c()I 6= c()J . Now let s0 be a constant
from S such that there is no edge in the dependency graph from s0 to any constant
in S. Such an s0 is guaranteed to exist since F is tight on c.
If s0 is a predicate, then for some , s0()
I = 1 and s0()
J = 0 by denition of
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J <c I. If s0 is a function, let v be s0()
I . Note that since I is a model of the
completion of F and since F is in clark normal form, there must be a rule in grI [F ]
of the form B ! s0() if s0 is a predicate (B ! s0() = v if s0 is a function)
where B may be >. Further it must be that I j= B since if not, I would not be a
model of the completion of F . Thus, the corresponding rule in grI [F ]
I is BI ! s0()
(BI ! s0() = v if s0 is a function).
Now there are two cases to consider:
 Case 1: J j= BI . In this case, J 6j= BI ! s0() (or J 6j= BI ! s0() = v if s0
is a function) and so J 6j= grI [F ]I .
 Case 2: J 6j= BI . By Lemma 15, there is a constant d occurring strictly posi-
tively in B that I and J disagree on. However, this means there is an edge from
s0 to d and since I and J disagree on d, d belongs to S which contradicts the
fact that s0 was chosen so that it had no edge to any element in S. Thus this
case cannot arise.
()) Assume I j= SM[F ; c]. Now for every rule r in F of the form 8x(H(x)  
G(x)), for each of the ground rules in grI [F ] corresponding to r of the form H() 
G() there are two cases:
 Case 1: I j= G().
In this case, since I j= F , it must also be that I j= H(). Thus, I j= H() $
G().
 Case 2: I 6j= G().
The corresponding rule in the reduct grI [F ]
I is either
H() ?
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or
?  ?
depending on if I j= H(). However, since F is in clark normal form, H()
appears in the head of no other rule. Thus, if I j= H(), I 6j= SM[F ; c] since
we can take J <c I (I j= 9xy(x 6= y) means there are at least two elements
in the universe so this is possible) that diers from I only in that J 6j= H()
which will satisfy F I . Thus, it must be that I 6j= H(). It then follows that
I j= H()$ G().
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Chapter 6
ELIMINATING INTENSIONAL PREDICATES IN FAVOR OF INTENSIONAL
FUNCTIONS
6.1 Embedding 1988 Denition of a Stable Model
Before considering the general case of eliminating intensional predicates in favor
of intensional functions, we rst explore a special case. We will see how to turn
propositional logic programs under the semantics in Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988)
into formulas under the functional stable model semantics which have no predicate
constants.
Let  be a nite set of rules of the form
A0  A1; : : : ; Am; not Am+1; : : : ; not An (6.1)
(n  m  0), where each Ai is a propositional atom from the signature . The stable
models of  in the sense of Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988) can be characterized in terms
of SM, in the same way as is handled in IF programs Lifschitz (2012). Lifschitz 2012
denes the functional image of  as follows. First, reclassify all propositional atoms
as intensional object constants, and add to the  two non-intensional object constants
0 and 1 to obtain a new signature func. Each rule (6.1) is rewritten as
A0 = 1 A1 = 1 ^    ^ Am = 1 ^ Am+1 6= 1 ^    ^ An 6= 1
(A 6= 1 is shorthand for :(A = 1)). For each atom A in the signature of  we add
the default rule
A = 0 ::(A = 0)
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(by default, atoms get the value false). Finally, we add constraints
0 6= 1;
x = 0 _ x = 1:
(6.2)
The resulting program is called the functional image of . Clearly, the models of (6.2)
can be viewed as sets of propositional atoms. Given a program  whose signature
is  and interpretation I of the functional image of , the corresponding set XI of
propositional atoms is
fpjpI = 1 where p is an object constant in func g:
Inversely, given a program  whose signature is  and a set of propositional atoms
X, the corresponding interpretation IX is dened such that
pIX =
8><>: 1 p 2 X0 otherwise
for each atom p in . The following theorem is similar to Proposition 5 from Lifschitz
(2012), but applies to the functional stable model semantics presented here.
Theorem 9 Let  be a program of signature .
 If X is a stable model of , then IX is a stable model of the functional image
of .
 If I is a stable model of the functional image of , then XI is a stable model of
.
Example 12 Consider the program :
p  q:
q  p:
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This has X = ; as its only stable model. We now consider the functional image of
:
p = 1  q = 1:
q = 1  p = 1:
p = 0  ::(p = 0):
q = 0  ::(q = 0):
0 6= 1:
x = 0 _ x = 1:
We can see that in the functional image, the idea of minimizing predicates is made
explicit by the third and fourth lines establishing that p and q should both be 0 (signi-
fying false) by default. Consider the interpretation I such that jIj = f0; 1g, pI = 0,
qI = 0, 1I = 1, 0I = 0 (the interpretation corresponding to X). We can see that the
reduct of the functional image of  w.r.t. to I is equivalent to
p = 1  q = 1:
q = 1  p = 1:
p = 0  >:
q = 0  >:
x = 0 _ x = 1:
and no other interpretation dierent from I on p; q satises this reduct. Thus, I is a
stable model of the functional image of  which corresponds to the only stable model
of .
On the other hand, we can see that for the interpretation J such that jJ j = f0; 1g,
pJ = 1, qJ = 1, 1J = 1, 0J = 0, the reduct of the functional image of  w.r.t. to J is
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equivalent to
p = 1  q = 1:
q = 1  p = 1:
x = 0 _ x = 1:
however, the interpretation I which is dierent from J on p and q is a model of
this reduct and so J is not a stable model of the functional image of  just as the
corresponding set Y = fp; qg is not a stable model of .
6.2 Eliminating Intensional Predicates
The process in the previous section can be extended to eliminate intensional predi-
cates in favor of intensional functions. Given a formula F and an intensional predicate
constant p, formula F pf is obtained from F as follows:
 in the signature of F , replace p with a new intensional function constant f of
arity n, where n is the arity of p, and add two non-intensional object constants
0 and 1;
 replace each subformula p(t) in F with f(t) = 1.
By FC f (\Functional Constraint on f") we denote the conjunction of the following
formulas, which enforces f to behave like predicates:
0 6= 1; (6.3)
::8x(f(x) = 0 _ f(x) = 1): (6.4)
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where x is a list of distinct object variables. By DF f (\Default False on f") we
denote the following formula:
8x(::(f(x) = 0)! f(x) = 0): (6.5)
Example 13 Let F be the conjunction of the universal closures of the following for-
mulas, which describes the eect of a monkey moving:
loc(monkey ; 0) = l1;
loc(monkey ; 1) = l2;
move(monkey ; L; T )! loc(monkey ; T + 1) = L
We eliminate the intensional predicate move in favor of an intensional function movef
to obtain Fmovemovef^FCmovef^DFmovef , which is the conjunction of the universal closures
of the following formulas:
loc(monkey ; 0) = l1;
loc(monkey ; 1) = l2;
movef (monkey ; L; T ) = 1! loc(monkey ; T + 1) = L;
0 6= 1;
::8xyz(movef (x; y; z) = 0 _movef (x; y; z) = 1)
8xyz(::(movef (x; y; z) = 0)! movef (x; y; z) = 0):
Theorem 10 Formulas 8x(f(x) = 1 $ p(x)), FC f entail SM[F ; pc] $ SM[F pf ^
DF f ; fc].
The following corollary shows that there is a 1{1 correspondence between the
stable models of F and the stable models of its \functional image" F pf ^DF f ^FC f .
For any interpretation I of the signature of F , by Ipf we denote the interpretation
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with universe jIj and with the signature of F pf obtained from I by replacing the set
pI with the function f I such that
f I(1; : : : ; n) = 1 if p
I(1; : : : ; n) = 1
f I(1; : : : ; n) = 0 otherwise :
where each i 2 jIj. A further constraint on Ipf is that Ipf j= 1 6= 0. Consequently, Ipf
satises FC f .
Corollary 1 (a) An interpretation I of the signature of F is a model of SM[F ; pc]
i Ipf is a model of SM[F
p
f ^DF f ; fc]. (b) An interpretation J of the signature of F pf
is a model of SM[F pf ^ DF f ^ FC f ; fc] i J = Ipf for some model I of SM[F ; pc].
6.3 Relating Strong Negation to Boolean Functions
6.3.1 Representing Strong Negation in Multi-Valued Propositional Formulas
The notion of strong negation (or classical negation) has been useful in logic
program. In particular, in combination with default negation (or negation as failure)
in solving the frame problem{that the world does not arbitrarily change.
Example 14 Consider the program that describes a simple transition system con-
sisting of two states depending on whether uent p is true or false, and an action a
that makes p true (subscripts 0 and 1 represent time stamps).
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Figure 6.1: Transition System
p1  a
p1  p0;not p1
p1  p0;not p1
p0  not p0
p0  not p0
a  not a
a  not a:
(6.6)
The program has four answer sets, each of which corresponds to one of the four
edges of the transition system. For instance, fp0; a; p1g is an answer set.
However, strong negation in the stable model semantics is not a primitive connec-
tive 1 . We provide an alternate characterization of the notion of strong negation by
translating a propositional logic program into a multi-valued propositional formula
in which all constants are Boolean.
Given a traditional propositional logic program  of a signature  Gelfond and
Lifschitz (1991), we identify  with the multi-valued propositional signature whose
constants are the same symbols from  and every constant is Boolean. By mv we
mean the multi-valued propositional formula that is obtained from  by replacing
1Strong negation can only appear in front of an atom so that (p _ q) is not a valid formula.
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negative literals of the form p with p = 0 and positive literals of the form p with
p = 1.
We say that a set X of literals from  is complete if, for each atom a 2 , either
a or a is in X. We identify a complete set of literals from  with the corresponding
multi-valued propositional interpretation.
Theorem 11 A complete set of literals is an answer set of  in the sense of Gelfond
and Lifschitz (1991) i it is a stable model of mv in the sense of the functional stable
model semantics.
The theorem tells us that checking the minimality of positive and negative liter-
als under the traditional stable model semantics is essentially the same as checking
the uniqueness of corresponding function values under the functional stable model
semantics.
Example 14 continued According to Theorem 11, the stable models of this pro-
gram are the same as the stable models of the following multi-valued propositional
formula (written in a logic program style; `:' represents default negation):
p0=1  :(p0=0)
p0=0  :(p0=1)
a=1  :(a=0)
a=0  :(a=1)
p1=1  a=1
p1=1  p0=1 ^ :(p1 = 0)
p1=0  p0=0 ^ :(p1 = 1)
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6.3.2 Representing Strong Negation Using Boolean Functions in the First-Order
Case
Theorem 11 can be extended to the rst-order case as follows. However, we rst
dene a syntactic restriction for the extension.
Let F be a formula possibly containing strong negation. Formula F
(p;p)
b is ob-
tained from F as follows:
 in the signature of F , replace p and p with a new intensional function constant
b of arity n, where n is the arity of p (or p), and add two non-intensional object
constants 1 and 0;
 replace every occurrence of p(t), where t is a list of terms, with b(t) = 0, and
then replace every occurrence of p(t) with b(t) = 1.
By BC b (\Boolean Constraint on b") we denote the conjunction of the following
formulas, which enforces b to be a Boolean function:
1 6= 0; (6.7)
::8x(b(x) = 1 _ b(x) = 0): (6.8)
where x is a list of distinct object variables.
Theorem 12 Let c be a set of predicate and function constants, and let F be a
c-plain formula. Formulas
8x((p(x)$ b(x)=1) ^ (p(x)$ b(x)=0)); (6.9)
and BC b entail
SM[F ; p;p; c]$ SM[F (p; p)b ; b; c] :
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Example 14 continued Consider the simple transition system from before. We
obtain F
(p;p)
b
b1 = 1  a
b1 = 1  b0 = 1; not b1 = 0
b1 = 0  b0 = 0; not b1 = 1
b0 = 1  not b0 = 0
b0 = 0  not b0 = 1
a  not a
a  not a:
We can see that the interpretation I such that
(b0)
I = 0; (p0)I = t; (p0)I = f ;
aI = 0;
(b1)
I = 1; (p1)
I = t; (p1)I = f
satises 6.9 and BC b. Then we can see that I j= SM[F ; p;p; c]$ SM[F (p;p)b ; b; c]
since I j= SM[F ; p;p; c] and I j= SM[F (p;p)b ; b; c].
If we drop the requirement that F be c-plain, the statement does not hold as the
following example demonstrates.
Example 15 Take c to be (f; g) and let F be p(f)^  p(g). F (p; p)b is b(f) =
1 ^ b(g) = 0. Consider the interpretation I whose universe is f1; 2g such that I
contains p(1);p(2) and with the mappings bI(1) = 1; bI(2) = 0; f I = 1; gI = 2. I
certainly satises BC b and (6.9). I also satises SM[F ; p;p; f; g] but does not sat-
isfy SM[F
(p; p)
b ; b; f; g]: we can take I such that
bbI(1) = 0;bbI(2) = 1; bf I = 2; bgI = 1
to satisfy both (bb; bf; bg) < (b; f; g) and (F (p; p)b )(bb; bf; bg), which is
b(f) = 1 ^bb( bf) = 1 ^ b(g) = 0 ^bb(bg) = 0:
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Note that any interpretation that satises both (6.9) and BC b is complete on p.
Theorem 12 tells us that for any interpretation I that is complete on p, minimizing
the extents of both p and p has the same eect as ensuring that the corresponding
Boolean function b has a unique value.
The following corollary shows that there is a 1{1 correspondence between the
stable models of F and the stable models of F
(p;p)
b . We say an interpretation I is
coherent if for every predicate p in the signature of I, we have I j= 8x(:p(x) _ : 
p(x)). For any coherent interpretation I of the signature of F that is complete on p,
by I
(p;p)
b we denote the interpretation of the signature of F
(p;p)
b obtained from I by
replacing the relation pI with function bI such that
bI(1; : : : ; n) = 1
I if pI(1; : : : ; n) = t;
bI(1; : : : ; n) = 0
I if (p)I(1; : : : ; n) = t :
Since I is complete on p and coherent, bI is well-dened. We also require that I
(p;p)
b
satisfy (6.7). Consequently, I
(p;p)
b satises BC b.
Corollary 2 Let c be a set of predicate and function constants, and let F be a c-
plain sentence. (I) A coherent interpretation I of the signature of F that is complete
on p is a model of SM[F ; p;p; c] i I(p; p)b is a model of SM[F (p; p)b ; b; c]. (II) An
interpretation J of the signature of F
(p; p)
b is a model of SM[F
(p; p)
b ^ BC b; b; c] i
J = I
(p; p)
b for some model I of SM[F ; p;p; c].
The other direction, eliminating Boolean intensional functions in favor of sym-
metric predicates, is similar as we show in the following.
Let F be a (b; c)-plain formula such that every atomic formula containing b has
the form b(t) = 1 or b(t) = 0, where t is any list of terms. Formula F b(p;p) is obtained
from F as follows:
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 in the signature of F , replace b with predicate constants p and p, whose arities
are the same as that of b;
 replace every occurrence of b(t) = 1, where t is any list of terms, with p(t), and
b(t) = 0 with p(t).
Theorem 13 Let c be a set of predicate and function constants, let b be a function
constant, and let F be a (b; c)-plain formula such that every atomic formula containing
b has the form b(t) = 1 or b(t) = 0. Formulas (6.9) and BC b entail
SM[F ; b; c]$ SM[F b(p; p); p;p; c] :
The following corollary shows that there is a 1{1 correspondence between the
stable models of F and the coherent stable models of F b(p;p). For any interpretation
I of the signature of F that satises BC b, by I
b
(p;p) we denote the interpretation of
the signature of F b(p;p) obtained from I by replacing the function b
I with predicate
pI such that
pI(1; : : : ; n) = t i b
I(1; : : : ; n) = 1
I ;
(p)I(1; : : : ; n) = t i bI(1; : : : ; n) = 0I :
Corollary 3 Let c be a set of predicate and function constants, let b be a function con-
stant, and let F be a (b; c)-plain sentence such that every atomic formula containing
b has the form b(t) = 1 or b(t) = 0. (I) A coherent interpretation I of the signature
of F is a model of SM[F ^ BC b; b; c] i I b(p; p) is a model of SM[F b(p; p); p;p; c].
(II) An interpretation J of the signature of F b(p; p) is a model of SM[F
b
(p; p); p;p; c]
i J = I b(p; p) for some model I of SM[F ^ BC b; b; c].
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6.4 Proofs
6.4.1 Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9 Let  be a program of signature .
 If X is a stable model of , then IX is a stable model of the functional image
of .
 If I is a stable model of the functional image of , then XI is a stable model of
.
Proof. Let p denote all of the atoms in  and let f denote all of the corresponding
object constants in the signature of the functional image of . We rst note that IX
is the same as Ipf . We also note that the added rules
fA=0gch
and
0 6= 1;
x = 0 _ x = 1:
are precisely DF f ^ FC f when considering their rst-order representation. Finally,
we note then that the rst-order representation of functional image of  is exactly
F pf ^DF f^FC f where F is the rst-order representation of . Then, the claim follows
from multiple applications of Corollary 1 for each p in p and the corresponding f in
f .
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6.4.2 Proof of Theorem 10
Theorem 10 Formulas
8x(f(x) = 1$ p(x)); (6.10)
and FC f entail SM[F ; pc]$ SM[F pf ^ DF f ; fc].
Proof.
For any interpretation I = hI;Xi of signature   ff; p; cg satisfying (6.10), it is
clear that I j= F i I j= F pf ^DF f since DF f is a tautology and F pf is equivalent to
F under (6.10). Thus it only remains to be shown that
I j= :9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ F (bp;bc))
i
I j= :9 bfbc(( bfbc < fc) ^ (F pf )( bf;bc) ^ DF f (bpbc))
or equivalently,
I j= 9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ F (bp;bc))
i
I j= 9 bfbc(( bfbc < fc) ^ (F pf )( bf;bc) ^ DF f ( bfbc)):
()) Assume I j= 9bpbc((bpbc < pc)^F (bp;bc)). We wish to show that I j= 9 bfbc(( bfbc <
fc) ^ (F pf )( bf;bc) ^ DF f ( bfbc)).
That is, take any predicate q of the same arity as p and any list of predicates
and functions d of the same length as c. Now let I 0 = hI [ Jfcgd ; X [ Y cd i be from an
extended signature 0 =  [ fg; q;dg where J is an interpretation of functions from
the signature  and I and J agree on all functions not in ff; cg. Jfcgd denotes the
interpretation from fcgd (the signature obtained from  by replacing f with g and all
elements of c with all elements of d) obtained from the interpretation J by replacing
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f with g and the functions in c with the corresponding functions in d. Similarly, Y cd is
the interpretation from cd obtained from the interpretation Y by replacing predicates
from c by the corresponding predicates from d. We assume
I 0 j= (qd < pc ^ F (qd))
and wish to show that there is a function g of the same arity as f such that
I 0 j= (gd < fc ^ (F pf )(gd) ^ DF f (gd)):
We dene the new function g in terms of q as follows:
gI
0
(~) =
8><>: 1 if I
0 j= q(~)
0 otherwise
We now show I 0 j= gd < fc:
Case 1: I 0 j= (q = p).
Since I 0 j= qd < pc, by denition I 0 j= dpred  cpred and I 0 j= :(qd = pc) and since
in this case, I 0 j= (q = p), I 0 j= :(d = c). From this, we conclude I 0 j= :(gd = fc).
Further, since I 0 j= dpred  cpred, we conclude I 0 j= gd < fc.
Case 2: I 0 j= :(q = p).
Since I 0 j= qd < pc, by denition, I 0 j= dpred  cpred and I 0 j= (q  p). Thus, since
in this case I 0 j= :(q = p), then it follows that I 0 j= 9x(p(x) ^ :q(x)). From the
denition of g and from (6.10), this is equivalent to I 0 j= 9x(f(x) = 1 ^ g(x) = 0).
Thus, we conclude I 0 j= :(f = g) and since I 0 j= dpred  cpred, we further conclude
that I 0 j= gd < fc.
We now show I 0 j= DF f (gd):
Since I 0 j= qd < pc, by denition, I 0 j= (q  p), or equivalently I 0 j= 8x(q(x) !
p(x)) and by contraposition, I 0 j= 8x(:p(x)! :q(x)). Finally, by (6.10),FCf , and
the denition of g, I 0 j= 8x(f(x) = 0! g(x) = 0) or simply I 0 j= DF f (gd).
90
We now show I 0 j= (F pf )(gd) by proving that I 0 j= (F pf )(gd) i I 0 j= F (qd):
Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing p.
F pf is exactly F thus F
(qd) is exactly (F pf )
(gd) so certainly the claim holds.
Case 2: F is p(t) where t contains an intensional function constant from c.
F (qd) is p(t) ^ q(t0)
where t0 is the result of replacing all intensional functions from c occurring in t with
the corresponding function from d.
F pf is f(t) = 1.
(F pf )
(gd) is f(t) = 1 ^ g(t0) = 1.
Since I 0 j= p(t)^ q(t0), it follows from (6.10) and the denition of g that I 0 j= f(t) =
1 ^ g(t0) = 1.
Case 3: F is p(t) where t does not contain any intensional function constant from c.
F (qd) is q(t).
F pf is f(t) = 1.
(F pf )
(gd) is f(t) = 1 ^ g(t) = 1.
Now, since I 0 j= (q  p), if I 0 j= q(t), then I 0 j= p(t). From (6.10), it follows that
I 0 j= f(t) = 1 and from the denition of g, it follows that I 0 j= g(t) = 1.
Case 4: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is G! H.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 6: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
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By I.H. on G.
(() Assume I j= 9 bfbc(( bfbc < fc)^ (F pf )( bf;bc)^DF f ( bfbc)). We wish to show that
I j= 9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ F (bp;bc)).
That is, take any function g of the same arity as f and any list of predicates and
functions d of the same length c and let I 0 = hI [ Jfcgd ; X [ Y cd i be dened as before.
We assume
I 0 j= (gd < fc ^ (F pf )(gd) ^ DF f (gd))
We wish to show that there is a predicate q of the same arity as p such that
I 0 j= (qd < pc ^ F (qd)):
We dene the new predicate q in terms of g as follows:
qI
0
(~) =
8><>: 1 if I
0 j= g(~) = 1
0 otherwise
We now show I 0 j= qd < pc:
Case 1: I 0 j= (g = f).
By denition of q and by (6.10), in this case, I 0 j= q = p and in particular, I 0 j= q  p.
Since I 0 j= gd < fc, by denition I 0 j= dpred  cpred and I 0 j= :(gd = fc) and
since in this case, I 0 j= (g = f), then I 0 j= :(d = c). From this, we conclude
I 0 j= :(qd = pc). Finally, we conclude I 0 j= qd < pc.
Case 2: I 0 j= :(g = f).
Since I 0 j= DF f (gd), then I 0 j= 8x(f(x) = 0 ! g(x) = 0). From this, we conclude
by denition of q, FC f (note that 0 6= 1 is essential here) and (6.10) that I 0 j=
8x(:p(x)! :q(x)). Equivalently, this is I 0 j= 8x(q(x)! p(x)) or simply I 0 j= q 
p.
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Now, since I 0 j= FCf , then I 0 j= 8x(f(x) = 0 _ f(x) = 1). Thus, for the
assumption in this case that I 0 j= :(g = f) to hold, it must be that I 0 j= 9x(f(x) =
1^:(g(x) = 1)). By dention of q and (6.10), it follows that I 0 j= 9x(p(x)^:q(x)).
Thus, since I 0 j= :(q = p), then I 0 j= :(qd = pc). Also, since I 0 j= gd < fc, by
denition I 0 j= dpred  cpred, and thus we conclude that I 0 j= qd < pc.
We now show I 0 j= F (qd) by proving that I 0 j= (F pf )(gd) i I 0 j= F (qd):
Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing p.
F pf is exactly F thus F
(qd) is exactly (F pf )
(gd) so certainly the claim holds.
Case 2: F is p(t) where t contains an intensional function constant from c.
F (qd) is p(t) ^ q(t0)
where t0 is the result of replacing all intensional functions from c occurring in t with
the corresponding function from d
F pf is f(t) = 1.
(F pf )
(gd) is f(t) = 1 ^ g(t0) = 1.
Since I 0 j= f(t) = 1 ^ g(t0) = 1, by denition of q and (6.10), I 0 j= p(t) ^ q(t0) and
thus I 0 j= F (qd).
Case 3: F is p(t) where t does not contain any intensional function constant from c.
F (qd) is q(t).
F pf is f(t) = 1.
(F pf )
(gd) is f(t) = 1 ^ g(t) = 1.
By denition of q and since I 0 j= f(t) = 1^g(t) = 1, I 0 j= q(t) and thus I 0 j= F (qd)
in this case.
Case 4: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
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By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is G! H.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 6: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
By I.H. on G.
6.4.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1 (a) An interpretation I of the signature of F is a model of SM[F ; pc]
i Ipf is a model of SM[F
p
f^DF f ; fc]. (b) An interpretation J of the signature of F pf
is a model of SM[F pf ^ DF f ^ FC f ; fc] i J = Ipf for some model I of SM[F ; pc].
Proof.
(a)) Assume I of the signature of F is a model of SM[F ; pc]. By denition of Ipf ,
I[Ipf j= 8x(f(x) = 1$ p(x)). Now, since I j= SM[F ; pc] by our assumption, it must
be that I [ Ipf j= SM[F ; pc] and further by Theorem 10, since I [ Ipf j= SM[F ; pc]$
SM[F pf ^ DF f ; fc], it must be that I [ Ipf j= SM[F pf ^ DF f ; fc]. Finally, since the
signature of I does not contain f , we conclude Ipf j= SM[F pf ^ DF f ; fc].
(a() Assume Ipf is a model of SM[F pf ^ DF f ; fc]. By denition of Ipf , I [ Ipf j=
8x(f(x) = 1 $ p(x)). Now, since Ipf j= SM[F pf ^ DF f ; fc] by our assumption, it
must be that I [ Ipf j= SM[F pf ^DF f ; fc] and further by Theorem 10, since I [ Ipf j=
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SM[F ; pc] $ SM[F pf ^ DF f ; fc], it must be that I [ Ipf j= SM[F ; pc]. Finally, since
the signature of Ipf does not contain p, we conclude I j= SM[F ; pc].
(b)) Assume an interpretation J of the signature of F pf is a model of SM[F pf ^
FC f ^DF f ; fc]. Let I = Jfp , where Jfp denotes the interpretation of the signature F
obtainted from J by replacing fJ with the set pI that consists of the tuples h1; : : : ; ni
for all 1; : : : ; n from the universe of J such that f(1; : : : ; n) = 1. By denition of
I, I [ J j= 8x(f(x) = 1 $ p(x)). Now, since J j= SM[F pf ^ FC f ^ DF f ; fc] by
our assumption, it must be that I [ J j= SM[F pf ^ FC f ^ DF f ; fc]. Since FC f
is comprised of constraints, by Theorem 3, I [ J j= SM[F pf ^ DF f ; fc] ^ FC f . In
particular, I [J j= SM[F pf ^DF f ; fc] and further by Theorem 10, I [J j= SM[F ; pc].
Finally, since the signature of J does not contain p, we conclude I j= SM[F ; pc].
(b() Take any I such that J = Ipf and I j= SM[F ; pc]. By denition of Ipf , I [ J j=
8x(f(x) = 1 $ p(x)). Now, since I j= SM[F ; pc] by our assumption, it must be
that I [ J j= SM[F ; pc] and further by Theorem 10, since I [ J j= SM[F ; pc] $
SM[F pf ^DF f ; fc], it must be that I [ J j= SM[F pf ^DF f ; fc]. Since the signature of
I does not contain f , we conclude J j= SM[F pf ^DF f ; fc]. Finally, since by denition
of Ipf , J j= FC f , and since FC f is comprised of constraints, by Theorem 3 we conclude
J j= SM[F pf ^ FC f ^ DF f ; fc]
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6.4.4 Proof of Theorem 11
Theorem 11 A complete set of literals is an answer set of  in the sense of Gelfond
et al. (1991) i it is a stable model of mv in the sense of Bartholomew and Lee
(2012).
Proof. Let I be the interpretation formed from including all of the literals from X
and all the assignments from the multi-valued view of X. Let us denote the set of all
predicate symbols from X as p and their negative counterparts as p and all of the
function symbols from the multi-valued view of X as b. Clearly I satises
8x((p(x)$ b(x)=1) ^ (p(x)$ b(x)=0));
for each p 2 p and the corresponding b 2 b. From this and since X is complete,
it follows that I j= BCb for each b 2 b. Thus, we can apply Theorem 12 (multiple
times) to conclude that SM[FOL; p p]$ SM[(mv)FOL; b].
6.4.5 Proof of Theorem 12
Theorem 12 Let c be a set predicate and function constants, and let F be a c-plain
formula. Formulas
8x((p(x)$ b(x)=1) ^ (p(x)$ b(x)=0));
and BC b entail
SM[F ; p;p; c]$ SM[F (p;p)b ; b; c] :
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Proof. For any interpretation I = hI;Xi of signature   fb; p; cg satisfying (6.9),
it is clear that I j= F i I j= F ppb since F ppb is simply the result of replacing
all p(t) with b(t) = 1 and all  p(t) with b(t) = 0. Thus it only remains to be
shown that I j= :9bb;bc((bb;bc < b; c) ^ (F (p;p)b )(bb;bc)) i I j= :9cp; bp;bc((cp; bp;bc <
p; p; c)^F (cp; bp;bc)) or equivalently, I j= 9bb;bc((bb;bc < b; c)^(F (p;p)b )( bf;bc)) i I j=
9cp; bp;bc((cp; bp;bc <p; p; c) ^ F (cp; bp;bc)).
()) Assume I j= 9bb;bc((bb;bc < b; c) ^ (F (pp)b )(bb;bc)). We wish to show that
I j= 9cp; bp;bc((cp; bp;bc <p; p; c) ^ F (cp; bp;bc))
That is, take any function a of the same arity as b and any list of predicates
and functions d of the same length c. Now let I 0 = hI [ J (b;c)(a;d); X [ Y cd i be from
an extended signature 0 =  [ fa; q;dg where J is an interpretation of functions
from the signature  and I and J agree on all symbols not occurring in fb; cg. J (b;c)(a;d)
denotes the interpretation from 
(b;c)
(a;d) (the signature obtained from  by replacing b
with a and all elements of c with all elements of d) obtained from the interpretation
J by replacing b with a and the functions in c with the corresponding functions in
d. Similarly, Y cd is the interpretation from 
0 obtained from the interpretation Y by
replacing predicates from c by the corresponding predicates from d. We assume
I 0 j= (a;d < b; c ^ (F (p;p)b )(a;d))
and wish to show that there are predicates q, q of the same arity as p, p such that
I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c ^ F (q; q;d)):
We dene the new predicates q, q in terms of b and a as follows:
q(x)$ a(x) = 0 ^ b(x) = 0
q(x)$ a(x) = 1 ^ b(x) = 1
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We rst show if I 0 j= (a;d < b; c) then I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c):
Observe that from the denition of q and q, it follows that I 0 j= 8x(q(x)! b(x) =
0) ^ 8x(q(x) ! b(x) = 1) and from (6.9), this is equivalent to I 0 j= 8x(q(x) !
p(x))^8x(q(x)! p(x)) or simply I 0 j=q; q p; p. Thus, since I 0 j= dpred  cpred,
it follows that I 0 j=q; q;dpred p; p; cpred.
Case 1: I 0 j= 8x(b(x) = a(x)).
In this case it then must be that I 0 j= d 6= c. Thus it follows that I 0 j=q; q;d 6=
p; p; c. Consequently we conclude that
I 0 j= (q; q;dpred p; p; cpred)^ q; q;d 6=p; p; c
or simply, I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c).
Case 2: I 0 j= :8x; y(b(x) = a(x)).
That is, since I 0 j= BCb, there is some list of object names t such that either I 0 j=
b(t) = 0 ^ a(t) 6= 0 or I 0 j= b(t) = 1 ^ a(t) 6= 1.
Subcase 1: I 0 j= b(t) = 0 ^ a(t) 6= 0
By (6.9), I 0 j=p(t) and by denition of q, I 0 j= : q(t) so I 0 j=q 6=p.
Subcase 2: I 0 j= b(t) = 1 ^ a(t) 6= 1
By (6.9), I 0 j= p(t) and by denition of q, I 0 j= :q(t) so I 0 j= q 6= p.
Therefore, no matter which subcase holds, we have q; q 6=p; p and thus q; q;d 6=
p; p; c. Consequently we conclude
I 0 j= (q; q;dpred p; p; cpred)^ q; q;d 6=p; p; c
or simply, I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c).
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We now show by induction that I 0 j= F (q; q;d):
Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing p.
F
(p;p)
b is exactly F thus (F
(p;p)
b )
(a;d) is exactly F (q; q;d) so certainly the claim
holds.
Case 2: F is p(t), where t contains no intensional function constants.
F (q; q;d) is q(t).
F
(p;p)
b is b(t) = 0.
(F
(p;p)
b )
(a;d) is b(t) = 0 ^ a(t) = 0.
By the denition of q, it is clear that I 0 j= F (q; q;d) so certainly the claim holds.
Case 3: F is p(t), where t contains no intensional function constants.
F (q; q;d) is q(t).
F
(p;p)
b is b(t) = 1.
(F
(p;p)
b )
(a;d) is b(t) = 1 ^ a(t) = 1.
By the denition of q, it is clear that I 0 j= F (q; q;d) so certainly the claim holds.
Case 4: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is G! H.
By I.H. on G and H.
99
Case 6: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
By I.H. on G.
(() Assume I j= 9cp; bp;bc((cp; bp;bc <p; p; c) ^ F (cp; bp;bc)). We wish to show
that I j= 9bb;bc((bb;bc < b; c) ^ (F (p;p)b )(bb;bc))
That is, take any predicates q, q of the same arity as p, p and any list of
predicates and functions d of the same length as c and let I 0 = hI [ J (b;c)(a;d); X [ Y cd i
is dened as before. We assume
I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c ^ F (q; q;d))
and wish to show that there is a function a of the same arity as b such that
I 0 j= (a;d < b; c ^ (F (p;p)b )(a;d)):
We dene the new function a in terms of p, p, q, and q as follows:
I 0 j= a(x) = 1 i I 0 j= ((p(x) ^ q(x)) _ (p(x) ^ : q(x)))
I 0 j= a(x) = 0 i I 0 j=$ ((p(x)^ q(x)) _ (p(x) ^ :q(x)))
Note that since I 0 j= (6:9), I 0 j= BCb and I 0 j=q; q;d <p; p; c this is a well-
dened function. This is because I 0 j= (6:9) and I 0 j= BC b guarantee that I 0 is
complete on p. In addition to this, I 0 j=q; q;d <p; p; c guarantees that the four
cases covered in this denition are the only ones possible; for any given t exactly one
of p(t) and p(t) is true. Wlog, assume p(t) then I 0 j=q; q;d <p; p; c gives us that
q(t) must be false and q(t) may be true or false. The other two cases are symmetric
by considering when p(t) is true.
We rst show if I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c) then I 0 j= (a;d < b; c):
Observe that I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c) by denition entails I 0 j= (q; q;dpred 
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p; p; cpred) and further by denition, I 0 j= (dpred  cpred) and then since b and a are
not predicates, I 0 j= ((a;d)pred  (b; c)pred).
Case 1: I 0 j= 8x(p(x)$ q(x)) ^ 8x(p(x)$q(x)).
In this case, I 0 j= (p; p =q; q) so for it to be the case that I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c),
it must be that I 0 j= :(c = d). It then follows that I 0 j= :(b; c = a;d). Consequently
in this case, I 0 j= ((a;d)pred  (b; c)pred) ^ :(b; c = a;d) or simply I 0 j= (a;d < b; c).
Case 2: I 0 j= :(8xy(p(x)$ q(x)) ^ 8x(p(x)$q(x))).
Since I 0 j=q; q <p; p and I 0 j= (6:9) and since I 0 is complete on p, there is some
list of object names t such that either I 0 j= p(t) ^ :q(t) or I 0 j=p(t) ^ : q(t).
Subcase 1: I 0 j= p(t) ^ :q(t).
By (6.9), I 0 j= b(t) = 1 and by denition of a, I 0 j= a(t) = 0. Thus, I 0 j= a 6= b.
Consequently, in this case I 0 j= ((a;d)pred  (b; c)pred) ^ :(b; c = a;d) or simply
I 0 j= (a;d < b; c).
Subcase 2: I 0 j=p(t) ^ : q(t).
By (6.9), I 0 j= b(t) = 0 and by denition of a, I 0 j= a(t) = 1. Thus, I 0 j= a 6= b.
Consequently, in this case I 0 j= ((a;d)pred  (b; c)pred) ^ :(b; c = a;d) or simply
I 0 j= (a;d < b; c).
We now show by induction that I 0 j= (F (p;p)b )(a;d):
Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing p.
F
(p;p)
b is exactly F thus (F
(p;p)
b )
(a;d) is exactly F (q; q;d) so certainly the claim
holds.
101
Case 2: F is p(t).
F (q;d) is q(t).
F
(p;p)
b is b(t) = 0.
(F
(p;p)
b )
(a;d) is b(t) = 0 ^ a(t) = 0.
By (6.9), I 0 j= b(t) = 0. By denition of a, I 0 j= a(t) = 0.
Case 3: F is p(t).
F (q;d) is q(t).
F
(p;p)
b is b(t) = 1.
(F
(p;p)
b )
(a;d) is b(t) = 1 ^ a(t) = 1.
By (6.9), I 0 j= b(t) = 1. By denition of a, I 0 j= a(t) = 1.
Case 4: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is G! H.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 6: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
By I.H. on G.
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6.4.6 Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2 For any formula F and any interpretation I of the signature of F
that is complete on p, (a) I is a model of SM[F ; p;p; c] i I(p; p)b is a model of
SM[F
(p; p)
b ^ BCb; b; c]. (b) An interpretation J of the signature of F (p; p)b is a
model of SM[F
(p; p)
b ^BCb; b; c] i J = I(p; p)b for some model I of SM[F ; p;p; c].
Proof. For two interpretations I of signature 1 and J of signature 2, by I [ J we
denote the interpretation of signature 1[2 and universe jIj [ jJ j that interprets all
symbols occurring only in 1 in the same way I does and similarly for 2 and J . For
symbols appearing in both 1 and 2, I must interpret these the same as J does, in
which case I [ J also interprets the symbol in this way.
(a)) Assume I j= 1 6= 0 and I j= SM[F ; p; p; c]. Since I j= 1 6= 0, I[I(pp)b j= 1 6= 0
since by denition of I
(pp)
b , I and I
(pp)
b share the same universe. By denition of
I
(pp)
b , I[I(pp)b j= (6:9). Therefore, since I is complete on p and by (6.9), I[I(pp)b j=
BCb. Thus by Theorem 12, I [ I(pp)b j= SM[F ppb ^BCb; b c]$ SM[F ; p; p; c].
Since we assume I j= SM[F ; p; p; c], it is the case that I [ I(pp)b j= SM[F ; p;
p; c] and thus it must be the case that I[I(pp)b j= SM[F (pp)b ; b; c]. Since I[I(pp)b j=
BCb and BCb is a constraint, I [ I(pp)b j= SM[F ppb ^BCb; b; c]. Therefore since the
signature of I does not contain b, we conclude I
(pp)
b j= SM[F (pp)b ^BCb; b; c].
(a() Assume I(pp)b j= SM[F (pp)b ^ BCb; b; c] ^ (1 6= 0). Since I(pp)b j= 1 6=
0, I [ I(pp)b j= 1 6= 0 since by denition of I(pp)b , I and I(pp)b share the same
universe. By denition of I
(pp)
b , I [ I(pp)b j= (6:9). Since we assume I(pp)b j=
SM[F
(pp)
b ^ BCb; b; c], it follows that I(pp)b j= BCb. Thus by Theorem 12, I [
I
(pp)
b j= SM[F (pp)b ^BCb; b; c]$ SM[F ; p; p; c].
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Since we assume I
(pp)
b j= SM[F (pp)b ^BCb; b; c], it is the case that I [ I(pp)b j=
SM[F
(pp)
b ^BCb; b; c] and thus since BCb is a constraint, it follows that I [ I(pp)b j=
SM[F
(pp)
b ; b; c]. It then follows that I [ I(pp)b j= SM[F ; p; p; c]. However since the
signature of I
(pp)
b does not contain p, we conclude I j= SM[F ; p; p; c].
(b)) Assume J j= 1 6= 0 and J j= SM[F (pp)b ^ BCb; b c]. Let I = J b(pp) where
J b(pp) denotes the interpretation of the signature of F
(pp)
b ^ BCb obtained from J
by replacing the boolean function b with the predicate p such that
I j= pI(1; : : : ; k) for all tuples such that bI(1; : : : ; k) = 1 and,
I j=pI(1; : : : ; k) for all tuples such that bI(1; : : : ; k) = 0.
Since J j= BCb, this is a well-dened function.
Clearly, J = I
(pp)
b so it only remains to be shown that I j= SM[F ; p;p; c].
Since I and J have the same universe and J j= 1 6= 0, it follows that I[J j= 1 6= 0.
Also by the denition of J b(pp) I [ J j= (6:9). Also, since J j= BCb, it follows that
I [ J j= BCb.Thus by Theorem 12, I [ J j= SM[F ppb ; b; c]$ SM[F ; p; p; c].
Since we assume J j= SM[F (pp)b ^ BCb; b; c], it is the case that I [ J j=
SM[F
(pp)
b ^ BCb; b; c] and since BCb is a constraint, I [ J j= SM[F (pp)b ; b; c].
Thus it must be the case that I [ J j= SM[F ; p; p; c]. Now since the signature of J
does not contain p, we conclude I j= SM[F ; p; p; c].
(b()Take any I such that J = I(pp)b and I j= SM[F ; p; p; c]. Since J j= 1 6= 0
and I and J share the same universe, I [ J j= 1 6= 0. By denition of J = I(pp)b ,
I[J j= (6:9). Since I is complete on p and I[J j= (6:9), it follows that I[Ibp j= BCb.
Thus by Theorem 12, I [ J j= SM[F ppb ; b; c]$ SM[F ; p; p; c]
Since we assume I j= SM[F ; p; p; c], it is the case that I [ J j= SM[F ; p; p; c]
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and thus it must be the case that I [ J j= SM[F ppb ; b; c]. Since BCb is a constraint,
it then follows that I [ J j= SM[F ppb ^BCb; b; c]. However since the signature of I
does not contain b, we conclude J j= SM[F ppb ^BCb; b; c].
6.4.7 Proof of Theorem 13
Theorem 13 Let c be a set of predicate and function constants, let b be a function
constant, and let F be a (b; c)-plain formula such that every atomic formula containing
b has the form b(t) = 1 or b(t) = 0. Formulas (6.9) and BC b entail
SM[F ; b; c]$ SM[F b(p;p); p; p; c] :
Proof.
For any interpretation I = hI;Xi of signature   fb; p; cg satisfying (6.9) and
BCb, it is clear that I j= F i I j= F b(p;p) since F b(p;p) is simply the result of
replacing all b(x) = 1 with p(x) and all b(x) = 0 with p(x). Thus it only remains
to be shown that I j= :9bb;bc((bb;bc < b; c) ^ F (bb;bc)) i I j= :9cp; bp;bc((cp; bp;bc <
p; p; c)^ (F b(p;p))(cp; bp;bc)) or equivalently, I j= 9bb;bc((bb;bc < b; c)^F ( bf;bc)) i I j=
9cp; bp;bc((cp; bp;bc <p; p; c) ^ (F b(p;p))(cp; bp;bc)).
()) Assume I j= 9bb;bc((bb;bc < b; c) ^ F (bb;bc)). We wish to show that I j=
9cp; bp;bc((cp; bp;bc <p; p; c) ^ (F b(p;p))(cp; bp;bc))
That is, take any function a of the same arity as b and any list of predicates
and functions d of the same length c. Now let I 0 = hI [ J (b;c)(a;d); X [ Y cd i be from
an extended signature 0 =  [ fa; q;dg where J is an interpretation of functions
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from the signature  and I and J agree on all symbols not occurring in fb; cg. J (b;c)(a;d)
denotes the interpretation from 
(b;c)
(a;d) (the signature obtained from  by replacing b
with a and all elements of c with all elements of d) obtained from the interpretation
J by replacing b with a and the functions in c with the corresponding functions in
d. Similarly, Y cd is the interpretation from 
0 obtained from the interpretation Y by
replacing predicates from c by the corresponding predicates from d. We assume
I 0 j= (a;d < b; c ^ F (a;d))
and wish to show that there are predicates q, q of the same arity as p, p such that
I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c ^ (F b(p;p))(q; q;d)):
We dene the new predicates q, q in terms of b and a as follows:
q(x)$ a(x) = 0 ^ b(x) = 0
q(x)$ a(x) = 1 ^ b(x) = 1
We rst show if I 0 j= (a;d < b; c) then I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c):
Observe that from the denition of q and q, it follows that I 0 j= 8x(q(x)! b(x) =
0) ^ 8x(q(x) ! b(x) = 1) and from (6.9), this is equivalent to I 0 j= 8x(q(x) !
p(x))^8x(q(x)! p(x)) or simply I 0 j=q; q p; p. Thus, since I 0 j= dpred  cpred,
it follows that I 0 j= q;dpred  p; cpred.
Case 1: I 0 j= 8x(b(x) = a(x)).
In this case it then must be that I 0 j= d 6= c. Thus it follows that I 0 j=q; q;d 6=
p; p; c. Consequently we conclude that
I 0 j= (q; q;dpred p; p; cpred)^ q; q;d 6=p; p; c
or simply, I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c).
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Case 2: I 0 j= :8xy(b(x) = a(x)).
That is, since I 0 j= BCb, there is some list of object names t such that either I 0 j=
b(t) = 0 ^ a(t) 6= 0 or I 0 j= b(t) = 1 ^ a(t) 6= 1.
Subcase 1: I 0 j= b(t) = 0 ^ a(t) 6= 0
By (6.9), I 0 j=p(t) and by denition of q, I 0 j= : q(t) so I 0 j=q 6=p.
Subcase 2: I 0 j= b(t) = 1 ^ a(t) 6= 1
By (6.9), I 0 j= p(t) and by denition of q, I 0 j= :q(t) so I 0 j= q 6= p.
Therefore, no matter which subcase holds, we have q; q 6=p; p and thus q; q;d 6=
p; p; c. Consequently we conclude
I 0 j= (q; q;dpred p; p; cpred)^ q; q;d 6=p; p; c
or simply, I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c).
We now show by induction that I 0 j= (F b(p;p))(q; q;d):
Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing b.
F b(p;p) is exactly F thus F
(a;d) is exactly (F b(p;p))
(q; q;d) so certainly the claim
holds.
Case 2: F is b(t) = 0.
F (a;d) is b(t) = 0 ^ a(t) = 0.
F b(p;p) is p(t).
(F b(p;p))
(q; q;d) is q(t).
By the denition of q, it is clear that I 0 j= (F b(p;p))(q; q;d) so certainly the claim
holds.
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Case 3: F is b(t) = 1.
F (a;d) is b(t) = 1 ^ a(t) = 1.
F b(p;p) is p(t).
(F b(p;p))
(q; q;d) is q(t).
By the denition of q, it is clear that I 0 j= (F b(p;p))(q; q;d) so certainly the claim
holds.
Case 4: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is G! H.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 6: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
By I.H. on G.
(() Assume I j= 9cp; bp;bc((cp; bp;bc <p; p; c) ^ (F b(p;p))(cp; bp;bc)). We wish to
show that I j= 9bb;bc((bb;bc < b; c) ^ F (bb;bc))
That is, take any predicates q, q of the same arity as p, p and any list of
predicates and functions d of the same length as c and let I 0 = hI [ J (b;c)(a;d); X [ Y cd i
is dened as before. We assume
I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c ^ (F b(p;p))(q; q;d))
and wish to show that there is a function a of the same arity as b such that
I 0 j= (a;d < b; c ^ F (a;d)):
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We dene the new function a in terms of p, p, q, and q as follows:
a(x) = 1$ ((p(x) ^ q(x)) _ (p(x) ^ : q(x)))
a(x) = 0$ ((p(x)^ q(x)) _ (p(x) ^ :q(x)))
Note that since I 0 j= (6:9) and I 0 j= q; q;d < p; p; c this is a well-dened
function.
We rst show if I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c) then I 0 j= (a;d < b; c):
Observe that I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c) by denition entails I 0 j= (q; q;dpred 
p; p; cpred) and further by denition, I 0 j= (dpred  cpred) and then since b and a are
not predicates, I 0 j= ((a;d)pred  (b; c)pred).
Case 1: I 0 j= 8x(p(x)$ q(x)) ^ 8x(p(x)$q(x)).
In this case, I 0 j= (p; p =q; q) so for it to be the case that I 0 j= (q; q;d <p; p; c),
it must be that I 0 j= :(c = d). It then follows that I 0 j= :(b; c = a;d). Consequently
in this case, I 0 j= ((a;d)pred  (b; c)pred) ^ :(b; c = a;d) or simply I 0 j= (a;d < b; c).
Case 2: I 0 j= :(8xy(p(x)$ q(x)) ^ 8x(p(x)$q(x))).
Since I 0 j=q; q <p; p and I 0 j= (6:9), there is some list of object names t such that
either I 0 j= p(t) ^ :q(t) or I 0 j=p(t) ^ : q(t).
Subcase 1: I 0 j= p(t) ^ :q(t).
By (6.9) I 0 j= b(t) = 1 and by denition of a, I 0 j= a(t) = 0. Thus, I 0 j= a 6= b.
Consequently, in this case I 0 j= ((a;d)pred  (b; c)pred) ^ :(b; c = a;d) or simply
I 0 j= (a;d < b; c).
Subcase 2: I 0 j=p(t) ^ : q(t).
By (6.9) I 0 j= b(t) = 0 and by denition of a, I 0 j= a(t) = 1. Thus, I 0 j= a 6= b.
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Consequently, in this case I 0 j= ((a;d)pred  (b; c)pred) ^ :(b; c = a;d) or simply
I 0 j= (a;d < b; c).
We now show by induction that I 0 j= F (a;d):
Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing b.
F b(p;p) is exactly F thus F
(a;d) is exactly (F b(p;p))
(q;d) so certainly the claim
holds.
Case 2: F is b(t) = 0.
F (a;d) is b(t) = 0 ^ a(t) = 0.
F b(p;p) is p(t).
(F b(p;p))
(q;d) is q(t).
By (6.9), I 0 j= b(t) = 0. By denition of a, I 0 j= a(t) = 0.
Case 3: F is b(t) = 1.
F (a;d) is b(t) = 1 ^ a(t) = 1.
F b(p;p) is p(t).
(F b(p;p))
(q;d) is q(t).
By (6.9), I 0 j= b(t) = 1. By denition of a, I 0 j= a(t) = 1.
Case 4: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is G! H.
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By I.H. on G and H.
Case 6: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
By I.H. on G.
6.4.8 Proof of Corollary 3
Corollary 3 Let c be a set of predicate and function constants, let b be a function
constant, and let F be a (b; c)-plain sentence such that every atomic formula contain-
ing b has the form b(t) = 1 or b(t) = 0. (a) A coherent interpretation I of the signature
of F is a model of SM[F ^BC b; b; c] i Ib(p;p) is a model of SM[F b(p;p); p;p; c]. (b)
An interpretation J of the signature of F b(p;p) is a model of SM[F
b
(p;p); p; p; c] i
J = Ib(p;p) for some model I of SM[F ^ BC b; b; c].
Proof.
For two interpretations I of signature 1 and J of signature 2, by I[J we denote
the interpretation of signature 1[2 and universe jIj[jJ j that interprets all symbols
occurring only in 1 in the same way I does and similarly for 2 and J . For symbols
appearing in both 1 and 2, I must interpret these the same as J does, in which
case I [ J also interprets the symbol in this way.
(a)) Assume I j= SM[F ; b; c] ^ (1 6= 0). Since I j= 1 6= 0, I [ Ibp j= 1 6= 0
since by denition of Ibp, I and I
b
p share the same universe. By denition of I
b
p,
I [ Ibp j= (6:9). Since we assume I j= SM[F ^ BFb; b; c], it follows that I j= BFb
which further means that I j= BCb and so I [ Ibp j= BCb. Thus by Theorem 13,
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I [ Ibp j= SM[F ^BFb; b; c]$ SM[(F ^BFb)bp; p; p; c].
Since we assume I j= SM[F^BFb; b; c], it is the case that I[Ibp j= SM[F^BFb; b; c]
and thus it must be the case that I [ Ibp j= SM[(F ^ BFb)bp; p; p; c]. However since
the signature of I does not contain p, we conclude Ibp j= SM[(F ^BFb)bp; p; p; c].
(a() Assume I j= 1 6= 0 and Ibp j= SM[(F ^ BFb)bp; p; p; c]. Since I j= 1 6= 0,
I[Ibp j= 1 6= 0 since by denition of Ibp, I and Ibp share the same universe. By denition
of Ibp, I [ Ibp j= (6:9). Therefore, since Ibp j= (BFb)bp, it follows that I j= BFb and thus,
I[Ibp j= BCb. Thus by Theorem 13, I[Ibp j= SM[F ^BFb; b; c]$ SM[(F ^BFb)bp; p;
p; c].
Since we assume Ibp j= SM[(F^BFb)bp; p; p; c], it is the case that I[Ibp j= SM[(F^
BFb)
b
p; p; p; c] and thus it must be the case that I[Ibp j= SM[F^BFb; b; c]. Therefore
since the signature of Ibp does not contain b, we conclude I j= SM[F ^BFb; b; c].
(b)) Assume J j= 1 6= 0 and J j= SM[(F ^BFb)bp; pc]. Let I = Jpb where Jpb denotes
the interpretation of the signature of F obtained from J by replacing the predicate p
with the boolean function b such that
bI(1; : : : ; k) = 1 for all tuples such that I j= pI(1; : : : ; k),
bI(1; : : : ; k) = 0 for all tuples such that I j=pI(1; : : : ; k). Since J j= (BFb)bp, this
is a well-dened function.
Clearly, J = Ibp so it only remains to be shown that I j= SM[F ^BFb; b; c].
Since I and J have the same universe and J j= 1 6= 0, it follows that I[J j= 1 6= 0.
Also by the denition of Jpb I [ J j= (6:9). Also, since J j= (BFb)bp, it follows that
I j= BFb and thus, I [ J j= BCb. Thus by Theorem 13, I [ J j= SM[F ^BFb; b; c]$
SM[(F ^BFb)bp ^ CC p; pc]
Since we assume J j= SM[(F ^ BFb)bp; p; p; c], it is the case that I [ J j=
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SM[(F ^BFb)bp; p; p; c] and thus it must be the case that I [J j= SM[F ^BFb; b; c].
Now since the signature of J does not contain b, we conclude I j= SM[F ^BFb; b; c].
(b()Take any I such that J = Ibp and I j= SM[F ^ BFb; b; c]. Since J j= 1 6= 0
and I and J share the same universe, I [ J j= 1 6= 0. By denition of J = Ibp,
I [ J j= (6:9). Since we assume I j= SM[F ^ BFb; b; c], it follows that I j= BFb
which further means that I j= BCb and so I [ Ibp j= BFb. Thus by Theorem 13,
I [ J j= SM[F ^BFb; b; c]$ SM[(F ^BFb)bp;p; p; c]
Since we assume I j= SM[F ; b; c], it is the case that I [ J j= SM[F ; b; c] and thus
it must be the case that I [ J j= SM[F b(p;p) ^ CC p; p; p; c]. However since the
signature of I does not contain p, we conclude J j= SM[F b(p;p) ^ CC p; p; p; c].
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Chapter 7
ELIMINATING INTENSIONAL FUNCTIONS IN FAVOR OF INTENSIONAL
PREDICATES
7.1 Multi-valued Propositional Formulas
We rst consider the simpler task of turning multi-valued propositional formulas
into propositional formulas. We show that multi-valued stable model semantics can
be viewed as a special case of the propositional stable model semantics. Let  be
a multi-valued signature, and let prop be the propositional signature consisting of
all propositional atoms c = v where c 2  and v 2 Dom(c). For example, for
 in Example 7, prop is the set fAmount0 = 0; : : : ;Amount0 = 10; Amount0 =
1; : : : ;Amount1=10; FillUp = t; FillUp = fg, where each element is understood as
a propositional atom. 1 We identify a multi-valued interpretation of  with the
corresponding set of propositional atoms from prop. It is clear that a multi-valued
interpretation I of signature  satises a multi-valued propositional formula F i
I satises F when F is viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop. Also,
it is not dicult to show that multi-valued formulas can be turned into standard
propositional formulas having the same classical models. Less obvious is whether
such a translation exists while keeping same stable models. Theorem 14 below shows
such a translation.
Given a multi-valued signature , by UC  (\Uniqueness Constraint") we denote
1We could have included in prop dierent expressions such as c(v) in place of c= v. Viewing
c= v as both multi-valued atoms and propositional atoms under dierent signatures simplies the
formal statements.
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the conjunction of ^
v 6=w j v;w2Dom(c)
:(c = v ^ c = w) (7.1)
for all c 2 , and by EC  (\Existence Constraint") we denote the conjunction of
::
_
v2Dom(c)
c = v ; (7.2)
for all c 2 . By UEC  we denote the conjunction of (10.1) and (7.2) for all c 2 .
The following theorem tells us that the functional stable model semantics for
multi-valued propositional formulas can be reduced to the stable model semantics
for classical propositional formulas in Ferraris (2005). In other words, checking the
uniqueness of functions coincides with checking the minimality of propositional atoms
under the stable model semantics.
Theorem 14 Let F be a multi-valued propositional formula of signature , which
can be also viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop.
(a) If an interpretation I of  is a multi-valued stable model of F , then I can be
viewed as an interpretation of prop that is a propositional stable model of F ^
UEC  in the sense of Ferraris (2005).
(b) If an interpretation I of prop is a propositional stable model of F ^ UEC  in
the sense of Ferraris (2005), then I can be viewed as an interpretation of  that
is a multi-valued stable model of F .
Example 6 continued UEC  is
::(c=1 _ c=2 _ c=3) ^ :(c=1 ^ c=2)
^:(c=2 ^ c=3) ^ :(c=1 ^ c=3) :
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Note that the presence of :: in (7.2) is essential for Theorem 14 to be valid.
For instance, consider the signature containing only one constant d whose domain is
f1; 2g and F to be >. F has no multi-valued stable models, but F ^ :(d=1 ^ d=
2) ^ (d=1 _ d=2) has two propositional stable models: fd=1g and fd=2g.
7.2 Eliminating Intensional Functions from c-Plain Formulas
We now show how to eliminate intensional functions in favor of intensional predi-
cates. Doing so yields two useful results. First, we can compute models of a formula
under the functional stable model semantics using state-of-the-art ASP solvers. Sec-
ond, results established for the rst-order stable model semantics Ferraris et al. (2011)
can be established for the functional stable model semantics by eliminating the in-
tensional functions.
Unlike the previous chapter, the result is rst established for f -plain formulas,
and then extended to allow \synonymity" rules.
Recall the denition of f -plain from Section 5.4
For a function constant f , a rst-order formula is called f -plain if each atomic
formula
 does not contain f , or
 is of the form f(t) = u where t is a tuple of terms not containing f , and u is a
term not containing f .
For a list f of function constants, we say that F is f -plain if F is f -plain for each
member f of f .
Let F be an f -plain formula, where f is an intensional function constant. Formula
F fp is obtained from F as follows:
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 in the signature of F , replace f with a new intensional predicate constant p of
arity n+ 1, where n is the arity of f ;
 replace each subformula f(t) = c in F with p(t; c).
By UEC p we denote the following formulas that enforce the functional image on
the predicates:
8xyz(y 6= z ^ p(x; y) ^ p(x; z)! ?);
::8x9y p(x; y);
(7.3)
where x is a n-tuple of variables, and all variables in x, y, and z are pairwise distinct.
Note that each formula is a constraint. Clearly, UEC p is strongly equivalent to
::8x9!y p(x; y) (7.4)
and also classically equivalent to
8x9!y p(x; y) : (7.5)
Example 13 continued
Recall the example from Section 6.2 that describes the eect of a monkey moving.
We eliminate the function Loc in favor of an intensional predicate Locp to obtain
F LocLocp ^ UEC Locp , which is the conjunction of the universal closures of the following
formulas:
Locp(Monkey ; 0; L1);
Locp(Monkey ; 1; L2);
Move(Monkey ; l; t)! Locp(Monkey ; t+ 1; l);
8wxyz(y 6= z ^ Locp(w; x; y) ^ Locp(w; x; z)! ?);
::8wx9y(Locp(w; x; y)):
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Theorem 15 For any f -plain formula F , formulas 8xy(p(x; y) $ f(x) = y),
9xy(x 6= y) entail
SM[F ; fc]$ SM[F fp ; pc]:
The following corollary shows that there is a simple 1{1 correspondence between
the stable models of F and the stable models of F fp ^UEC p. Recall that the signature
of F fp is obtained from the signature of F by replacing f with p. For any interpretation
I of the signature of F , by Ifp we denote the interpretation of the signature of F
f
p
obtained from I by replacing the function f I with the set pI that consists of the tuples
h1; : : : ; n; f I(1; : : : ; n)i
for all 1; : : : ; n from the universe of I.
Corollary 4 Let F be an f -plain sentence. (a) An interpretation I of the signature
of F that satises 9xy(x 6= y) is a model of SM[F ; fc] i Ifp is a model of SM[F fp ; pc].
(b) An interpretation J of the signature of F fp that satises 9xy(x 6= y) is a model of
SM[F fp ^ UEC p; pc] i J = Ifp for some model I of SM[F ; fc].
Theorem 15 and Corollary 4 are similar to Theorem 3 and Corollary 5 from Lif-
schitz and Yang (2011), which are about eliminating explainable functions in non-
monotonic causal logic in favor of explainable predicates.
The method above eliminates only one intensional function constant at a time, but
repeated applications can eliminate all intensional functions f from a given f -plain
formula. This allows us to represent the f -plain formula by a logic program.
7.3 Non-c-plain formulas
We expect that many domains can be described by f -plain formulas, but we know
of some concepts where f -plain formulas are limited. One limitation is in capturing
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the many-sorted functional stable model semantics within the nonsorted functional
stable model semantics, which will be described in detail in Section 8.4. Another is
when we want to express \synonymity" rules Lee et al. (2010); Lifschitz and Yang
(2011) that have the form
B ! f1(t1) = f2(t2); (7.6)
where f1, f2 are intensional function constants in f , and t1, t2 are tuples of terms not
containing members of f . This rule expresses that we believe f1(t1) to be \synony-
mous" to f2(t2) under condition B. We can eliminate f1 and f2 in favor of predicate
constants p1 and p2 as follows.
We consider a more general case than an f -plain formula. We dene a new class
of f -plain-syn formulas in which every atomic formula
 does not contain any member of f , or
 is of the form f(t) = u where f is in f , symbol t is a tuple of terms not
containing any member of f , and u is a term not containing any member of f ,
or
 is of the form f1(t1) = f2(t2) where f1, f2 are in f , symbols t1 and t2 are tuples
of terms not containing any member of f .
Example 16 Consider the Gears World domain in which there are two gears, and
one is attached to a motor which turns the gear at 1 revolution per minute. If the
gears are moved close together, the gears spin at the same rate. We can describe using
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the following f -plain-syn formula.
gear1speed(t) = 1
Choice(gear2speed(t) = 0)
Choice(moveGearsTogether(0))
moveGearsTogether(0)! gearsConnected(1)
gearsConnected(t)! gear1speed(t) = gear2speed(t)
One stable model of this is I where
gear1speed(0)I = 1; gear1speed(1)I = 1;
gear2speed(0)I = 0; gear2speed(1)I = 1;
moveGearsTogether(0)I = t; moveGearsTogether(1)I = f
gearsConnected(0)I = f ; gearsConnected(1)I = t:
Let F be an f -plain-syn formula. The elimination is done by extending the
previous method by turning atomic formulas of the form f1(t1) = f2(t2) into
8y(p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y));
where p1, p2 are new intensional predicate constants corresponding to f1, f2.
F fp is dened similar to F
f
p except that it applies to the list of symbols.
Theorem 16 For any f -plain-syn formula F , the set of formulas 8xy(p(x; y) $
f(x) = y) for each f 2 f and the corresponding p, and 9xy(x 6= y) entail
SM[F ;fq]$ SM[F fp ;pq]:
Unlike in Theorem 15, the elimination in Theorem 16 applies to the list of in-
tensional functions simultaneously. Applying the result of Theorem 10 to F fp results
in an f -plain formula, and so the composition of these two translations reveals that
f -plain-syn formula F can actually be transformed into f -plain formulas.
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Example 16 continued Using Theorem 16, we can eliminate the functions in the
Gears World example in favor of predicates to get the formula F
gear1speed(t; 1)
Choice(gear2speed(t; 0))
Choice(moveGearsTogether(0))
moveGearsTogether(0)! gearsConnected(1)
gearsConnected(t)! 8x(gear1speed(t; x)$ gear2speed(t; x))
Then, the interpretation I with jIj = f0; 1g satisfying
8tx(gear1speed(t) = x$ gear1speed(t; x))
8tx(gear2speed(t) = x$ gear2speed(t; x))
9xy(x 6= y)
such that both 0 and 1 mapped to themselves and
gear1speed(0; 1)I = t; gear1speed(1; 1)I = t;
gear2speed(0; 0)I = t; gear2speed(1; 1)I = t;
moveGearsTogether(0)I = t; moveGearsTogether(1)I = f
gearsConnected(0)I = f ; gearsConnected(1)I = t:
is a stable model of F .
7.4 Unfolding
In an attempt to relax the syntactic restrictions in the previous two sections, we
have investigated transformations that turn non-c-plain formulas into c-plain formu-
las. In this section, we present one such method which we call \unfolding".
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The process of unfolding F w.r.t. c, denoted by UF c(F ), is formally dened as
follows.
 If F is of the form p(t1; : : : ; tn) (n  0) such that tk1 ; : : : ; tkj are all the terms
in t1; : : : ; tn that contain some members of c, then UF c(p(t1; : : : ; tn)) is
9x1 : : : xj

p(t1; : : : ; tn)
00 ^
^
1ij
UF c(tki = xi)

where p(t1; : : : ; tn)
00 is obtained from p(t1; : : : ; tn) by replacing each tki with the
variable xi.
 If F is of the form f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0 (n  0) such that tk1 ; : : : ; tkj are all the
terms in t0; : : : ; tn that contain some members of c, then UF c(f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0)
is
9x1 : : : xj

(f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0)
00 ^
^
0ij
UF c(tki = xi)

where (f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0)
00 is obtained from f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0 by replacing each
tki with the variable xi.
 UF c(F G) is UF c(F ) UF c(G) where  2 f^;_;!g.
 UF c(QxF ) is Qx UF c(F (x)) where Q 2 f8;9g.
It is clear that UF c(F ) is equivalent to F under classical logic. However, in
general, UF c(F ) and F do not have the same stable models.
Example 17 Consider when F is p(f) ^ p(1) ^ p(2). UF f (F ) is 9x(p(x) ^ f =
x) ^ p(1) ^ p(2). For an interpretation I such that f I = 1 and the universe jIj is
f1; 2g, I is a stable model of UF f (F ) but not of F , which we can easily see observing
the reducts with respect to I.
F I is p(f) ^ p(1) ^ p(2), while
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UF f (F )
I is equivalent to f = 1 ^ p(1) ^ p(2).
Then, we can see that the interpretation J such that fJ = 2 and jJ j = jIj = f1; 2g
satises J <(f;g) I. Now, J j= F I but J 6j= UF (f;g)(F )I .
The following corollary shows that this method does preserve the stable models
of formulas that are tight and in Clark Normal Form. And from this, combined with
Theorem 15, we see another class of formulas for which we can eliminate intensional
functions in favor of intensional predicates.
Corollary 5 Let F be a formula in Clark Normal Form that is tight on c. SM[F ; c]$
SM[UF c(F ); c].
7.5 Attempts at Generalizing Unfolding
While the syntactic restrictions in the previous sections{f -plain, f -plain-syn, and
tight formulas in Clark Normal Form{are suitable for expressing many domains, it
would be ideal to have a single general result that reveals how intensional functions
may be eliminated in terms of intensional predicates. However, all attempts to convert
non-c-plain formulas into c-plain formulas while preserving the stable models have
proven fruitless.
In del Cerro et al. (2013), an attempt was made at establishing a Gentzen-style
system for the functional stable model semantics. Theorem 2 in del Cerro et al. (2013)
claimed that formulas that could be shown to be equivalent through the Gentzen-style
system were strongly equivalent to each other. However, we were able to show that
the formula p(f) and 9x(p(x)^f = x) could be shown to be equivalent in the Gentzen-
style system. Example 17 in the previous section, demonstrates that these formulas
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are not strongly equivalent. The authors revised the Gentzen-style system in Cabalar
et al. (2014) so that it no longer had this defect. Unfortunately, the new system no
longer hinted at a way to convert non-c-plain formulas into c-plain formulas while
preserving the stable models.
In fact, we are able to make a strong claim about the inability to nd such a trans-
formation. A modular translation is one that can be performed on conjunctive sub-
formulas independently of each other. This is important for supporting elaboration-
tolerance; if an elaboration E is introduced to a formula F , a modular translation T
is one such that T (F ^ E) is strongly equivalent to T (F ) ^ T (E).
Theorem 17 There is no modular, signature-preserving translation that turns any
sentence F into a c-plain sentence F 0 such that SM[F ; c] is equivalent to SM[F 0; c]
for any list c of constants.
124
7.6 Proofs
7.6.1 Proof of Theorem 14
Lemma 16 Assume that K and X are multi-valued interpretations of  and Y is a
propositional interpretation of prop which is a subset of X such that
K(c) = X(c) i c = X(c) 2 Y:
We have that K j= FX (when we view F as a multi-valued formula of ) i Y j= FX
(when we view F as a propositional formula of prop).
Proof. By induction on F. We show only the case of atoms. The other cases are
straightforward.
Let F be an atom c = v. If X j= c = v, then FX is F . The claim follows from
the assumption since K j= c = v i Y j= c = v. If X 6j= c = v, then FX is ?, which
neither K nor Y satises.
Theorem 14 Let F be a multi-valued propositional formula of signature , which
can be also viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop.
(a) If an interpretation I of  is a multi-valued stable model of F , then I can
be viewed as an interpretation of prop that is a propositional stable model
of F ^ UEC  in the sense of Ferraris (2005).
(b) If an interpretation I of prop is a propositional stable model of F ^ UEC  in
the sense of Ferraris (2005), then I can be viewed as an interpretation of  that
is a multi-valued stable model of F .
Proof. (a) Assume X of signature  is a stable model of F . This means X j= F
and no multi-valued interpretation K dierent from X satises FX . Now since X is
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a multi-valued intepretation, X j= UEC. Then clearly X j= F when viewed as a
propositional formula of signature prop.
So, we wish to show that there is no interpretation Y of signature prop such that
Y  X when X is viewed as a set of propositional atoms and Y j= (F ^ UEC)X
when viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop. To do so, we prove the
contrapositive. We will show that if there is an interpretation Y of signature prop
such that Y  X when X is viewed as a set of propositional atoms and Y j= (F ^
UEC)
X when viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop, then there is an
interpretation K dierent from X that satises FX when viewed as a multi-valued
formula of signature .
Given such an interpretation Y , we create K as follows. For each c 2 ,
K(c) =
8><>: v if c = v 2 Ymc(v) : if c = v 2 X and c = v =2 Y
where mc is any mapping from m : Dom(c) ! Dom(c) such that m(x) 6= x. Note
that this requires that every Dom(c) have at least two elements. Note that since
Y  X, there is at least one c 2  and v 2 Dom(c) such that c = v 2 X but
c = v =2 Y . For this c, K(c) = m(X(c)) 6= X(c) so K and X are dierent.
In addition, we have that K(c) = X(c) i c = X(c) 2 Y . Now, since Y j=
(F ^ UEC)X , it follows that Y j= FX . Thus, from Lemma 16 it follows that since
Y j= FX , then K j= FX .
(b) Assume X of signature prop is a stable model of F ^ UEC. This means that
X j= F ^ UEC and no interpretation Y such that Y  X satises (F ^ UEC)X .
Since X j= UEC, then X can be viewed as a multi-valued interpretation. Then
clearly, X j= F .
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Now, we wish to show that there is no interpretation K of signature  that is
dierent from X satisfying FX . To do so, we prove the contrapositive. We will show
that if there is an interpretation K of signature  dierent from X and K j= FX ,
then there is an interpretation Y such that Y  X that satises (F ^UEC)X . Now
since we already have seen that X j= UEC, then (UEC)X is equivalent to > so we
need only show that there is an interpretation Y such that Y  X that satises FX .
Given such an interpretation K, we create Y as follows. Let us view K as a set
of propositional atoms. We will take Y = X \K. Clearly Y  X. In addition, we
have that K(c) = X(c) i c = X(c) 2 Y . Thus, from Lemma 16 it follows that since
Y j= FX , then K j= FX .
7.6.2 Proof of Theorem 15
Theorem 15 For any f -plain formula F ,
8xy(p(x; y)$ f(x) = y) (7.7)
and 9xy(x 6= y) entail
SM[F ; fc]$ SM[F fp ; pc]:
Proof.
This is precisely the statement of Lemma 13.
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7.6.3 Proof of Corollary 4
Corollary 4 Let F be an f -plain sentence. (a) An interpretation I of the signature
of F that satises 9xy(x 6= y) is a model of SM[F ; fc] i Ifp is a model of SM[F fp ; pc].
(b) An interpretation J of the signature of F fp that satises 9xy(x 6= y) is a model of
SM[F fp ^ UEC p; pc] i J = Ifp for some model I of SM[F ; fc].
Proof.
This is precisely the same statement as Lemma 14.
7.6.4 Proof of Theorem 16
Lemma 17 Given two lists of predicate and function constants c and d whose ele-
ments are in one-to-one correspondence, two lists of predicate constants p and q and
two lists of function constants f and g all of the same length, a formula F of signature
  c[f that is f -plain, and an interpretation I over a signature 0  [d[p[q[g
that satises
8xy(p(x; y)$ f(x) = y) (7.8)
for each corresponding p and f in p and f respectively,
8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y) (7.9)
for each corresponding q, f , and g in q, f , and g respectively, and
8xy(f1(x) = f2(y)! g1(x) = g2(y) (7.10)
for each corresponding f1,f2 and g1,g2 in f and g respectively, if I j= (F fp )(qd), then
I j= F (gd).
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Proof. By induction on F .
Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing any f from f .
F fp is exactly F thus F
(gd) is exactly (F fp )
(qd) so certainly the claim holds.
Case 2: F is f(t) = c where f 2 f and t and c contain no elements from f .
F (gd) is f(t) = c ^ g(t) = c.
F fp is p(t; c).
(F fp )
(qd) is q(t; c).
Since I j= (7:9) for every corresponding q, f , and g in q, f , and g respectively, it
immediately follows that I j= F (gd) i I j= (F fp )(qd).
Case 3: F is of the form f1(t1) = f2(t2) where f1 and f2 are intensional and neither
t1 nor t2 contains intensional constants.
F (gd) is f1(t1) = f2(t2) ^ g1(t1) = g2(t2).
F fp is 8y(p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y)).
(F fp )
(gd) is 8y((p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y)) ^ (q1(t1; y)$ q2(t2; y))).
which is further equivalent to 8y(p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y)) ^ 8y(q1(t1; y)$ q2(t2; y)):
Since I j= (7:8) for every corresponding p and f in p and f respectively, it is clear
that I j= f1(t1) = f2(t2) i I j= 8y((p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y)). We consider two cases.
 If I 6j= f1(t1) = f2(t2), then clearly, I 6j= F (gd) and by the previous observation
I 6j= (F fp )(gd) so the claim holds.
 Otherwise, I j= f1(t1) = f2(t2). Now, since I j= (7:10) for each corresponding
f1,f2 and g1,g2, we have that I j= g1(t1) = g2(t2) and so I j= F (gd). If f1(t1) =
g1(t1) (and thus f2(t2) = g2(t2)), then since I j= (7:9) for each corresponding q,
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f , and g in q, f , and g respectively, I j= q1(t1; ) for f1(t1)I =  and similarly
I j= q2(t2; ). If on the other hand f1(t1) 6= g1(t1) (and thus f2(t2) 6= g2(t2)),
then I 6j= q1(t1; ) for any . In either case, we conclude I j= 8y(q1(t1; y) $
q2(t2; y)).
Case 4: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is G! H.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 6: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
By I.H. on G.
Lemma 18 Given two lists of predicate and function constants c and d whose ele-
ments are in one-to-one correspondence, two lists of predicate constants p and q and
two lists of function constants f and g all of the same length, a formula F of signature
  c[f that is f -plain, and an interpretation I over a signature 0  [d[p[q[g
that satises
8xy(p(x; y)$ f(x) = y) (7.11)
for each corresponding p and f in p and f respectively,
8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y) (7.12)
for each corresponding q, f , and g in q, f , and g respectively, if I j= F (gd), then
I j= (F fp )(qd).
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Proof. By induction on F .
Case 1: F is an atomic formula not containing any f from f .
F fp is exactly F thus F
(gd) is exactly (F fp )
(qd) so certainly the claim holds.
Case 2: F is f(t) = c where f 2 f and t and c contain no elements from f .
F (gd) is f(t) = c ^ g(t) = c.
F fp is p(t; c).
(F fp )
(qd) is q(t; c).
Since I j= (7:12) for every corresponding q, f , and g in q, f , and g respectively, it
immediately follows that I j= F (gd) i I j= (F fp )(qd).
Case 3: F is of the form f1(t1) = f2(t2) where f1 and f2 are intensional and neither
t1 nor t2 contains intensional constants.
F (gd) is f1(t1) = f2(t2) ^ g1(t1) = g2(t2).
F fp is 8y(p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y)).
(F fp )
(gd) is 8y((p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y)) ^ (q1(t1; y)$ q2(t2; y))).
which is further equivalent to 8y(p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y)) ^ 8y(q1(t1; y)$ q2(t2; y)):
Since I j= (7:11) for every corresponding p and f in p and f respectively, it is clear
that I j= f1(t1) = f2(t2) i I j= 8y((p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y)). We consider two cases.
 If I 6j= f1(t1) = f2(t2), then clearly, I 6j= F (gd) and by the previous observation
I 6j= (F fp )(gd) so the claim holds.
 Otherwise, I j= f1(t1) = f2(t2). Now, if I j= f1(t1) = g1(t1), then since we
assume I j= F (gd), we have I j= f2(t2) = g2(t2). Thus, since I j= (7:12), it
follows that I j= q1(t1; ) ^ q2(t2; )) for f1(t1)I =  and for all other 0 6= ,
131
I j= :q1(t1; )^:q2(t2; )). If on the other hand I 6j= f1(t1) = g1(t1), then since
we assume I j= F (gd), we have I 6j= f2(t2) = g2(t2). Thus, since I j= (7:12),
it follows that I j= :q1(t1; ) ^ q2(t2; )) for all . In either case we conclude
I j= 8y(q1(t1; y)$ q2(t2; y)) so the claim holds.
Case 4: F is GH where  2 f^;_g.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is G! H.
By I.H. on G and H.
Case 6: F is QxG(x) where Q 2 f8; 9g.
By I.H. on G.
Lemma 19 Given two lists of predicate and function constants c and d whose ele-
ments are in one-to-one correspondence, two lists of predicate constants p and q and
two lists of function constants f and g all of the same length, a formula F of signature
  c[f that is f -plain, and an interpretation I over a signature 0  [d[p[q[g
that satises
8xy(p(x; y)$ f(x) = y) (7.13)
for each corresponding p and f in p and f respectively and
8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y) (7.14)
for each corresponding q, f , and g in q, f , and g respectively, I j= gd < fc i
I j= qd < pc.
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Proof. ()) Assume I j= gd < fc. By denition, it follows that I j= (gd)pred 
(fc)pred and since g and f contain no predicates, we have I j= dpred  cpred.
The following arguments are made for corresponding tuples of p, q, f , and g from
p, q, f , and g respectively. Since we assume I j= (7:14), it follows that I j=
8xy(q(x; y) ! f(x) = y). Then from the assumption that I j= (7:13), it follows
that I j= 8xy(q(x; y)! p(x; y)) or simply that I j= q  p, from which it follows that
I j= (qd)pred  (pc)pred.
Now since I j= gd < fc, it follows that I j= :(gd = fc). We consider two cases
 If I j= :(d = c) for some corresponding d and c in d and c respectively, then
we have I j= :(d = c) and further, I j= :(qd = pc).
 Otherwise, it must be that I j= :(g = f) for some corresponding g and f in g
and f respectively. That is, for some  and , I 6j= f() =  $ g() = . For
a given , I maps f() to exactly one  and similarly for g() and so it follows
that I 6j= f() =  ^ g() =  for every . Since I j= (7:14), I 6j= q(; ) for
every . However, since I j= f() =  for some , from I j= (7:13), we know
I j= p(; ) for some . Thus, I j= :(q = p) and further I j= :(qd = pc).
From either case, we then conclude that I j= qd < pc.
(() Assume I j= qd < pc. By denition, it follows that I j= (qd)pred  (pc)pred and
further, we have I j= dpred  cpred. Then, since f and g do not contain predicates,
we have I j= (gd)pred  (fc)pred.
Now since I j= qd < pc, it follows that I j= :(qd = pc). We consider two cases
 If I j= :(d = c) for some corresponding d and c in d and c respectively, then
we have I j= :(d = c) and further, I j= :(gd = fc)
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 Otherwise, it must be that I j= :(q = p) for some corresponding q and p from
q and p respectively. That is, for some  and , I 6j= q(; ) $ p(; ). Since
I j= (7:13), there is exactly one  and  such that I j= p(; ), which further
means that I j= f() = . Thus since I j= q < p, it must be that I 6j= q(; ),
and since I j= (7:14), it follows that I 6j= g() = . Thus, I j= :(g = f) and
further I j= :(gd = fc).
From either case, we then conclude that I j= gd < fc.
Theorem 16 For any f -plain-syn formula F , the set of formulas 8xy(p(x; y) $
f(x) = y) for each f 2 f and the corresponding p, and 9xy(x 6= y) entail
SM[F ;fq]$ SM[F fp ;pq]:
Proof. We will show that the conjunction over all pairs of corresponding f and p
from f and p of
8xy(p(x; y)$ f(x) = y) (7.15)
entails
SM[F ;fc]$ SM[F fp ;pc]:
Claim 1:For any interpretation I = hI;Xi of signature   ff ;p; cg satisfying (7.15),
I j= F i I j= F fp . We show this by showing that every atomic formula A in F is
classically equivalent to the corresponding formula Afp in F
f
p :
 A contains no intensional function constants. Then A is identical to Afp .
 A is of the form f(t) = c where f is an intensional function constant and neither
t nor c contains intensional function constants. The corresponding formula Afp
is p(t; c) and under (7.15) it is clear that these are equivalent.
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 A is of the form f1(t1) = f2(t2) where f1 and f2 are intensional function con-
stants and neither t1 nor t2 contains intensional function constants. The corre-
sponding formula Afp is p1(t1; y)$ p2(t2; y) and under (7.15), this is equivalent
to f1(t1) = y $ f2(t2) = y which is equivalent to A.
Claim 2:
I j= :9bfbc((bfbc < fc) ^ F (bfbc))
i
I j= :9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ (F fp )(bpbc))
or equivalently,
I j= 9bfbc((bfbc < fc) ^ F (bfbc))
i
I j= 9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ (F fp )(bpbc)):
()) Assume I j= 9bfbc((bfbc < fc) ^ F (bfbc)). We wish to show that I j=
9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ (F fp )(bpbc)).
That is, take any list of functions g of the same arities as the corresponding
functions in f and any list of predicates d of the same length c. Now let I 0 =
hI [ Jfg ; X [ Y cd i be from an extended signature 0 =  [ fg;dg where J is an
interpretation of functions from the signature  and I and J agree on all symbols
not occurring in f . Jfg denotes the interpretation from 
f
g (the signature obtained
from  by replacing f 2 f with the corresponding g 2 g and all elements of c with
all elements of d) obtained from the interpretation J by replacing f 2 f with the
corresponding g 2 g. Similarly, Y cd is the interpretation from cd obtained from the
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interpretation Y by replacing c 2 c by the corresponding d 2 d. We assume
I 0 j= (gd < fc ^ F (gd))
and wish to show that there is a list of predicates q of the same arities as the corre-
sponding predicates in p such that
I 0 j= (qd < pc ^ (F fp )(qd)):
We dene each new predicate q in terms of the corresponding f and g as follows:
qI
0
(~; ) =
8><>: 1 if I
0 j= f(~) =  ^ g(~) = 
0 otherwise
We assume I 0 j= (7:15) for each corresponding f and p from f and p respectively.
It is clear from the denition of q that I 0 j= 8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y) for
each corresponding q, f , and g from q, f and g respectively. Thus, by Lemma 19,
I 0 j= qd < pc. From Lemma 18, we conclude I 0 j= F fp )(bpbc).
(() Assume I j= 9bpbc((bpbc < pc) ^ (F fp )(bpbc)). We wish to show that I j=
9bfbc((bfbc < fc) ^ F (bfbc)).
That is, take any list predicates q of the same arities as the corresponding predi-
cates in p and any list of predicates d the same length as c such that
I 0 j= (qd < pc ^ (F fp )(qd)):
We wish to show that there is a function g of the same arity as f such that
I 0 j= (gd < fc ^ F (gd))
where I 0 = hI [ Jfg ; X [ Y cd i is dened as before. Take any mapping m : jI 0j ! jI 0j
such that 8x(m(x) 6= x). We dene each new function g in terms of the corresponding
f , p, and q as follows:
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gI
0
(~) =
8><>: f
I0(~) if I 0 j= 9y(p(~; y) ^ q(~; y))
m(fI
0
(~)) otherwise
Note that the assumption that there are at least two elements in the universe is
essential to this denition. We assume I 0 j= (7:15) for each corresponding f and p
from f and p respectively. It is clear from the denition of g that I 0 j= 8xy(f1(x) =
f2(y) ! g1(x) = g2(y) for each corresponding f and g from f and g respectively.
We now show that I 0 j= 8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y) for each corresponding
q, f , and g from q, f and g respectively.
Since we assume I 0 j= (7:7), it follows that for any given , there is only one  such
that I 0 j= p(; ). Then, since we assume I 0 j= q  p, we know I 0 6j= q(; 0) for any
0 6= . If I 0 j= q(; ), then I 0 j= g() = . Otherwise, I 0 j= g() = 0 for some 0 6= .
Since this is true for any , it follows that I 0 j= 8xy(q(x; y)$ f(x) = y ^ g(x) = y).
Thus, by Lemma 19, I 0 j= qd < pc. From Lemma 17, we conclude I 0 j= F fp )(bpbc).
7.6.5 Proof of Corollary 5
Corollary 5 Let F be a formula in Clark Normal Form that is tight on c.
SM[F ; c]$ SM[UF c(F ); c].
Theorem 8 from section 5.5 tells us that the stable models relative to c of a formula
F in Clark Normal Form that is tight on c are in one-to-one correspondence with the
classical models of the completion of F relative to c, which we will denote G. Further,
since unfolding is a classically equivalent transformation, the stable models of F are
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in one-to-one correspondence with classical models of UF c(G).
To apply Theorem 8 to UF c(F ), we must rst establish that UF c(F ) is tight on
c. This follows immediately from the fact that UF c does not aect strictly positively
occurring atomic formulas since F is in Clark Normal Form and so these are of the
form p(x) or f(x)=y and so are already c plain. Further, for any implication B ! H
of F , any atomic formula A occuring strictly positively in B, then since UF c does
not aect the number of implications that have A in the antecedent. Thus, UF c(F )
is tight on c.
So by Theorem 8, the stable models of UF c(F ) are in one-to-one correspondence
with the classical models of the completion of UF c(F ) relative to c. All that remains
to shown is that UF c(G) is the same formula as the completion of UF c(F ) relative
to c.
Consider any implication B ! H in F . The corresponding equivalence in the
completion of F is B $ H. Now, applying unfolding here yields UF c(B) $ H
since as noted before, H is already c-plain. On the other hand, the corresponding
implication in G is UF c(B) ! H and further, the corresponding equivalence in the
completion of G is UF c(B)$ H and so we conclude that UF c(G) is the same formula
as the completion of UF c(F ) relative to c.
7.6.6 Proof of Theorem 17
For a formula F involving function f and g, we call it fg-indistinguishable if every
occurrence of f or g in F has the form (f = t) ^ (g = t), where t is a term. For 2
interpretations I and J of F, dene the relation R(I; J) as R(I; J) if
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 I(f) 6= I(g);
 J(f) 6= J(g);
 For every symbol s other than f or g, I(s) = J(s).
Lemma 20 If F is fg-indistinguishable, then for any I and J satisfying R(I; J),
F I = F J .
Proof. By induction on F .
 F is an atom a (or ? or >), where a does not involve f or f 0. Obvious.
 F is (f = t)^ (f 0 = t) for some t. Clearly since I(f) 6= I(f 0) and J(f) 6= J(f 0),
F I = F J = 0.
 F is :G, where G is f -indistinguishable. For any I and J satisfying R(I; J),
by I.H., GI = GJ , so F I = F J .
 F is G H, where G and H are both f -indistinguishable and  2 f^;_;!g.
For any I and J satisfying R(I; J), by I.H, GI = GJ and HI = HJ , so F I = F J
.
Theorem 17 There is no modular, signature-preserving translation that turns any
sentence F into a c-plain sentence F 0 such that SM[F ; c] is equivalent to SM[F 0; c]
for any list c of constants.
Proof.
Assume there is such a translation T that can turn a sentence F into a c-plain
sentence F 0 such that SM[F ; c] is equivalent to SM[F 0; c] for any list c of constants.
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We rst consider a formula G that is p(f)^ p(1) and a list c that is ffg. It is not
hard to verify that for I = fp(1); f = 1g, we have I j= SM[G; f ]. Thus we will have
that I j= SM[G0; f ].
In particular, for a new function constant g and interpretation K = fp(1); f =
1; g = 2g, we have that K 6j= G0(g).
Further, we consider a formula H that is p(2). Now since T is modular, we have
that (G ^ H)0 = G0 ^ H 0. Further, since H is already f -plain, H 0 = H and so
(G ^H)0 = G0 ^H. We will proceed by referring to G ^H as F .
We rst note that by denition of SM, we will be showing that F ^ :9bc(bc <
c ^ F (bc)) is equivalent to F 0 ^ :9bc(bc < c ^ F 0(bc)).
Now, when we let c be empty, this is simply to show that T is such that F is
equivalent to F 0. Thus, we only need to show that :9bc(bc < c ^ F (bc)) is equivalent
to :9bc(bc < c ^ F 0(bc)) or equivalently, the contrapositive 9bc(bc < c ^ F (bc)) is
equivalent to 9bc(bc < c ^ F 0(bc)).
That is, we will show that for some list of predicates and function constants d
corresponding to c,
Now consider when F is the formula
p(f) ^ p(1) ^ p(2)
and where c = ffg. Consider a new function constant g. F (g) is
p(f) ^ p(g) ^ p(1) ^ p(2):
Consider two interpretations I = fp(1); p(2); f = 1; g = 2g and J = fp(1); p(2); f =
1; g = 3g. Clearly I j= F (g) and J 6j= F (g). Note that R(I; J). Observe that I
serves to show that for J = fp(1); p(2); f = 1g, we have that J 6j= SM[F ; g]. Now,
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since I j= F and we already observed that T is such that F is equivalent to F 0,
I j= F 0.
Now, recall that F is G ^H and that F 0 = G0 ^H. Then, we have that F 0(g) is
G0(g)^H. Now since K 6j= G0(g) certainly, I 6j= G0(g) (recall K = fp(1); f = 1; g =
2g) and further I 6j= G0(g) ^ H 2 . Now since F 0 is c-plain, it must be that every
occurrence of f is in a term of the form f = t where t does not contain f . Then, in
F 0(g), every occurrence of f and g has the form (f = t)^ (g = t). Therefore, we can
apply Lemma 20 and conclude that F 0(g)I = F 0(g)J for any interpretations such
that R(I; J). Thus, for every J that is fg-indistinguishable, J 6j= G0(g) ^H. So we
conclude that J j= SM[F 0; g] but J 6j= SM[F ; g]. Thus, no such translation can exist.
2Splitting Theorem is the basis of this claim.
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Chapter 8
MANY-SORTED FSM
Under the functional stable model semantics described in Chapter 4, in any in-
terpretation I, each function f is understood as f : jIj      jIj ! jIj. When
describing real-world domain, this is unnatural; while velocity(car) is certainly a
value of interest, velocity(17) is not. To allow functions to map to and from sets
other than the universe, in this chapter we present the many-sorted functional stable
model semantics.
8.1 Extending FSM to Many-sorted FSM
To extend FSM to many-sorted logic, we use the same denition of a signature
as in many-sorted logic; a signature  is comprised of a list of function and predicate
constants and a list of sorts. To each function and predicate of arity n, we assign
argument sorts s1; : : : ; sn and to function constants of arity n, we assign a value sort
sn+1. We assume that we have an innite number of variables for each sort. Atomic
formulas are built similar to standard logic with the restriction that in f(t1; : : : ; tn) (
p(t1; : : : ; tn)), the sort of ti must be a subsort of the ith argument of f (p). In addition
t1 = t2 is an atomic formula if the sorts and t1 and t2 have a common supersort.
A many-sorted interpretation I has a non-empty universe jIjs for each sort s.
When s1 is a subsort of s2, then an interpretation must satisfy jIjs1  jIjs2 . The notion
of satisfaction is similar to classical logic with the restriction that an interpretation
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map a term to an element in its associated sort.
For predicate symbols (constants or variables) u and c that have the same assigned
argument and value sorts, we dene u  c as 8x(u(x) ! c(x)) where each x 2 x is
of the appropriate sort. We dene u = c as 8x(u(x) $ c(x)) where each x 2 x is
of the appropriate sort if u and c are predicate symbols, and 8x(u(x) = c(x)) where
each x 2 x is of the appropriate sort if they are function symbols.
Let c be a list of distinct predicate and function constants and let bc be a list of
distinct predicate and function variables corresponding to c such that each bc 2 bc and
corresponding c 2 c have the same assigned argument and value sorts.
By cpred we mean the list of the predicate constants in c, and by bcpred the list of
the corresponding predicate variables in bc. We dene bc < c as
(bcpred  cpred) ^ :(bc = c)
and SM[F ; c] as
F ^ :9bc(bc < c ^ F (bc));
where F (bc) is dened as follows.
 When F is an atomic formula, F  is F 0 ^ F , where F 0 is obtained from F
by replacing all intensional (function and predicate) constants in it with the
corresponding (function and predicate) variables;
 (F ^G) = F  ^G; (F _G) = F  _G;
 (F ! G) = (F  ! G) ^ (F ! G);
 (8xF ) = 8xF ; (9xF ) = 9xF .
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When F is a many-sorted sentence, the many-sorted interpretations that are mod-
els of SM[F ; c] are called the c-stable models of F . They are the models of F that
are \stable" on c.
Note that the second-order characterization of the many-sorted functional stable
model semantics is only dierent from the denition in Chapter 4 in that the formula
F and interpretation I are many-sorted and every variable bc in the list of variables bc
must have the same assigned sorts as the corresponding constant c in c.
8.2 Reduct characterization of Many-sorted FSM
As was the case for the nonsorted functional stable model semantics, we can also
dene a characterization of the many-sorted functional stable model semantics in
terms of grounding and reduct.
We rst present a natural extension of the process of grounding with respect to
many-sorted interpretations.
Let F be any rst-order sentence of a many-sorted signature , and let I be a
(many-sorted) interpretation of . By grI [F ] we denote the innitary ground formula
w.r.t. I that is obtained from F by the following process:
 If F is an atomic formula, grI [F ] is F ;
 grI [GH] = grI [G] grI [H] ( 2 f^;_;!g);
 grI [9xG(x)] = fgrI [G()] j  2 jIjsg_ where s is the sort of the variable
x;
 grI [8xG(x)] = fgrI [G()] j  2 jIjsg^ where s is the sort of the variable
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x.
We say for two interpretations I; J of multi-valued signature  and a set of pred-
icate and function constants c that J <c I if
 jIjs = jJ js for every sort s 2 ;
 I and J agree on all constants not in c;
 pJ  pI for all predicates p in c;
 I and J do not agree on c.
Example 18 Consider four interpretations I; J;K; L with universe f1; 2; 3g and sig-
nature  = fp; q; f; sg where p and q are unary predicates, f is a unary function, and
s is a sort. Let c be fp; fg. When
I = fp(1); q(1); f = 1; s = f1; 2gg
J = fp(1); q(1); f = 2; s = f1; 2gg
K = fq(1); f = 1; s = f1; 2gg
L = fq(1); f = 1; s = f1; 2; 3gg
we can see that J <c I holds since pJ  pI (both have an extent of f1g) and J and I
do not agree on c since f I 6= fJ . Similarly, K <c I holds since pK  pI (the former
has an empty extent while the latter has extent f1g) and K and I disagree on p. On
the other hand, L <c I does not hold since L and I do not agree on the sort s.
The reduct F I of an innitary ground formula F relative to an many-sorted inter-
pretation I is dened as follows:
 For each atomic formula F , F I = ? if I 6j= F and F I = F otherwise;
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 (H^)I = ? if I 6j= H^; otherwise (H^)I = fGI j G 2 Hg^;
 (H_)I = ? if I 6j= H_; otherwise (H_)I = fGI j G 2 Hg_;
 (G! H)I = ? if I 6j= G! H; otherwise (G! H)I = GI ! HI .
The following is the many-sorted counterpart to Theorem 1.
Theorem 18 Let F be a rst-order sentence of a many-sorted signature  and let c
be a list of intensional constants. For any interpretation I of , I j= SM[F ; c] i
 I satises F , and
 every interpretation J such that J <c I does not satisfy (grI [F ])I .
8.3 Relation to Multi-valued Propositional Formulas
In this section, we show that multi-valued propositional formulas can be expressed
naturally in terms of the many-sorted functional stable model semantics. Given a
multi-valued signature , we construct the many-sorted signature 0 as follows:
 For every c 2 , we have a sort sortc 2 0;
 For every v 2 Dom(c) for some c 2 , we have a sort sortv 2 0 that is a subsort
of every sort sortc for which v 2 Dom(c);
 For every c 2 , we include an object constant c 2 0 and associate it with the
sort sortc;
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 For every v 2 Dom(c) for some c 2 , we include an object constant v 2 0 and
associate it with the sort sortv.
We dene the universes of these sorts as jIjsortv = fvg and jIjsortc = Dom(c)
We identify a multi-valued propositional interpretation X of signature  with a
many-sorted interpretation of signature 0 so that X(c) = v i cX = v.
Theorem 19 Let F be a multi-valued propositional formula. a) If X is a stable
model of F viewed as a multi-valued formula of signature , then X is a stable model
of F viewed as a many-sorted formula of signature 0.
b) If X is a stable model of F viewed as a many-sorted formula of signature 0, then
X is a stable model of F viewed as a multi-valued formula of .
8.4 Reducing Many-sorted FSM to Nonsorted FSM
We can represent many-sorted FSM using nonsorted FSM as follows. Given a
many-sorted signature , we dene the signature ns to contain every function and
predicate constant from . In addition, for each sort s 2 , we add a unary predicate
s to ns.
Given a formula F of many-sorted signature , we obtain the formula F ns from
nonsorted signature ns as follows.
We replace every 9x F (x), where x is a sorted variable whose sort is s, with the
formula
9y(F (y) ^ s(y))
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where y is an nonsorted variable. Similarly, we replace every 8x F (x), where x is a
sorted variable whose sort is s, with the formula
8y(s(y)! F (y))
where y is an nonsorted variable.
By SF we denote the conjunction of
 the formulas 8y(si(y)! sj(y)) for every two sorts si and sj in  such that si is
a subsort of sj,
 the formulas 9y s(y) for every sort s in 
 the formulas 8y1 : : : yk(args1(y1)^    ^ argsk(yk)! vals(f(y1; : : : ; yk))) for each
function constant f in  where the arity of f is k and the ith argument sort of
f is argsi and the value sort of f is vals.
 the formulas 8y1 : : : yk+1(:args1(y1)_  _:argsk(yk)! ff(y1; : : : ; yk) = yk+1g)
for each function constant f in  where the arity of f is k and the ith argument
sort of f is argsi.
 the formulas 8y1 : : : yk(:args1(y1) _    _ :argsk(yk)! fp(y1; : : : ; yk)g) for each
function constant f in  where the arity of f is k and the ith argument sort of
f is argsi.
Note that only the rst 3 items are necessary to turn many-sorted formulas in
classical logic to non-sorted formulas. Here, however, we need to add the fourth
and fth item for the FSM semantics so that any constant c and the corresponding
variable bc in the formula SM for the nonsorted case can only disagree using values
according to the many-sorted setting (which has arguments adhering to the argument
sorts).
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Example 19 Consider  = ff; s1; s2g where the argument and value sort of f are
both s1. Take F to be f(1) = 1 ^ f(2) = 2. The many-sorted interpretation I such
that jIjs1 = f1; 2g, jIjs2 = f3; 4g, f(1)I = 1, and f(2)I = 2 is clearly a stable model
of F . However, if we neglect the last two items of SF, F
ns is
f(1) = 1 ^ f(2) = 2^
9y(s1(y)) ^ 9y(s2(y))^
8y1(sort1(y1)! sort1(f(y1)))
and K is a nonsorted interpretation such that jKj = f1; 2; 3; 4g, (s1)K = f1; 2g,
(s2)
K = f3; 4g, f(1)K = 1, f(2)K = 2, f(3)K = 3, and f(4)K = 4 is not a stable
model of F ns since we can take J that is dierent from K only on f(4) so that
f(4)J = 3 and J still satises the reduct.
Also note that the formulas in item 3 are not c-plain. This transformation illus-
trates one use of non-c-plain formulas that is unable to be expressed as a c-plain as
far as we know.
Given an interpretation I of a many-sorted signature , we can identify this with
the nonsorted signature Ins by taking jInsj = S
s is a sort in 
jIjs. We specify that the
sort predicates and sorts correspond by dening the sort predicate s for every sort
s 2  as
sI
ns
= jIjs
For every function f in  and every tuple  comprised of elements from jInsj, we take
f()I
ns
=
8><>: f()
I if i 2 jIjargsi where argsi is the ith argument sort of f
jInsj0 otherwise
149
where jInsj0 denotes some element in the universe (we use the same element for every
situation this case holds).
For every predicate p in  and every  we take
p()I
ns
=
8><>: p()
I if i 2 jIjargsi where argsi is the ith argument sort of p
f otherwise.
Note that f was arbitrarily chosen.
The choice of Ins mapping a function whose arguments are not of the intended
sort to the value jInsj0 is arbitrary and so there are many unsorted interpretations
that correspond to the many-sorted interpretation. To characterize this many-to-one
relationship, we say two unsorted interpretations I and J are related with relation R,
denoted R(I; J), if for every predicate or function constant c, we have c(1; : : : ; k)
I =
c(1; : : : ; k)
J whenever each i 2 argsi where argsi is the ith argument sort of c.
Theorem 20 Given a formula F of a many-sorted signature , and a set of function
and predicate constants c,
a) An interpretation I of signature  is a model of SM[F ; c] i Ins is a model of
SM[F ns ^ SF; c].
b) An interpretation L1 of signature 
ns is a model of SM[F ns ^ SF; c] i there is
some interpretation L of signature ns such that R(L;L1) and L = I
ns for some model
I of SM[F ; c].
8.5 ASPMT as a Special Case of Many-Sorted FSM
In this section, we present a special case of Many-Sorted FSM{answer set pro-
gramming modulo theories (ASPMT). This is a framework which extends answer set
programming analogously to how SMT extends SAT. We then present a prototype
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implementation of this framework in Section 9.2. We expect this framework to elicit
similar benets to those that SMT provided over SAT.
Formally, an SMT instance is a formula in many-sorted rst-order logic, where
some designated function and predicate constants are constrained by some xed back-
ground interpretation. SMT is the problem of determining whether such a formula
has a model that expands the background interpretation Barrett et al. (2009).
The syntax of ASPMT is the same as that of SMT. Let bg be the (many-sorted)
signature of the background theory bg. An interpretation of bg is called a background
interpretation if it satises the background theory. For instance, in the theory of
reals, we assume that bg contains the set R of symbols for all real numbers, the
set of arithmetic functions over real numbers, and the set f<;>;;g of binary
predicates over real numbers. Background interpretations interpret these symbols in
the standard way.
Let  be a signature that is disjoint from bg. We say that an interpretation I
of  satises F w.r.t. the background theory bg, denoted by I j=bg F , if there is a
background interpretation J of bg that has the same universe as I, and I[J satises
F . For any ASPMT sentence F with background theory bg, interpretation I is a
stable model of F relative to c (w.r.t. background theory bg) if I j=bg SM[F ; c].
Example 7 continued Formula F can be understood as an ASPMT formula with
the theory of integers as the background theory. Arithmetic functions and comparison
operators belong to the background signature. Let I be an interpretation of signature
fAmount0;Amount1;FillUpg such that Amount I0 = 6, Amount I1 = 5, FillUpI = f .
We say that I j=bg SM[F ;Amount1].
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8.6 Proofs
8.6.1 Proof of Theorem 18
Given an interpretation J of many-sorted signature , a set of constants c  ,
and a set of constants d that is disjoint from  and is of the same length as c
whose corresponding elements have the same argument and value sorts, Jcd is the
interpretation from ( n c) [ d obtained from J by replacing every constant from c
with the corresponding constant from d.
For two interpretations I and J of the same many-sorted signature , a set of
constants c   such that I and J agree on constants in  nc and a set of constants d
of the same length as c (whose constants have the same argument / value sorts) that
is disjoint from , we dene I [ Jcd as the interpretation from the extended signature
 [ d such that
 I [ Jcd agrees with both I and J on constants in  n c
 I [ Jcd agrees with I for all constants in c and
 I [ Jcd agrees with Jcd for all constants in d.
Lemma 21 If F is a sentence, I and J are interpretations of the same many-sorted
signature and J <c I, then Jcd [ I j= F (d) i J j= grI(F )I .
Proof.
 Case 1: F is a variable-free atomic formula containing no intensional constants.
In this case, F (d) = F so Jcd [ I j= F (d) i I j= F i J j= F (recall I and
J agree on all non-intensional constants). On the other hand, grI(F )
I is F if
I j= F and ? if I 6j= F . In both cases, since I and J agree on all non-intensional
constants, J j= grI(F )I i J j= F so the claim holds in this case.
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 Case 2: F is a variable-free atomic formula containing an intensional constant.
F (d) is equivalent to F ^ F (d).
Consider the following subcases:
{ Subcase 1: I j= F . In this case, F (d) = F ^ F (d) so Jcd [ I j= F (d)
i Jcd j= F (d) i J j= F . On the other hand, grI(F )I = F since there is
no subformula that is unsatised and thus J j= grI(F )I i J j= F so the
claim holds in this case.
{ Subcase 2: I 6j= F . In this case Jcd [ I 6j= F ^ F (d) = F (d). Also in this
case, we have grI(F )
I = ? since the entire formula is not satised by I.
J 6j= grI(F )I so the claim holds in this case.
 Case 3: F is G ^H. By I.H. on G and H.
 Case 4: F is G _H. By I.H. on G and H.
 Case 5: F is G! H.
In this case, F (d) = (G ! H) ^ (G(d) ! H(d)). Consider the following
subcases:
{ Subcase 1: I j= G and I j= H. In this case, Jcd [ I j= F (d) i Jcd [ I j=
G(d)! H(d). On the other hand, grI(F )I = G! H so this case holds
by I.H. on G and H.
{ Subcase 2: I j= G and I 6j= H. In this case Jcd [ I 6j= F (d). Also in this
case, we have grI(F )
I = ? since the entire formula is not satised by I.
J 6j= grI(F )I so the claim holds in this case.
{ Subcase 3: I 6j= G. In this case, grI(F )I = ? ! H or grI(F )I = ? ! ?
depending on whether I j= H. In either case, J j= grI(F )I . On the
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other hand, Jcd [ I j= F (d) i Jcd [ I j= G(d) ! H(d). However, since
I 6j= G, grI(G)I = ?. By I.H. on G, we conclude that Jcd [ I 6j= G(d)
(since J 6j= grI(G)I = ?). Thus Jcd [ I j= G(d) ! H(d) and further
Jcd [ I j= F (d) so the claim holds in this case.
 Case 6: F is 9xG(x). By I.H. on G() for each  2 jIjs where s is the sort of
x. By showing Jcd [ I j= G()(d) i J j= grI(G())I for each  2 jIjs, we prove
that Jcd [ I j= F (d) i J j= grI(F )I .
 Case 7: F is 8xG(x). By I.H. on G() for each  2 jIjs where s is the sort of
x. By showing Jcd [ I j= G()(d) i J j= grI(G())I for each  2 jIjs, we prove
that Jcd [ I j= F (d) i J j= grI(F )I .
Lemma 22 Given two interpretations I and J of the same many-sorted signature ,
a set of constants c  , and a set of constants d disjoint from  of the same length
as c, Jcd [ I j= d < c i J <c I.
Proof. By denition, d < c is
dpred  cpred ^ :(d = c)
and by denition, J <c I is
 jJ js and jIjs are the same for each sort s 2  and agree on all constants not in
c;
 pJ  pI for all predicate constants p in c; and
 J and I do not agree on c.
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By denition of Jcd [ I, jJ js and jIjs are the same for each sort s 2  and agree on
all constants not in c.
By denition, Jcd [ I j= dpred  cpred is true i for every predicate p in c
8x(p(x)cd ! p(x))
which is equivalent to saying (pcd)
Jcd[I  pJcd[I . Since I does not interpret any constant
from d and Jcd does not interpret any constant from c, this is equivalent to (p
c
d)
Jcd  pI
and further to pJ  pI .
Since I does not interpret any constant from d and Jcd does not interpret any constant
from c, Jcd [ I j= :(d = c) is equivalent to saying J and I do not agree on c.
Theorem 18 Let F be a rst-order sentence of a many-sorted signature  and let
c be a list of intensional constants. For any interpretation I of , I j= SM[F ; c] i
 I satises F , and
 every interpretation J such that J <c I does not satisfy (grI [F ])I .
Proof.
I j= SM[F ; c] is by denition
I j= F ^ :9bc(bc < c ^ F (bc)): (8.1)
The rst item, \I saties F", is equivalent to the rst conjunctive term of (8.1).
By Lemma 16 and Lemma 22, the second item, \no interpretation J of  such that
J <c I satises grI(F )
I", is equivalent to the second conjunctive term in (8.1).
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8.6.2 Proof of Theorem 19
The following lemma shows thatX satises a multi-valued formula F iX satises
F when viewed as a many-sorted propositional formula of signature 0.
Lemma 23 Let F be a multi-valued formula of signature . A multi-valued interpre-
tation X satises F i X satises F when we view both to be from the many sorted
signature 0.
Proof. By induction on F . We only show the base case of atomic formulas. When
F an atomic formula c = v, X satises this in the multi-valued sense when X(c) = v.
For X to satisfy F in the many-sorted sense, it must be that cX = vX . However
by denition of 0, jXjv = fvg so vX = v. Thus it follows that cX = vX i cX =
v. Then from the way we identify a multi-valued interpretation and a many-sorted
interpretation{X(c) = v i cX = v{the claim follows.
Lemma 24 Assume that K and X are multi-valued interpretations of  and Y is a
many-sorted interpretation of 0 such that Y <c X such that for every c 2 c, we have
K(c) = cY :
We have that K j= FX (when F is viewed as a multi-valued formula of ) i Y j= FX
(when F is viewed as a many-sorted formula of signature 0).
Proof. By induction on F . We show only the case of atoms. The other cases are
straightforward.
Let F be an atom c = v. If X j= c = v, then FX is F . The claim follows from
the assumption since K j= c = v i Y j= c = v. If X 6j= c = v, then FX is ?, which
neither K nor Y satises.
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Theorem 19 a) If X is a stable model of F viewed as a multi-valued formula
of signature , then X is a stable model of F viewed as a many-sorted formula of
signature 0.
b) If X is a stable model of F viewed as a many-sorted formula of signature 0, then
X is a stable model of F viewed as a multi-valued formula of .
Proof.
Let c denote the list of constants in  and let c0 denote the list of constants in 0.
By Lemma 23 X satises a multi-valued formula F i X satises F when viewed
as a many-sorted propositional formula of signature 0. We need only show that there
is an interpretation Y that disagrees with X on  that is a model of the reduct FX
(when viewed as a multi-valued formula) i there is an interpretation Y such that
Y <c X that is a model of the reduct FX (when viewed as a many-sorted formula).
The proof is by considering the same identication for Y .
Take any multi-valued interpretation Y of  and note that we identify Y with a
many-sorted interpretation of signature 0. We consider the meaning of Y <c
0
X in
this context. Since there are no predicate constants in 0, this is equivalent to saying
that Y and X have the same universes jIjs for every sort s, I and J agree on all
constants not in c0, and I and J do not agree on c0. Further since the sorts for each
constant v 2 Dom(c) for some c 2  contain only one element, it is impossible for Y
to disagree with X on these constants. So in order for it to be the case that Y <c
0
X,
it must be that Y and X disagree on some c 2 c. However, this is precisely the same
as saying Y disagrees with X on  when viewed as multi-valued interpetations.
So we have Y disagrees with X on  i Y <c
0
X.
It follows from Lemma 24 that X satises FX when viewed as a multi-valued
formula i X satises FX when viewed as a many-sorted propositional formula of
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signature 0.
8.6.3 Proof of Theorem 20
Lemma 25 Given a formula F of many-sorted signature  and an interpretation I
of , I j= grI [F ] i Ins j= grIns [F ns].
Proof. By induction on F .
 F is p(t) where each ti in t is comprised of ground terms from the extended
signature I . grI [F ] is also p(t).
F ns is p(t). grIns [F
ns] is also p(t). By the denition of Ins, p(t)I = p(t)I
ns
since
t must be comprised of terms from the corresponding argument sorts of p and
so the claim holds.
 F is t1 = t2 where each ti is comprised of ground terms from the extended
signature I . grI [F ] is also t1 = t2 . F
ns is t1 = t2. grIns [F
ns] is also t1 = t2.
By the denition of Ins, tI1 = t
Ins
1 and t
I
2 = t
Ins
2 since the subterms of t1 and t2
must be comprised of terms from the corresponding argument sorts and so the
claim holds.
 F is GH where  2 f^;_;!g. grI [F ] is grI [G] grI [H]. F ns is GnsHns.
grIns [F
ns] is grIns [G
ns] grIns [Hns] so the claim follows by induction on G and
H.
 F is 9xG(x). grI [F ] is fgrI [G()] :  2 jIjsg_ where s is the sort of x.
F ns is 9y(G(y)ns ^ s(y)). grIns [F ns] is fgrIns [G()ns] ^ s() :  2 jInsjg_.
158
()) Assume I j= grI [F ]. That is, assume there is some  2 jIjs where s is the
sort of x such that I j= grI [G()]. By denition of Ins, since  2 jIjs, then
Ins j= s(). So then, the claim follows by I.H. on G().
(() Assume Ins j= grIns [F ns]. That is, assume there is some  2 jInsj such
that Ins j= grIns [G()ns] ^ s(). By denition of Ins, since Ins j= s(), then
 2 jIjs. SO then, the claim follows by I.H. on G().
 F is 8xG(x). grI [F ] is fgrI [G()] :  2 jIjsg^ where s is the sort of x.
F ns is 8y(s(y)! G(y)ns). grIns [F ns] is fs()! grIns [G()ns] :  2 jInsjg^.
()) Assume I j= grI [F ]. That is, for every  2 jIjs where s is the sort of x,
assume that I j= grI [G()]. Note that for every  2 jInsj such that Ins 6j= s(),
we have that Ins vacuously satises s()! grIns [G()ns]. By denition of Ins,
since  2 jIjs i Ins j= s() the claim follows by I.H. on G() for every  2 jIjs.
(() Assume Ins j= grIns [F ns]. That is, assume for every  2 jInsj that Ins j=
s() ! grIns [G()ns]. This means that for every  such that Ins j= s(), it
must be that Ins j= grIns [G()ns].
Now, by denition of Ins, for any  such that Ins j= s(), we have that  2 jIjs.
So then, the claim follows by I.H. on G() for every  2 jIjs.
Lemma 26 Given a formula F of many-sorted signature , interpretations I and J
of  and an interpretation K of ns such that
 for every sort s in , jIjs = jJ js = sK,
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 for every predicate and function constant c and for every tuple  composed of
elements from jInsj such that i 2 jIjargsi for every i 2  , where argsi is the
ith argument sort of c, we have c()K = c()J ,
 for every predicate and function constant c and for every tuple  composed of
elements from jInsj such that i =2 jIjargsi for some i 2 jIjargsi, where argsi is
the ith argument sort of c, we have c()K = c()I
ns
,
J is a model of grI [F ]
I i K is a model of grIns [F
ns]I
ns
.
Proof. By induction on F .
 F is p(t) where each ti in t is comprised of ground terms from the extended
signature I .
F ns is p(t).
We consider two cases:
{ If I j= p(t), then grI [F ]I is p(t). By Lemma 25 , it follows that Ins j= p(t)
and so grIns [F
ns]I
ns
is p(t). Thus, in this case, J is a model of grI [F ]
I i
K is a model of grIns [F
ns]I
ns
.
{ If I 6j= p(t), then grI [F ]I is ?. By Lemma 25 , it follows that Ins 6j= p(t)
and so grIns [F
ns]I
ns
is also ?. Thus, in this case, J is not a model of
grI [F ]
I and K is not a model of grIns [F
ns]I
ns
so the claim follows.
 F is t1 = t2 where each ti is comprised of ground terms from the extended
signature I .
F ns is t1 = t2.
We consider two cases:
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{ If (t1)
I = (t2)
I , then grI [F ]
I is t1 = t2. By Lemma 25 , it follows that
(t1)
Ins = (t2)
Ins and so grIns [F
ns]I
ns
is t1 = t2. Thus, in this case by the
second item in the requirement of this lemma, J is a model of grI [F ]
I i
K is a model of grIns [F
ns]I
ns
.
{ If (t1)
I 6= (t2)I , then grI [F ]I is ?. By Lemma 25 , it follows that (t1)Ins 6=
(t2)
Ins and so grIns [F
ns]I
ns
is also ?. Thus, in this case, J is not a model
of grI [F ]
I and K is not a model of grIns [F
ns]I
ns
so the claim follows.
 F is GH where  2 f^;_;!g.
F ns is Gns Hns. We consider two cases:
{ If I j= G  H, then grI [F ]I is grI [G]I  grI [H]I . By Lemma 25, Ins j=
GnsHns and so grIns [F ns]Ins is grIns [Gns]Ins  grIns [Hns]Ins so the claim
follows by induction on G and H.
{ If I 6j= GH then grI [F ]I is ?. By Lemma 25, Ins 6j= Gns Hns and so
(F ns)I
ns
is ?. Thus, in this case, J is not a model of grI [F ]I and K is not
a model of grIns [F
ns]I
ns
so the claim follows.
 F is 9x(G(x)) where the sorted variable x has sort s.
F ns is 9y(G(y)ns ^ s(y)) (the variable here is unsorted ).
grI [F ] is fgrI [G()] :  2 jIjsg_.
grIns [F
ns] is fgrIns [G()ns] ^ s() :  2 jInsjg_.
grI [F ]
I is equivalent to
fgrI [G()]I :  2 jIjs and I j= grI [G()]g_:
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grIns [F
ns]I
ns
is equivalent to
fgrIns [G()ns]Ins ^ s() :  2 jInsj and Ins j= grIns [G()ns] ^ s()g_:
Further, since Ins j= s() i  is from jIjs and by the rst item in the require-
ment of this lemma, K j= grIns [F ns]Ins i
K j= fgrIns [G()ns]Ins :  2 jIjs and Ins j= grIns [G()ns]g_:
Then, by I.H. on each G() such that  2 jIjs and I j= G(), we have that
J j= grI [G()]I i K j= grIns [G()ns]Ins , from which the claim then follows.
 F is 8x(G(x)) where the sorted variable x has sort s.
F ns is 8x(s(y)! G(y)) (the variable here is unsorted ).
grI [F ] is fgrI [G()] :  2 jIjsg^.
grIns [F
ns] is fs()! grIns [G()ns] :  2 jInsjg^.
We consider two cases:
{ If I j= G() for every  2 jIjs, then grI [F ]I is equivalent to
fgrI [G()]I :  2 jIjsg^:
For every  =2 jIjs, Ins 6j= s() and so in grIns [F ns]Ins , the implications cor-
responding to such  are vacuously satised and so grIns [F
ns]I
ns
is equiv-
alent to
fs()Ins ! grIns [G()ns]Ins :  2 jIjs and Ins j= grIns [G()ns]g^:
Since  2 jIjs i Ins j= s() and since by Lemma 25, Ins j= grIns [G()ns]
for every  2 jIjs, K j= grIns [F ns]Ins i
K j= fgrIns [G()ns]Ins :  2 jIjsg^:
162
Then, by I.H. on each G() such that  2 jIjs, we have that J j=
grI [G(
)]I i K j= grIns [G()ns]Ins , from which the claim then follows.
{ If I 6j= G() for some  2 jIjs, then grI [F ]I is ?. Since  2 jIjs, Ins j= s()
but by Lemma 25, Ins 6j= grIns [G()ns] so grIns [F ns]Ins is ?. In this case,
J is not a model of grI [F ]
I and K is not a model of grIns [F
ns]I
ns
so the
claim follows.
Lemma 27 Given a formula F of many-sorted signature  and two interpretations
L and L1 of 
ns such that R(L;L1), if L j= F ns ^ SF, then L1 j= F ns ^ SF.
Proof. We rst show that L1 j= SF. Since R(L;L1), L and L1 agree on all sort
predicates s corresponding to sorts s 2 . Thus, L1 clearly satises the rst two items
of SF. We now consider the third item of SF. For tuples 1; : : : ; k such that each
i 2 argsi where argsi is the ith argument sort of f , since R(L;L1), L and L1 agree
on f(1; : : : ; k) so L1 satises the implication. For all other tuples, the implication
is vacuously satised. Finally, the fourth and fth items of SF are tautologies in
classical logic so we conclude that L1 j= SF.
We now show that L1 j= F ns by induction on F ns.
 F ns is pt where t is a ground term from the extended signature I . Since every
ti 2 t must be from the ith argument sort of p, it follows from R(L;L1) that
L1 j= F ns.
 F ns is t1 = t2 where t1 and t2 are ground terms from the extended signature
I . Since every subterm of t1 and t2 must be from the the appropriate sort, it
follows from R(L;L1) that L1 j= F ns.
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 F ns is Gns Hns where  2 f^;_;!g. The claim follows by I.H. on Gns and
Hns.
 F ns is 9y(G(y)^ s(y)). Since we assume there L j= F ns, there is some  2 jInsj
such that L j= G() ^ s(). Further, since L j= s() i  2 jIjs, the claim
follows by I.H. on G().
 F ns is 8y(s(y) ! G(y)). Since we assume there L j= F ns, for every  2 jInsj
we have L j= s() ! G(). For every  =2 jIjs, L1 vacuously satises s() !
G(). For every  2 jIjs, since L1 j= s() i  2 jIjs, the claim follows by I.H.
on every G() such that  2 jIjs.
Lemma 28 Given a formula F of many-sorted signature , a set of function and
predicate constants c from  and two interpretations L and L1 of 
ns such that
R(L;L1), if L is a stable model of F
ns ^ SF w.r.t. c, then L1 is a stable model
of F ns ^ SF w.r.t. c.
Proof. We rst note c contains function and predicate constants from  and thus
contains none of the sort predicates introduced in ns.
We assume that L is a stable model of F ns ^ SF, and wish to show that L1 is
a stable model of F ns ^ SF. That is, given that L j= F ns ^ SF and there is no
interpretation K such that K <c L and K j= grL[F ns ^ SF]L, we wish to show
that there is no interpretation K1 such that K1 <
c L1 and K1 j= grL1 [F ns ^ SF]L1 .
Equivalently, we will show that if there is an interpretation K1 such that K1 <
c L1
and K1 j= grL1 [F ns ^ SF]L1 , then there is an interpretation K such that K <c L
and K j= grL[F ns ^ SF]L.
Assume that there is an interpretationK1 such thatK1 <
c L1 andK1 j= grL1 [F ns^
SF]
L1 , we construct K as follows.
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 jKj = jK1j,
 sK = sK1 for every s corresponding to a sort s 2 ,
 c(1; : : : ; k)K = c(1; : : : ; k)K1 for every tuple 1; : : : ; k such that i 2 si where
si is the ith argument sort of c,
 c(1; : : : ; k)K = c(1; : : : ; k)L for every tuple 1; : : : ; k such that i =2 si for
some i where si is the ith argument sort of c.
We rst show that K <c L. By denition jKj = jK1j. From K1 <c L1, it follows
that jKj = jL1j. Then since R(L1; L), it follows that jKj = jLj. By denition of K, it
follows that sK = sK1 for every s corresponding to a sort s 2 . Then, since K1 <c L1
and since R(L1; L), it follows that s
K = sL. Now, for any function or predicate c and
any tuple 1; : : : ; k such that i =2 si for some i where si is the ith argument sort of c,
by denition, c(1; : : : ; k)
K = c(1; : : : ; k)
L. Finally, for every function or predicate
c and every tuple 1; : : : ; k such that i 2 si where si is the ith argument sort of
c, since R(L;L1), it is clear that c(1; : : : ; k)
L1 = c(1; : : : ; k)
L. We also have by
denition, c(1; : : : ; k)
K = c(1; : : : ; k)
K1 for such predicate (functions) and tuples.
Now since we assume that K1 <
c L1, there must be some function or predicate
constant c and some tuple 1; : : : ; k such that c(1; : : : ; k)
K1 6= c(1; : : : ; k)L1 . Now
by denition of K1 <
c L1, K1 and L1 agree on all of the sort predicates s com-
ing from sorts s 2 . Further, since K1 j= (SF)L1 , the fourth and fth items of
(SF)
L1 force K1 to agree with L1 on all functions (predicates) and tuples such that
some tuple is not of the correct sort. Thus, it must be that the tuple 1; : : : ; k
such that c(1; : : : ; k)
K1 6= c(1; : : : ; k)L1 has that every i belongs to the appropri-
ate sort. Thus, by the observation before that c(1; : : : ; k)
L1 = c(1; : : : ; k)
L and
c(1; : : : ; k)
K = c(1; : : : ; k)
K1 , it follows that K <c L.
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Now, we show that K j= grL[SF]L by considering each item of SF. We rst note
that since K1 j= grL1 [SF]L1 , it must be that L1 j= grL1 [SF]. Thus by Lemma 27,
we have that L j= grL[SF].
 Item 1: 8y(si(y) ! sj(y)) for every two sorts si and sj in  such that si is a
subsort of sj.
From K1 <
c L1, it follows that si()
K1 = si()
L1 for every predicate s corre-
sponding to a sort s 2  and for every  in jL1j = jK1j. By denition of K, and
since R(L;L1), we then have that si()
K = si()
K1 = si()
L1 = si()
L so clearly
the claim holds for this item.
 Item 2: 9y(s(y)) for every sort s in .
By the same argument in Item 1, si()
K = si()
K1 = si()
L1 = si()
L so clearly
the claim holds for this item.
 the formulas 8y1 : : : yk(args1(y1)^  ^argsk(yk)! vals(f(y1; : : : ; yk))) for each
function constant f in  where the arity of f is k and the ith argument sort of
f is argsi and the value sort of f is vals.
By R(L;L1), for every 1; : : : ; k such that i 2 argsi, we have that
f(1; : : : ; k)
L = f(1; : : : ; k)
L1). Then, by denition of K, f(1; : : : ; k)
K =
f(1; : : : ; k)
K1) so the claim holds for this item.
 the formulas 8y1 : : : yk+1(:args1(y1) _    _ :argsk(yk) ! ff(y1; : : : ; yk) =
yk+1g)
for each function constant f in  where the arity of f is k and the ith argument
sort of f is argsi.
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By denition of K, f(1; : : : ; k)
K = f(1; : : : ; k)
L and since the reduct of these
formulas is only satised when K agrees with L for these tuples, the claim holds
for this item.
 the formulas 8y1 : : : yk(:args1(y1)_  _:argsk(yk)! fp(y1; : : : ; yk)g) for each
function constant f in  where the arity of f is k and the ith argument sort of
f is argsi.
By denition of K, p(1; : : : ; k)
K = p(1; : : : ; k)
L and since the reduct of these
formulas is only satised when K agrees with L for these tuples, the claim holds
for this item.
Finally, we show that K j= grL[F ns]L i K1 j= grL1 [F ns]L1 by induction on F ns
and will conclude that since we assume K1 j= grL1 [F ns]L1 , that K j= grL[F ns]L.
 F ns is p(t) where each element of t is a ground term from the extended signature
I and belongs to the corresponding argument sort of p.
grL[F
ns]L is the same as grL1 [F
ns]L1 by Lemma 27. If L1 6j= p(t) then grL1 [F ns]L1
is ? neitherK norK1 satisfy this reduct so the claim holds. If instead L1 j= p(t)
then grL1 [F
ns]L1 is p(t).
Then, by denition of K, since p(t)K = p(t)K1 , clearly the claim holds.
 F ns is f1(t1) = f2(t2) where each element of t1 and t2 is a ground term of the
extended signature I and belongs to the corresponding argument sort of f1
and f2 respectively.
grL[F
ns]L is the same as grL1 [F
ns]L1 by Lemma 27. If L1 6j= f1(t1) = f2(t2)
then grL1 [F
ns]L1 is ? neither K nor K1 satisfy this reduct so the claim holds.
If instead L1 j= f1(t1) = f2(t2) then grL1 [F ns]L1 is f1(t1) = f2(t2).
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Then, by denition of K, since f1(t1)
K = f1(t1)
K1 and f2(t2)
K = f2(t2)
K1 ,
clearly the claim holds.
 F ns is GnsHns where  2 f^;_;!g. grL[F ns]L is grL[Gns]L grL[Hns]L and
grL1 [F
ns]L1 is grL1 [G
ns]L1  grL1 [Hns]L1 so the claim follows by I.H. on Gns and
Hns.
 F ns is 9y(G(y)ns ^ s(y)).
grL[F
ns]L is equivalent to fgrL[G()ns]L : L j= s()g_ and
grL1 [F
ns]L1 is equivalent to fgrL1 [G()ns]L1 : L1 j= s()g_. Since R(L;L1), we
have that sL = sL1 and so the claim follows by I.H. on each G()ns such that
L j= s().
 F is 8y(s(y)! G(y)ns). We consider two cases:
{ If L 6j= G()ns for some  such that L j= s(), then grL[F ns]L is ?. By
Lemma 27, we have that L1 6j= G()ns and so grL1 [F ns]L1 is ?. Thus
neither K nor K1 satises the reduct and so the claim holds in this case.
{ Otherwise, L j= G()ns for every  such that L j= s().
grL[F
ns]L is equivalent to fgrL[G()ns]L : L j= s()g^ and
grL1 [F
ns]L1 is equivalent to fgrL1 [G()ns]L1 : L1 j= s()g^. SinceR(L;L1),
we have that sL = sL1 and so the claim follows by I.H. on each G()ns
such that L j= s().
Theorem 20 Given a formula F of a many-sorted signature , and a set of function
and predicate constants c,
a) If an interpretation I of signature  is a model of SM[F ; c], then Ins is a model of
SM[F ns ^ SF; c].
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b) If an interpretation L of signature ns is a model of SM[F ns^SF; c] then there is
some interpretation I of signature  such that I is a model of SM[F ; c] and R(L; Ins).
Proof.
a) Consider an interpretation I (of many-sorted signature ) that is a stable model
of F w.r.t. c. This means that I j= F and there is no interpretation J such that
J <c I and J j= grI [F ]I . We wish to show that Ins j= F ns ^ SF and there is no
(unsorted) interpretation K such that K <c Ins and K j= grIns [F ns ^ SF]Ins . From
Lemma 25, I j= F i Ins j= F ns. It follows from the denition of Ins that Ins j= SF
so we conclude that I j= F i Ins j= F ns ^ SF. For the second item, we will prove
the contrapositive; if there is an (unsorted) interpretation K such that K <c Ins and
K j= grIns [F ns ^ SF]Ins , then there is a (many-sorted) interpretation J such that
J <c I and J j= grI [F ]I .
Assume there is an interpretation K such that K <c Ins and K j= grIns [F ns ^
SF]
Ins . We obtain the interpretation J as follows.
For every sort s in , jJ js = jIjs. For every predicate or function c in  and every
tuple ~ such that i 2 jIjsi where si is the sort of the ith argument of c, c()J = c()K .
For predicates, it is not hard to see that this is a valid assignment as atoms are either
true or false whether considering many-sorted or unsorted logic.
However, for functions, we argue that this assignment is valid. That is, K does
not map a function f to a value outside of jIjs where s is the value sort of f . This
follows from the fact that Ins j= SF and in particular, the third item of SF. Thus,
since K j= grIns [F ns ^ SF]Ins , it follows that K too maps functions to elements of
the appropriate sort.
We now show that J <c I. Since K j= grIns [SF]Ins , the fourth and fth rules
in SF are choice formulas that force K to agree with I
ns on every predicate and
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function c for every tuple that has at least one element outside of the corresponding
sort. For every predicate and function c and all tuples that have all elements in the
appropriate sort, K and J agree. Further, since I and Ins agree on these as well, it
follows immediately since K <c Ins, that J <c I.
To apply Lemma 26, it is clear that the second condition is satised. The rst
condition follows from the denition of K <c Ins; since the sort predicates are not
in c, K and Ins agree on these predicates. The third item follows from the fact that
since K j= grIns [F ns^SF]Ins it follows that K j= grIns [SF]Ins . The fourth and fth
rules in SF are choice formulas that force K to agree with I
ns for every tuple that
has at least one element outside of the corresponding sort. Thus, by Lemma 26, since
K j= grIns [F ns ^ SF]Ins and thus, K j= grIns [F ns]Ins , it follows that J j= grI [F ]I .
b) Given an interpretation L that is a stable model of F ns ^SF w.r.t. c, we rst
obtain the interpretation L1 of 
ns as follows.
 jL1j = jLj,
 sL1 = sL for every s corresponding to a sort s from ,
 c(1; : : : ; k)L1 = c(1; : : : ; k)L for every tuple 1; : : : ; k such that i 2 si where
si is the ith argument sort of c,
 c(1; : : : ; k)L1 = jL1j0 for every tuple 1; : : : ; k such that i =2 si for some i
where si is the ith argument sort of c.
It is easy to see that R(L;L1). By Lemma 28, L1 is a stable model of F
ns ^ SF
w.r.t. c. We then obtain the interpretation I of signature  as follows.
For every sort s in , jIjs = sL1 . For every predicate or function c in  and every
tuple ~ such that i 2 jLjsi where si is the sort of the ith argument of c, c()I = c()L1 .
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For predicates, it is not hard to see that this is a valid assignment as atoms are either
true or false whether considering many-sorted or unsorted logic.
However, for functions, we argue that this assignment is valid. That is, I does
not map a function f to a value outside of jIjs where s is the value sort of f . This
follows from the fact that L1 j= SF (by Lemma 27) and in particular, the third item
of SF. Thus, it follows that I too maps functions to elements of the appropriate
sort.
Now it is clear that L1 = I
ns and so we have R(L; Ins). We now show that I is a
stable model of F .
We have an interpretation I (of many-sorted signature ) such that Ins is a stable
model of F ns ^ SF w.r.t. c. This means that Ins j= F ns ^ SF and there is no
interpretation K such that K <c Ins and K j= grIns [F ns ^SF]Ins . We wish to show
that I j= F and there is no interpretation J such that J <c I and J j= grI [F ]I . From
Lemma 25, I j= F i Ins j= F ns so we conclude that I j= F . For the second item,
we will prove the contrapositive; if there is a (many-sorted) interpretation J such
that J <c I and J j= grI [F ]I , then there is an (unsorted) interpretation K such that
K <c Ins and K j= grIns [F ns ^ SF]Ins .
Assume there is an interpretation J such that J <c I and J j= grI [F ]I . We obtain
the interpretation K as follows. K = Jns.
We now show that K <c Ins. For every predicate and function c for every tuple
that has at least one element outside of the corresponding sort, by denition of
K = Jns, cK = cI
ns
= jInsj0 if c is a function and cK = cIns = 0 if c is a predicate.
That is, for every predicate and function c for every tuple that has at least one
element outside of the corresponding sort, K and Ins agree. For every predicate and
function c and all tuples that have all elements in the appropriate sort, K and J
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agree. Further, since I and Ins agree on these as well, it follows immediately since
J <c I, that K <c Ins.
To apply Lemma 26, we must verify the conditions of the lemma. It is clear
that the second condition is satised. The rst condition follows from the denition
of K = Jns. The third item follows from the observation above; by denition of
K = Jns, cK = cI
ns
= jInsj0 if c is a function and cK = cIns = 0 if c is a predicate.
Thus, by Lemma 26, since J j= grI [F ]I , it follows that K j= grIns [F ns]Ins .
Then, it is easy to see that by denition of Ins, Ins j= SF. Then, by denition
of K = Jns, it is clear that K j= SF. We show that K j= (SF)Ins .
Since K and Ins agree on all sort predicates, it is clear that K models the rst
two items of (SF)
Ins .
Since K and Ins agree on all functions f for tuples i; : : : ; k such that each i is
in jIjsi where si is the ith argument sort of f , it is clear that K models the third item
of (SF)
Ins .
The last two items of (SF)
Ins are only satised if K agrees with Ins on all
predicates (functions) c and all tuples 1; : : : ; k such that some i is not in jIjsi where
si is the ith argument sort of c. However, by denition of K = J
ns and Ins, both K
and Ins map this to jInsj0 if c is a function or 0 if c is a predicate so K satises these
items. So we conclude that K j= grIns [F ns ^ SF]Ins .
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Chapter 9
IMPLEMENTATIONS
9.1 MVSM
System MVSM 1 is a prototype implementation of multi-valued propositional
formulas under the stable model semantics. In fact, it is a script that invokes the fol-
lowing software: mvpf2lpCompiler, f2lp, gringo, claspD, and as2transition.
The component mvpf2lpCompiler is an implementation of the translations in The-
orem 14 from Chapter 7 and Theorem 23 from Chapter 10, which translates total and
partial multi-valued propositional formulas respectively into standard propositional
formulas under the stable model semantics. As the theorems show, the translations
are very similar, and the user can choose which translation to use. Then, f2lp
transforms the propositional formula into an ASP program in the input language of
gringo. Systems gringo, claspD ground and solve the ASP program respectively.
Finally as2transition processes the output of claspD and produces propositional
atoms in the form of multi-valued atoms. The composition of these software is de-
1http://reasoning.eas.asu.edu/mvsm/
Figure 9.1: Architecture of mvsm
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picted in Figure 9.1.
Shown below is a description of the blocks world domain in the language ofMVSM
assuming the functional stable model semantics. The syntax of declarations follows
the one in the input language of the Causal Calculator V2 2 . Compared to the usual
ASP encoding, explicit declaration of sorts and type checking help reduce user error.
The inertia and exogeneity assumptions in the last three rules have a simple reading,
once we understand fFg (the encoding of Choice(F ) in MVSM) as representing
defaults. There is no need to use both strong negation and default negation.
% F i l e 'bw ' : The b locks world
:  s o r t s
s tep ; astep ;
l o c a t i o n >> block .
:  ob j e c t s
0 . . maxstep : : s t ep ;
0 . . maxstep 1 : : as tep ;
1 . . 6 : : b lock ;
t ab l e : : l o c a t i o n .
:  va r i a b l e s
ST : : s tep ;
T : : astep ;
Bool : : boolean ;
2http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~tag/cc/
174
B,B1 : : b lock ;
L : : l o c a t i o n .
:  cons tant s
l o c ( block , s tep ) : : l o c a t i o n ;
move( block , l o ca t i on , astep ) : : boolean .
% two b locks can ' t be on the same block at the same time
<  l o c (B1 ,ST)=B & lo c (B2 ,ST)=B & B1!=B2 .
% e f f e c t o f moving a block
l o c (B,T+1)=L <  move(B,L ,T) .
% a block can be moved only when i t i s c l e a r
<  move(B,L ,T) & l o c (B1 ,T)=B.
% a block can ' t be moved onto a block that i s be ing
% moved a l s o
<  move(B,B1 ,T) & move(B1 ,L ,T) .
% i n i t i a l l o c a t i o n i s exogenous
f l o c (B,0)=Lg .
% ac t i on s are exogenous
fmove(B,L ,T)=Bool g .
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% f l u e n t s are i n e r t i a l
f l o c (B,T+1)=Lg <  l o c (B,T)=L .
9.2 ASPMT2SMT
9.2.1 Variable Elimination
Some SMT solvers do not support variables at all (e.g. iSAT) while others suer
in performance when handling variables (e.g. z3). While we can partially ground
the input theories, some variables have large (or innite) domains and should not
(cannot) be grounded. Thus, we consider two types of variables; ASP variables{
variables which should be grounded{and SMT variables{variables which should not
be grounded. Eliminating ASP variables is simply done by grounding the original
ASPMT theory. Then, we consider the problem of equivalently rewriting the comple-
tion of the partially ground ASPMT theory so that the result contains no variables.
To ensure that variable elimination can be performed, we impose some syntactic
restrictions on ASPMT instances. We rst impose that no SMT variable appears in
the argument of an uninterpreted function.
We consider ASPMT2SMT programs comprised of rules of the form H  B
where
 H is ? or an atom of the form f(t) = v, where v is a variable;
 B is a conjunction of atomic formulas possibly preceded with :.
We dene the variable dependency graph of a conjunction of possibly negated
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atomic formulas C1 ^    ^ Cn as follows. Nodes of the graph are variables occuring
in C1 ^    ^ Cn. There is a directed edge from v to u if there is a Ci that is v = t
or t = v for some term t such that u appears in t. We say a variable v depends on a
variable u if there is a directed path from v to u in the variable dependency graph.
We say a rule H  B is variable isolated if every variable v in it occurs in an equality
t = v or v = t that is positive in B and for the dependency graph of B, v does not
depend on v.
Example 20 The formula f = X  g = 2  X is not variable isolated because X
does not occur in an equality X = t or t = X. Instead, we write this as f = X  
g = Y ^ Y = 2 X which is variable isolated.
Example 21 The formula f = X  2 X = Y ^ 2  Y = X is not variable isolated;
although Y occurs in an equality of the form t = Y , Y depends on Y (through X).
The variable elimination is performed modularly so the process need only be
described for a single equivalence. Any equivalence in the completion of an ASPMT
program with no variables occurring in arguments of uninterpreted functions that is
variable isolated will be of the form
8v(f = v $ 9x(B1(v;x) _    _Bk(v;x)))
where each Bi is a conjunction of possibly negated literals and has v = t as a non-
negated subformula and within Bi, v does not depend on v. In the following, the
notation F vt denotes the formula obtained from F by replacing every occurrence of
the variable v with the term t. We dene the process of eliminating variables from
such an equivalence E as follows.
177
1. Given an equivalence E = 8v(f = v $ 9x(B1(v;x) _    _Bk(v;x)))
F := 8v(f = v ! 9x(B1(v;x) _    _Bk(v;x)))
G := 8v(9x(B1(v;x) _    _Bk(v;x))! f = v)
2. Eliminate variables from F as follows
(a) F := 9x(B1(v;x)vf _    _Bk(v;x)vf ) and then equivalently,
F := 9x(B1(v;x)vf ) _    _ 9x(Bk(v;x)vf )
(b) Fi := 9x(Bi(v;x)vf )
(c) Eliminate variables from Fi as follows
i. Di := Bi(v;x)
v
f
ii. While there is a variable x still inDi, select a conjunctive term x = t or
t = x (such that no variable in t depends on x) inDi, thenDi := (Di)
x
t .
iii. Fi = Di (drop the existential quantier since there are no variables in
Di).
(d) F := F1 _    _ Fk.
3. Eliminate variables from G as follows
(a) G := 8vx((B1(v;x) _    _Bk(v;x))! f = v) and then equivalently,
G := 8vx(B1(v;x)! f = v) ^    ^ 8vx(Bk(v;x)! f = v)
(b) Gi := 8vx(Bi(v;x)! f = v)
(c) Eliminate variables from Gi as follows
i. Di := Bi(v;x)! f = v
ii. While there is a variable x still in Di, select a conjunctive term x = t
or t = x (such that no variable in t depends on x) from the body of
Di, then Di := (Di)
x
t .
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iii. Gi = Di (drop the universal quantier since there are no variables in
Di).
(d) G := G1 _    _Gk.
4. E := F ^G.
The following proposition asserts the correctness of this method. Note that the
absence of variables in arguments of uninterpreted functions can be achieved by
grounding ASP variables and enforcing that no SMT variable occurs nested inside
uninterpreted functions.
Proposition 1 For any completion of a variable isolated ASPMT program with no
variables in arguments of uninterpreted functions, applying variable elimination method
repeatedly results in a classically equivalent formula that contains no variables.
Example 1 continued Recall the equivalence
speed(1) = Y $ 9XD( (accel(0)=1 ^ speed(0)=X ^ duration(0)=D
^ (Y = X + aD))
_ (decel(0)=1 ^ speed(0)=X ^ duration(0)=D
^ (Y = X   aD))
_ (speed(0) = Y ) )
Step 2a) turns the implication from left to right into the formula
9XD( (accel(0)=1 ^ speed(0)=X ^ duration(0)=D ^
(speed(1)=X + aD))
_ (decel(0)=1 ^ speed(0)=X ^ duration(0)=D^
(speed(1)=X   aD))
_ (speed(0) = speed(1)))
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And then step 2d) produces
(accel(0)=1 ^ speed(1)=speed(0) + a duration(0))_
(decel(0)=1 ^ speed(1) = speed(0)  a duration(0))_
(speed(0) = speed(1)):
To see why variable isolation is required, consider the formula f = X $ 2 X =
Y ^ 2  Y = X. One step of 3c) produces the formula
2  2  Y = Y ^X = X ! f = 2  Y:
We can drop X = X and then perform another step of 3c) to get
2  2  (2  2  Y ) = 2  2  Y ! f = 2  (2  2  Y ):
Then, at this point, no conjunctive term exists of the form x = t so the procedure
terminates but the variable Y still remains in the formula.
9.2.2 Syntax of Input Language
System ASPMT2SMT imposes three syntactic restrictions on input
ASPMT2SMT theories comprised of rules of the form H  B where B is a con-
junction of possibly negated literals and H is ? or f(t) = v: they must be variable
isolated (dened in Section 9.2.1), av-separated, and f -plain (dened in Section 5.4).
It should also be noted that the only background theories considered in this version
of the implementation are arithmetic over reals and integers.
We require that input formulas be c-plain. As Theorem 8 indicates, this condition
can be relaxed if F is tight. Relaxing this restriction is left for a future version of this
system.
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We call a variable v in a rule an argument variable if it occurs in an argument t
of some uninterpreted function f(t) in the rule. We call a variable v in a rule a value
variable if it occurs in
 f(t) = v for any term where f is an uninterpreted function, or
 t1 = t2 where t1, t2 are terms consisting of interpreted symbols (i.e., from bg)
and at least one other value variable (dierent from v) in the rule.
A rule is said to be av-separated (argument-value separated) if it contains no
variable that is both an argument variable and a value variable. This is a stronger
condition than the condition described in Section 9.2.1 concerning ASP and SMT
variables and will be relaxed in future versions of the system.
Example 22 In f(x) = y  y = m m ^m = z + 1 ^ g(x) = z, x is an argument
variable as it occurs as an argument of functions g and f . Both y and z occur as v
in some f(t) = v so they are value variables. Since m occurs in m = z+1 and z is a
value variable, m is also a value variable. This rule is av-separated since no variable
is both an argument variable and a value variable.
Example 23 In f(x) = y ^ y = x, y is a value variable and since x appears in
y = x, x is also a value variable. At the same time, x is also an argument variable.
Consequently, this rule is not av-separated.
Example 24 To see why this condition is imposed, consider the formula
f(x) = 1 g = y ^ y = x:
The system sets the equality y = x aside and grounds the formula and then replaced
the equality y = x to get
f(1) = 1 g = y ^ y = x
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f(2) = 1 g = y ^ y = x
rather than the intended
f(1) = 1 g = y ^ y = 1
f(2) = 1 g = y ^ y = 2
System ASPMT2SMT uses a syntax similar to system cplus2asp Babb and
Lee (2013) for the declarations and a syntax similar to system f2lp Lee and Palla
(2009) for the theory itself.
There are declarations of four kinds, sorts, objects, constants, and variables. The
sort declarations specify user data types (note: these cannot be used for value sorts).
The object declarations specify the elements of the user-declared data types. The
constant declarations specify all of the (possibly boolean) function constants that
appear in the theory. The variables declarations specify the user-declared data types
associated with each variable. A declaration for the car example is shown below.
:  s o r t s
s tep ; astep .
:  ob j e c t s
0 . . s t : : s t ep ;
0 . . st 1 : : as tep .
:  cons tant s
time ( s tep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . t ] ;
durat ion ( astep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . t ] ;
a c c e l ( astep ) : : boolean ;
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dec e l ( astep ) : : boolean ;
speed ( s tep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . ms ] ;
l o c a t i o n ( s tep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . l ] .
:  va r i a b l e s
S : : as tep ;
B : : boolean .
Only propositional connectives are supported in this version of ASPMT2SMT
and these are represented in the system as follows:
^ _ : !  
& | not   > <  
Comparison and arithmetic 3 operators are represented as usual:
<   > = 6= add subtract multiply divide
< <= >= > = ! = +    =
a ! = b is understood as :(a = b). To abbreviate the formula A _ :A (or
Choice(A)), which is useful for expressing defaults and inertia, we write fAg. The
rest of the car example is shown below.
% Actions and durat ions are exogenous
f a c c e l (S)=Bg .
f dec e l (S)=Bg .
fdurat ion (S)=Xg .
3Note that the type of division (integer or real) is based on context; for atomic formulas not
containing value variables, the division is understood as integer division whereas for atomic formulas
containing value variables, the division is instead understood as real division.
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% nonconcurrency o f a c t i on s
<  a c c e l (S)=true & dec e l (S)=true .
%e f f e c t s o f a c c e l and dec e l
speed (S+1)=Y <  a c c e l (S)=true & speed (S)=X & durat ion (S)=D
& Y = X+arD.
speed (S+1)=Y <  dec e l (S)=true & speed (S)=X & durat ion (S)=D
& Y = X arD.
% pre cond i t i on s o f a c c e l and dec e l
<  a c c e l (S)=true & speed (S)=X & durat ion (S)=D
& Y = X+arD & Y > ms .
<  dec e l (S)=true & speed (S)=X & durat ion (S)=D
& Y = X arD & Y < 0 .
% i n e r t i a o f speed
f speed (S+1)=Xg <  speed (S)=X.
l o c a t i o n (S+1)=Y <  l o c a t i o n (S)=X & speed (S)=A &
speed (S+1)=C & durat ion (S)=D & Y = X+(A+C)/2D.
time (S+1)=Y <  time (S)=X & durat ion (S)=D & Y=X+D.
% problem in s tance
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time (0)=0.
speed (0)=0.
l o c a t i o n (0)=0.
<  l o c a t i o n ( s t ) = Z & Z != l .
<  speed ( s t ) = Z & Z != 0 .
<  time ( s t ) = Z & Z != t .
This description can be run by the command
$aspmt2smt car  c s t=3  c t=4  c ms=4  c ar=3  c l=10
which yields the output
a c c e l (0 ) = true a c c e l (1 ) = f a l s e a c c e l (2 ) = f a l s e
de c e l (0 ) = f a l s e de c e l (1 ) = f a l s e de c e l (2 ) = true
durat ion (0 ) = 1.1835034190 durat ion (1 ) = 1.6329931618
durat ion (2 ) = 1.1835034190 l o c a t i o n (0 ) = 0 .0
l o c a t i o n (1 ) = 2.1010205144 l o c a t i o n (2 ) = 7.8989794855
l o c a t i o n (3 ) = 10 .0 speed (0 ) = 0 .0
speed (1 ) = 3.5505102572 speed (2 ) = 3.5505102572
speed (3 ) = 0 .0 time (0 ) = 0 .0 time (1) = 1.1835034190
time (2 ) = 2.8164965809 time (3 ) = 4 .0
z3 time in m i l l i s e c ond s : 30
Total time in m i l l i s e c ond s : 71
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Figure 9.2: ASPMT2SMT System Architecture
9.2.3 Architecture
The architecture of the system is shown in Figure 9.2.3 The ASPMT2SMT sys-
tem rst converts the ASPMT description to a propositional formula containing only
predicates. In addition, this step substitutes auxiliary constants for value variables
and necessary preprocessing for f2lp and gringo to enable partial grounding of argu-
ment variables only. f2lp transforms the propositional formula into a logic program
and then gringo performs partial grounding on only the argument variables. The
ASPMT2SMT system then converts the predicates back to functions and replaces
the auxiliary constants with the original expressions. Then the system computes the
completion of this partially ground logic program and performs variable elimination
on that completion. Finally, the system converts this variable-free description into
the language of z3 and then relies on z3 to produce models which correspond to
stable models of the original ASPMT description.
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Example 1 continued Consider the result of variable elimination on the portion
of the completion related to speed(1) of the running car example:
(Accel(0)=1 ^ Speed(1)=Speed(0) + A Duration(0))_
(Decel(0)=1 ^ Speed(1) = Speed(0)  A Duration(0))_
(Speed(0) = Speed(1)):
In the language of z3, this is
( a s s e r t ( or ( or
( and (= a c c e l 0 t rue ) (= speed 1
(+ speed 0 ( dura t i on 0 a ) ) ) )
( and (= d e c e l 0 t rue ) (= speed 1
(  speed 0 ( dura t i on 0 a ) ) ) ) )
(= speed 1 speed 0 )
) )
The system is available at http://reasoning.eas.asu.edu/aspmt/.
9.2.4 Experiments
The following experiments demonstrate the capability of the ASPMT2SMT sys-
tem to perform nonmonotonic reasoning about continuous changes. In addition, this
shows a signicant performance increase compared to ASP systems for domains in
which only value variables have large domains. However, when argument variables
have large domains, similar scalability issues arise as comparable grounding still oc-
curs.
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We also provide a comparison to system clingcon which loosely integrates logic
programming and constraint satisfaction. While this performs well, these representa-
tions are either not elaboration tolerant or require new auxiliary abnormality symbols
to represent the notions of inertia and default behaviors. Additionally, this system
does not support continuous reasoning.
These experiments were performed on an Intel Core 2 Duo 3.00 GHZ CPU with
4 GB RAM running Ubuntu 13.10.
Leaking Bucket
Consider a leaking bucket with maximum capacity c that loses one unit of water
every time step by default. The bucket can be relled to its maximum capacity by
the action fill. The initial capacity is 5 and the desired capacity is 10. Here, the
argument variable corresponding to the length of the plan increases so both systems
suer scalability issues.
:  s o r t s
atime ; time .
:  ob j e c t s
0 . . c : : s t ep ;
0 . . c 1 : : astep .
:  cons tant s
amt( s tep ) : : i n t [ 0 . . c ] ;
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f i l l ( as tep ) : : boolean .
:  va r i a b l e s
T : : s tep ;
ST : : astep ;
X : : i n t [ 0 . . c ] .
famt(ST+1) = X 1g <  amt(ST) = X.
f f i l l (ST) = true g .
f f i l l (ST) = f a l s e g .
amt(ST+1) = X <  f i l l (ST) = true & X = c .
<  amt(T) = X & X < 2 .
amt (0 ) = 5 .
<  not (amt( c ) = 10 ) .
c ASP (clingo 4.3.0) ASPMT2SMT 1.0 clingcon 2.0.3
Run Time Run Time Run Time
(Grounding + Solving) (Preprocessing + Solving) (Preprocessing + Solving)
10 0s (0s+0s) .037s (.027s + .01s) 0s(0s + 0s)
50 .03s (03s + 0s) .089s (.079s + .01s) 0s(0s + 0s)
100 .15s (.15s + 0s) .180s (.170s + .01s) 0.1s(0.1s + 0s)
500 3.95s (3.95s + 0s) 1.731s (1.661s + .07s) 0.3s(0.3s + 0s)
1000 19.01s (18.99s+ .02s) 35.326s (35.206s + .12s) 0.6s(0.6s + 0s)
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We see that in this experiment, ASPMT2SMT does not yield better results than
clingo. The reason for this is that the scaling of this domain takes place in the num-
ber of timesteps. Thus, since ASPMT2SMT uses gringo (the grounder for both
clingo and ASPMT2SMT) to obtain functions for each of these timesteps, the
ground descriptions given to clasp (the solver in system clingo) and z3 are of simi-
lar size. Consequently, we see that the majority of the time taken for ASPMT2SMT
is in preprocessing.
Car Example
Recall the domain in Example 1.
The rst half of the experiments are done with the values L = 10k, A = 3k, MS =
4k, T = 4k, which yields solutions with irrational values and so cannot be solved by
systems clingo and clingcon. The second half of the experiments are done with
the values L = 4k, A = k, MS = 4k, T = 4k, which yields solutions with integral values
and so can be solved by systems clingo and clingcon. In this example, only the
value variables have increasing domains but the argument variable domain remains
the same. Consequently, the ASPMT2SMT system scales very well compared to
the ASP system which can only complete the two smallest size domains.
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k ASP (clingo 4.3.0) ASPMT2SMT 1.0 clingcon 2.0.3
Run Time Run Time Run Time
(Grounding + Solving) (Preprocessing + Solving) (Preprocessing + Solving)
1 n/a .084s (.054s + .03s) n/a
5 n/a .085s (.055s + .03s) n/a
10 n/a .085s (.055s + .03s) n/a
50 n/a .087s (.047s + .04s) n/a
100 n/a .088s (.048s + .04s) n/a
1 .22s (.22s + 0s) .060s (.050s + .01s) 0s(0s + 0s)
2 62.11s (62.10s + .01s) .07s (.050s + .02s) 0s(0s + 0s)
3 > 30 minutes .072s (.052s + .02s) 0s(0s + 0s)
5 > 30 minutes .068s (.048s + .02s) 0s(0s + 0s)
10 > 30 minutes .068s (.048s + .02s) 0s(0s + 0s)
50 > 30 minutes .068s (.048s + .02s) 0s(0s + 0s)
100 > 30 minutes .072s (.052s + .02s) 0s(0s + 0s)
Here, the results for ASPMT2SMT are much more favorable. In this problem,
the scaling lies only in the size of the value of the functions involved in the descrip-
tion. Consequently, we see no scaling issues in either ASPMT2SMT or clingcon.
Neither clingcon nor clingo is able to handle the rst set of congurations since
these parameters yield non-integral solutions. On the other hand, ASPMT2SMT
handles these congurations with comparable execution time to the performance in
the second set of congurations.
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Space Shuttle Example
The following example is from Lee and Lifschitz (2003), which represents cumulative
eects on continuous changes. A spacecraft is not aected by any external forces. It
has two jets and the force that can be applied by each jet along each axis is at most
4k. The initial position of the rocket is (0,0,0) and its initial velocity is (0,1,1). How
can it get to (0,3k,2k) within 2 seconds? Assume the mass is 2.
:  s o r t s
s tep ; astep ; ax i s .
:  ob j e c t s
0 . . s t : : s t ep ;
0 . . st 1 : : as tep ;
x , y , z : : a x i s .
:  cons tant s
durat ion ( astep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . 2 ] ;
time ( s tep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . 2 ] ;
mass : : r e a l [ 0 . .m] ;
speed ( axis , s t ep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . v ] ;
pos ( ax is , s t ep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . p ] ;
j e t 1 f i r e ( ax i s , as tep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . f ] ;
j e t 2 f i r e ( ax i s , as tep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . f ] .
:  va r i a b l e s
S : : s t ep ;
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AS : : astep ;
AX,AX1 : : ax i s .
mass = m.
speed (x , 0 ) = 0 .
speed (y , 0 ) = 1 .
speed ( z , 0 ) = 1 .
time (0 ) = 0 .
pos (x , 0 ) = 0 .
pos (y , 0 ) = 0 .
pos ( z , 0 ) = 0 .
fdurat ion (AS) = Xg .
f j e t 1 f i r e (AX,AS) = Xg .
f j e t 2 f i r e (AX,AS) = Xg .
<  j e t 1 f i r e (AX,AS) = X & j e t 1 f i r e (AX1,AS) = X1 &
X != 0 & X1 != 0 & AX != AX1.
<  j e t 2 f i r e (AX,AS) = X & j e t 2 f i r e (AX1,AS) = X1 &
X != 0 & X1 != 0 & AX != AX1.
pos (AX,AS+1) = Z <  pos (AX,AS) = X & durat ion (AS) = T &
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speed (AX,AS) = S0 & speed (AX,AS+1) = S1 &
Z = X + T( S0+S1 ) /2 .
speed (AX,AS+1) = Z <  j e t 1 f i r e (AX,AS) = X1 &
j e t 2 f i r e (AX,AS) = X2 & durat ion (AS) = T & mass = M &
speed (AX,AS) = Y & Z = Y+T(X1+X2)/M.
time (AS+1) = X <  time (AS) = Y & durat ion (AS) = T &
X = Y+T.
<  pos (x , s t ) = X & X != 0 .
<  pos (y , s t ) = X & X != 3k .
<  pos ( z , s t ) = X & X != 2k .
k ASP (clingo 4.3.0) ASPMT2SMT 1.0 clingcon 2.0.3
Run Time Run Time Run Time
(Grounding + Solving) (Preprocessing + Solving) (Preprocessing + Solving)
1 0.01s (0.01s + 0s) .048s (.038s + .01s) 0s(0s + 0s)
5 .08s (.06s + .02s) .047s (.037s + .01s) 0s(0s + 0s)
10 .35s (.24s + .11s) .053s (.043s + .01s) 0s(0s + 0s)
50 13.40s (6.64s + 6.76s) .050s (.040s + .01s) 0s(0s + 0s)
100 39.17s (30.71s + 8.46s) .051s (.041s + .01s) 0s(0s + 0s)
Again in this problem, the scaling lies only in the size of the value of the func-
tions involved in the description. Consequently, we see no scaling issues in either
ASPMT2SMT or clingcon.
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Bouncing Ball Example
The following example is from Chintabathina (2008). Consider an agent acting in a
domain consisting of a ball. The ball is held above the ground by the agent. The
actions available to the agent are drop and catch. Dropping the ball causes the height
of the ball to change continuously with time as dened by Newton's laws of motion.
As the ball accelerates towards the ground it gains velocity. If the ball is not caught
before it reaches the ground it hits the ground with speed s and bounces up into
the air with speed r  s where r = :95 is the rebound coecient. The bouncing ball
reaches a certain height and falls back towards the ground due to gravity. A robot is
holding a ball at height 100k. We want to have the ball hit the ground and caught
at height 50.
:  s o r t s
s tep ; astep .
:  ob j e c t s
0 . . s t : : s t ep ;
0 . . st 1 : : as tep .
:  cons tant s
pos ( s tep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . p ] ;
speed ( s tep ) : : r e a l [  5000 . . 5 000 ] ;
drop ( astep ) : : boolean ;
catch ( astep ) : : boolean ;
durat ion ( astep ) : : r e a l [ 0 . . 1 0 0 0 ] ;
g r av i ty : : r e a l [   5 0 . . 5 0 ] ;
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c o e f f i c i e n t : : r e a l [ 0 . . 1 ] ;
ho ld ing ( s tep ) : : boolean .
:  va r i a b l e s
S : : s t ep ;
AS : : astep .
c o e f f i c i e n t = 95/100.
g rav i ty =  98/10.
pos (0 ) = p .
ho ld ing (0 ) = true .
speed (0 ) = 0 .
fdurat ion (AS) = Xg .
fdrop (AS) = true g .
fdrop (AS) = f a l s e g .
f catch (AS) = true g .
f catch (AS) = f a l s e g .
<  drop (AS) = true & catch (AS) = true .
<  drop (AS) = true & hold ing (AS) = f a l s e .
<  catch (AS) = true & hold ing (AS) = true .
<  drop (AS) = true & durat ion (AS) = X & X != 0 .
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<  catch (AS) = true & durat ion (AS) = X & X != 0 .
ho ld ing (AS+1) = true <  catch (AS) = true .
speed (AS+1) = 0 <  catch (AS) = true .
ho ld ing (AS+1) = f a l s e <  drop (AS) = true .
ho ld ing (AS+1) = true <  ho ld ing (AS) = true &
drop (AS) = f a l s e .
ho ld ing (AS+1) = f a l s e <  ho ld ing (AS) = f a l s e &
catch (AS) = f a l s e .
f speed (AS+1) = Xg <  speed (AS) = Y & durat ion (AS) = T &
grav i ty = G & X = Y+TG & hold ing (AS) = f a l s e .
speed (AS+1) = X <  speed (AS) = X & hold ing (AS) = true .
speed (AS+1) = X <  speed (AS) = Y & c o e f f i c i e n t = C &
X =  1YC & pos (AS) = 0 & hold ing (AS) = f a l s e .
<  pos (S) = X & X < 0 .
pos (AS+1) = X <  pos (AS) = Y & durat ion (AS) = T &
speed (AS+1) = S2 & speed (AS) = S1 &
X = Y + T( S1+S2 )/2 & ( ( catch (AS) = f a l s e &
ho ld ing (AS) = f a l s e ) j drop (AS) = true ) .
pos (AS+1) = X <  pos (AS) = X &
(( ho ld ing (AS) = true & drop (AS) = f a l s e ) j
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catch (AS) = true ) .
<  pos ( st 2) = X & X != 0 .
<  pos ( s t ) = X & X != 50 .
k ASP (clingo 4.3.0) ASPMT2SMT 1.0 clingcon 2.0.3
Run Time Run Time Run Time
(Grounding + Solving) (Preprocessing + Solving) (Preprocessing + Solving)
1 n/a .072s (.062s + .01s) n/a
10 n/a .072s (.062s + .01s) n/a
100 n/a .071s (.061s + .01s) n/a
1000 n/a .075s (.065s + .01s) n/a
10000 n/a .082s (.062s + .02s) n/a
Again, clingo and clingcon are unable to nd solutions to this domain since
solutions are not integral. Also, we see that ASPMT2SMT suers no scaling issues
here again due to the fact that in this problem the scaling lies only in the size of the
value of the functions involved in the description.
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9.3 Proofs
9.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof relies on the following lemmas.
Lemma 29
8vx(t(x) = v ^H(vx)! G(vx))
is equivalent to
8x(H(vx)! G(vx))vt(x):
Proof. Given an interpretation I
I j= 8vx(t(x) = v ^H(vx)! G(vx)) i
I j= t(~) =  ^H(~)! G(~) for every ~ from jIj i
I j= H(~) ! G(~) where  = t(~)I for every ~ from jIj, (when  6= t(~)I , the
implication is trivially satised) i
I j= 8x(H(t(x)x)! G(t(x)x)) i
I j= 8x(H(vx)! G(vx))vt(x):
Lemma 30
9zx(D(zx) ^ z = t(x))
is equivalent to
9x(D(zx)zt(x)):
Proof. Given an interpretation I
I j= 9zx(D(zx) ^ z = t) i
I j= D(~) ^  = t(~) for some ~ from jIj i
I j= D(~) where  = t(~)I for some ~ from jIj, (if t(~)I 6= , then clearly I 6j=
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D(~) ^  = t(~)) i
I j= 9x(D(t(x)x)) i
I j= 9x(D(zx)zt(x))
Lemma 31 Consider a conjunction of possibly negated atomic formulas C1^  ^Cn
such that for every variable v occurring in the conjunction, there is some Ci such that
Ci is v = t or t = v for some term t such that within C1 ^    ^ Cn, no variable
in t depends on v. Given such a v and t, (C1 ^    ^ Cn)vt , for every variable u in
(C1 ^    ^ Cn)vt , there is some Ci such that Ci is u = t0 or t0 = u for some term t0
such that within C1 ^    ^ Cn, no variable in t0 depends on u.
Proof. Consider any variables v and u in C1 ^    ^ Cn. We start with the fact
that there is some Ci that is v = t1 or t1 = v for some term t1 such that within
C1 ^    ^Cn, no variable in t1 depends on v and that there is some Cj that is u = t2
or t2 = u for some term t2 such that within C1 ^    ^ Cn, no variable in t2 depends
on u. Now we consider the eect of replacing v with t1 in C1 ^    ^ Cn. This yields
(C1 ^    ^ Cn)vt1 . There are two possibilities for Cj.
 Cj does not contain v. Then (Cj)vt1 is exactly Cj and so this still satises that
no variable in t2 depends on u.
 Cj does contain v. Then (Cj)vt1 is u = (t2)vt1 or (t2)vt1 = u we must check that
(t2)
v
t1
does not contain any variable that depends on u. However, in this case u
depends on v and since we assumed that t2 contained no variable that depends
on u, we know v does not depend on u. Consequently, no variable in t1 depends
on u and so we conclude that (t2)
v
t1
does not contain any variable that depends
on u.
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Proposition 1 For any completion of an av-separated, variable isolated ASPMT
program, applying variable elimination method repeatedly results in a classically
equivalent formula that contains no variables.
Proof.
Consider the completion of an av-separated, variable isolated ASPMT program,
which is a conjunction of equivalences of the form
E = 8v(f = v $ 9x(B1(x) _    _Bk(x)))
where each Bi(x) is a conjunction of possibly negated atomic formulas and has v = t
or t = v as a non-negated subformula for some term t such that within Bi(x), no
variable in t depends on v. The proof is by induction on each equivalence E and n,
the number of variables in the E.
 E contains no variables. The variable elimination leaves E unchanged and since
there are no variables in F , the claim holds.
 E is
8v(f = v $ 9x(B1(x) _    _Bk(x)))
where each Bi(x) is a conjunction of possibly negated atomic formulas and has
v = t or t = v as a non-negated subformula for some term t such that within
Bi(x), no variable in t depends on v. Step 1 produces two formulas F and G
where
F := 8v(f = v ! 9x(B1(x) _    _Bk(x)))
G := 8v(9x(B1(x)_    _Bk(x))! f = v) Clearly E is equivalent to F ^G so
the claim follows by induction on F and G.
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 E is 8v(f = v ! 9x(B1(x) _    _ Bk(x))) where each Bi(x) is a conjunction
of possibly negated atomic formulas and has v = t or t = v as a non-negated
subformula for some term t such that within Bi(x), no variable in t depends on
v. Step 2(a) of the variable elimination method produces the formula
F := 9x(B1(x)vf ) _    _ 9x(Bk(x)vf ). F is equivalent to E by Lemma 29. F
does not contain the variable v since v is replaced by f . The claim follows by
induction on each 9x(Bi(x)vf ).
 E is 9yx(B(yx)) where B(yx) is a conjunction of possibly negated atomic
formulas and has y = t or t = y as a non-negated subformula for some term t
such that within B(yx), no variable in t depends on y. One iteration of step 2(c)
will produce the formula F := 9x(B(x)yt ). F is equivalent to E by Lemma 30.
F does not contain the variable y since y is replaced by t and no variable in t
depends on y. Further, by Lemma 31 F has the property that for every variable
z in F , F has z = t0 or t0 = z as a non-negated subformula for some term t0
such that within B(x)yt , no variable in t
0 depends on z. So, the claim follows
by induction on F .
 E is 8y(9x(B1(x) _    _ Bk(x))! f = v) (for k  2). Step 3(a) will produce
the formula
F := 8vx(B1(x) ! f = v) ^    ^ 8vx(Bk(x) ! f = v). E is classically
equivalent to F so the claim holds by induction on each 8vx(Bi(x)! f = v).
 E is 8yx(B(x)! f = v) (y and v may be the same) where B(yx) is a conjunc-
tion of possibly negated atomic formulas and has y = t or t = y as a non-negated
subformula for some term t such that within B(yx), no variable in t depends on
y. One iteration of step 3(c) produces the formula F := 8x(B(x) ! f = u)yt .
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F is equivalent to E by Lemma 29. F does not contain the variable y since y
is replaced by t and no variable in t depends on y. Further, by Lemma 31 F
has the property that for every variable z in F , F has z = t0 or t0 = z as a
non-negated subformula for some term t0 such that within B(x)yt , no variable
in t0 depends on z. So, the claim follows by induction on F .
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Chapter 10
CABALAR SEMANTICS
10.1 Reduct Characterization
The Cabalar semantics reviewed in Chapter 3 can also be reformulated in terms of
grounding and reduct. A theorem similar to Theorem 1 can be stated for the Cabalar
semantics.
Theorem 21 Let F be a rst-order sentence of signature  and let c be a list of
intensional constants. For any partial interpretation I of , hI; Ii is a partial equi-
librium model of F i
 I j=
p
F , and
 for every partial interpretation J of  such that J c I, we have J 6j=
p
grI [F ]
I .
Example 3 continued Recall the example that describes the inertia of the location
of a box. The reduct F I1 is
at(box; 0; l1)^
((at(box; 1; l1) _ ?)  at(box; 0; l1))^
((? _ :?)  ?)
Recall the three partial interpretations J1; J2; J3 that satisfy Ji at I1 which agree
with I1 except that
 at(box; 0; l1)J1 = u;
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 at(box; 1; l1)J2 = u;
 at(box; 0; l1)J3 = u and at(box; 1; l1)J3 = u.
Now it is easy to see that J1 and J3 fail to satisfy the rst conjunction of the reduct
while J2 fails to satisfy the second conjunction of the reduct. Thus, this characteri-
zation corresponds to the equilibrium logic style denition for this case.
On the other hand, the reduct F I2 is
at(box; 0; l1)^
((? _ :?)  at(box; 0; l1))^
((at(box; 1; l2) _ ?)  ?)
Consider again the partial interpretation J4 that agrees with I2 except that
at(box; 1; l2)J4 = u. We can see that J4 satises this reduct. Thus, this characteriza-
tion corresponds to the equilibrium logic style for this case.
Interestingly, this reformulation of the Cabalar semantics is closely related to the
language ASPffg Balduccini (2012). We discuss the details in Section 11.2.
Comparing the reformulation of the Cabalar semantics in Theorem 21 and the
reformulation of the functional stable model semantics semantics in Theorem 1 tells
us that the reducts are dened in the same way, whereas interpretations we consider
for stability checking and the notions of satisfaction are dierent. That is, if the
intensional constants are function constants only, under the functional stable model
semantics, the interpretations J we consider for stability checking are all other classi-
cal interpretations that are dierent from I, while under the Cabalar semantics, they
are partial interpretations that are \smaller" than I. For instance, in Example 7,
there are many such Js that are dierent from I1 for the functional stable model se-
mantics semantics depending on the size of the universe, while there are only 3 such
J for the Cabalar semantics.
205
Later in this chapter, we present some syntactic classes of formulas on which the
two semantics coincide despite these dierences.
10.2 Second-Order Logic Characterization
The Cabalar semantics can also be formulated in the style of second-order logic.
We extend the formulas to allow predicate and function variables as in the standard
second-order logic, but consider partial interpretations in place of classical interpre-
tations. Similar to the denition of bc < c, we dene bc  c as
(bcpred  cpred) ^ (bcfunc  cfunc) ;
where bcpred  cpred is as dened in Section 4.2{the conjunction of 8x(bp(x)! p(x)) for
each predicate constant p 2 cpred and the corresponding predicate variable bp 2 bcpred.
bcfunc  cfunc is dened as the conjunction of
8x(( bf(x) 6= bf(x)) _ ( bf(x) = f(x))) :
for all function constants f in cfunc and the corresponding function variables bf in
bcfunc. As explained earlier, the rst disjunctive term is satisable under a partial
interpretation, meaning that bf is undened on x; the second disjunctive term means
that bf and f are both dened on x and map to the same element in the universe.
We dene bc  c as (bc  c) ^ :(c  bc).
We reformulate the Cabalar semantics by using the expression CBL that looks
similar to SM. It is dened as:
CBL[F ; c] = F ^ :9bc(bc  c ^ F y(bc)) ;
where F y(bc) is dened the same as F (bc) in Section 4.2 except for the base case:
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 When F is an atomic formula, F y(bc) is F (bc) where F (bc) is the result of replacing
each occurrence of each constant c 2 c with the corresponding variable bc 2 bc.
1
The following theorem states the correctness of the reformulation.
Theorem 22 For any sentence F , a PHT-interpretation hI; Ii is a partial equilib-
rium model of F relative to c i I j=
p
CBL[F ; c].
Note the similarity between this reformulation of the Cabalar semantics given
in Theorem 22 and the denition of SM in Section 4.2. The dierences are in the
comparison operators  vs. <, and whether to consider partial interpretations or
classical interpretations.
Neither semantics is stronger than the other. The following example presents a
formula that has a stable model under the Cabalar semantics, but not under the
functional stable model semantics.
Example 25 SM[f = g; f; g] has no models if the universe contains more than one
element. Take any I such that I j= f = g. The reduct of f = g relative to I is f = g
itself, and there are other models of the reduct. Since I is not the unique model of
the reduct, I is not a (f; g)-stable model of f = g. On the other hand, assuming that
the universe is f1; 2; 3g, an interpretation I that assigns 1 to both f and g satises
CBL[f = g; f; g]. The reduct is the same as before, but any interpretation J smaller
than I maps either or both f and g to u, and hence does not satisfy the reduct.
Similarly, there are two other models of CBL[f = g; f; g] with the same universe.
1In fact, F (bc) can be also used in place of F y(bc) for dening CBL[F ; c] as well, without aecting
the models.
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On the other hand, in the following example, the formula has a stable model under
the functional stable model semantics, but not under the Cabalar semantics.
Example 26 Let F be the formula f(1) = 1^ f(2) = 1^ (f(g) = 1! g = 1), and I
be an interpretation such that the universe is f1; 2g, and 1I = 1, 2I = 2, f(1)I = 1,
f(2)I = 1, gI = 1. One can check that I is a model of SM[F ; f; g], but not a model
of CBL[F ; f; g].
10.3 Correspondence on Multi-valued Propositional Formulas
We rst present the simpler relationship between the two semantics in the context
of multi-valued propositional formulas.
Similar to Theorem 14, the following theorem tells us that the partial stable models
of a multi-valued propositional formula can be identied with the stable models of a
propositional formula.
Recall that given a multi-valued signature , by UC  (\Uniqueness Constraint")
we denote the conjunction of
^
v 6=w j v;w2Dom(c)
:(c = v ^ c = w) (10.1)
for all c 2 . The only dierence between the two transformations is that we only
impose UC  and omit EC  (the existence constraint).
Theorem 23 Let F be a multi-valued propositional formula of signature , which
can be also viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop.
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(a) If a partial interpretation I of  is a partial multi-valued stable model of F , then
I can be viewed as an interpretation of prop that is a propositional stable model
of F ^ UC  (in the sense of Ferraris (2005)).
(b) If an interpretation I of prop is a propositional stable model of F ^ UC  (in
the sense of Ferraris (2005)), then I can be viewed as a partial interpretation
of  that is a partial multi-valued stable model of F .
The following corollary immediately follows from Theorems 14 and 23. It tells us
that the stable model semantics can be fully embedded into the partial multi-valued
stable model semantics.
Corollary 6 For any multi-valued propositional formula F of signature  and any
partial interpretation I, we have that I is a multi-valued stable model of F i I is a
partial multi-valued stable model of F ^ EC .
Let  be a multi-valued signature, and let none be the signature that is the same
as  except that the domain of each constant has an additional new value none.
Given a partial multi-valued interpretation I of , by Inone we denote a multi-valued
interpretation of none that agrees with I on all dened constants, and maps undened
constants to none.
Theorem 24 Let F be a multi-valued propositional formula of signature .
(a) If an interpretation I of  is a partial multi-valued stable model of F , then Inone
is a multi-valued stable model of F ^Vc2 c=none _ :(c=none).
(b) If an interpretation J of none is a stable model of F ^Vc2 c=none _ :(c=
none)

then J = Inone for some partial multi-valued stable model I of F .
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10.4 Correspondence on f -plain Sentences
This section presents the correspondence on f -plain sentences between the func-
tional stable model semantics and the Cabalar semantics coincide when we consider
\total" interpretations only. Recall that a partial interpretation I is called total if I
does not map any function constant to u. Obviously, a total interpretation can be
identied with the classical interpretation.
Recall that for any function constant f , a rst-order formula F is called f -plain
if each atomic formula in F
 does not contain f , or
 is of the form f(t) = t1 where t is a list of terms not containing f , and t1 is a
term not containing f ,
and for a list c of predicate and function constants, we say that F is c-plain if F is
f -plain for each function constant f in c.
The following theorem states that the two semantics coincide on c-plain formulas.
Theorem 25 For any c-plain sentence F of signature , any list c of intensional
constants, and any total interpretation I of  satisfying 9xy(x 6= y), I j= SM[F ; c] i
I j=
p
CBL[F ; c].
Examples 25 and 26 above demonstrate why the restriction to c-plain formulas is
necessary in Theorem 25.
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The requirement in Theorem 25 that every occurrence of every atomic formula be
c-plain can be relaxed if the formula is tight and in Clark Normal Form. 2
Theorem 26 For any sentence F of signature  in Clark Normal Form that is tight
on c, and any total interpretation I of  satisfying 9xy(x 6= y), I j= SM[F ; c] i
I j=
p
CBL[F ; c].
10.4.1 Correspondence on non-f -plain Sentences
Theorem 25 can be extended to non-c-plain formulas by rst unfolding F using
the same process presented in Section 7.4 that we review here:
 If F is of the form p(t1; : : : ; tn) (n  0) such that tk1 ; : : : ; tkj are all the terms
in t1; : : : ; tn that contain some members of c, then UF c(p(t1; : : : ; tn)) is
9x1 : : : xj

p(t1; : : : ; tn)
00 ^
^
1ij
UF c(tki = xi)

where p(t1; : : : ; tn)
00 is obtained from p(t1; : : : ; tn) by replacing each tki with the
variable xi.
 If F is of the form f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0 (n  0) such that tk1 ; : : : ; tkj are all the
terms in t0; : : : ; tn that contain some members of c, then UF c(f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0)
is
9x1 : : : xj

(f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0)
00 ^
^
0ij
UF c(tki = xi)

where (f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0)
00 is obtained from f(t1; : : : ; tn) = t0 by replacing each
tki with the variable xi.
2Recall these denitions from Section 5.5.
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 UF c(F G) is UF c(F ) UF c(G) where  2 f^;_;!g.
 UF c(QxF ) is Qx UF c(F (x)) where Q 2 f8;9g.
Recall that UF c(F ) is equivalent to F under classical logic. Similarly, Theorem 27
below shows that the Cabalar semantics preserves stable models when unfolding is
applied. However, this is not the case under the functional stable model semantics.
Theorem 27 For any sentence F , any list c of constants, and any partial interpre-
tation I, we have I j=
p
CBL[F ; c] i I j=
p
CBL[UF c(F ); c].
This theorem generalizes Theorem 1 in Cabalar (2011) that turns programs with
functions to programs without functions using a notion similar to unfolding.
Example 27 Let F be f = g. Recall that UF c(F ) is 9xy(x = y ^ f = x ^ g = y).
Let I1, I2, I3 be interpretations whose universe is f1; 2; 3g, and each Ii maps f and g
to i (1  i  3). Each of them satises CBL[F ; f; g] and CBL[UF (f;g)(F ); f; g], but
as we observed, none of them is a model of SM[F ; f; g].
However, since UF c(F ) is c-plain, the following corollary follows from Theo-
rems 25 and 27.
Corollary 7 For any sentence F , any list c of constants, and any total interpretation
I satisfying 9xy(x 6= y), we have I j=
p
CBL[F ; c] i I j=
p
CBL[UF c(F ); c] i I j=
SM[UF c(F ); c].
For example, SM[UF (f;g)(f = g); f; g] has the same models as CBL[f = g; f; g].
These theorems have established several relationships between the two semantics
for total interpretations but in the next sections we consider partial interpretations
that may map functions to u.
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10.5 Comparing the Cabalar Semantics and FSM for Partial Stable Models
Let F be a rst-order sentence of signature . F none is the formula of signature
[fnoneg (where none is a new object constant) that is obtained from F as follows.
 for any atomic formula F , F none = F ;
 (GH)none = (Gnone Hnone) where  2 f^;_;!g;
 8xG(x)none is 8x(x 6= none! G(x)none);
 9xG(x)none is 9x(G(x)none ^ x 6= none).
Given a partial interpretation I, we dene the total interpretation Inone as
 jInonej = jIj [ fnoneg;
 noneInone = none;
 for every function constant f 2  and  2 jInonejn where n is the arity of f ,
f I
none
() =
8><>: f
I() if  is in jIjn and f I() is dened;
none otherwise;
 For every predicate p 2  and  2 jInonejn where n is the arity of p,
pI
none
() =
8><>: p
I() if  is in jIjn;
f otherwise.
Theorem 28 For any sentence F of signature ,
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(a) If I is a Cabalar stable model of F relative to c, then Inone is a stable model of
(UF (F ))
none ^
^
f2c
8xhf(x) = nonei (10.2)
relative to c.
(b) If an interpretation J such that noneJ = none is a stable model of (10.2)
relative to c, then J = Inone for some Cabalar stable model I of F relative to c.
Example 28 Let F be f = f , and let c be f . Assuming that the universe is f1; 2g,
F has two Cabalar stable models: ff = 1g and ff = 2g. The translation (10.2) yields
the formula
9x(f = x ^ x 6= none) ^ ff=noneg;
and, in accordance with Theorem 28, its stable models are the same as the Cabalar
stable models.
For :F , set ; is the only Cabalar stable model. Accordingly, (UF (:F ))none^ff=
noneg has only one stable model which maps f to none.
Theorem 28 becomes incorrect if we do not apply unfolding, i.e., if we replace
UF (F ) in the statement with F . Indeed, for formula f = f above, the modication
of (10.2) yields f = f ^ hf = nonei, which has ff=noneg as the only stable model.
Also, Theorem 28 becomes incorrect if the unfolding is restricted to c only rather
than to the whole , i.e., if we replace UF (F ) with UF c(F ). Indeed, consider F
to be a = b where neither a nor b is intensional (i.e., a; b 62 c). Formula (10.2)
is still a = b. I = ; is not a Cabalar stable model of a = b relative to ;, but
Inone = fa = none; b = noneg is a stable model of a = b relative to ;.
To see why we need the condition that noneJ = none in part (b), consider the
following example.
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Example 29 Consider the formula > with signature  = fcg and the universe f1g.
The only Cabalar stable model I is undened on c. On the other hand, formula (10.2)
yields f =none _ f 6= none. Here, without the condition, we have a stable model J
such that noneJ = 1 and fJ = 1 but this does not correspond to the Cabalar stable
model.
10.6 Capturing FSM in the Cabalar Semantics
Theorem 25 tells us that for any c-plain sentence F , the complete Cabalar stable
models of F are precisely the stable models of F . The following corollary shows that
the restriction to complete interpretations can instead be expressed in the sentence
itself.
Corollary 8 For any c-plain sentence F and any partial interpretation I that satis-
es 9xy(x 6= y), I is a stable model of F relative to c i I is a Cabalar stable model
of F ^ :: V
f2c
8x(f(x) = f(x)) relative to c.
However, the restriction that the sentence is c-plain remains. We consider two
examples of non-c-plain sentences below.
Example 30 Consider the very simple problem of restricting the function f to a
certain domain. To express that f is a member of dom1 with the universe f1; 2; 3g, we
can simply write dom1(f) where c = ffg (dom1 is non-intensional) which alone has
no stable models as long as dom1 has more than one element. However, this has among
its Cabalar stable models fdom1(1); dom1(2); f = 1g and fdom1(1); dom1(2); f = 2g.
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We can try writing this as a constraint ::dom1(f) and no longer are there any
Cabalar stable models. However, this does not work in general.
Example 31 Consider the extension to the previous example in which we know that f
belongs to two dierent domains. To express that f is a member of dom1 and a mem-
ber of dom2 with universe f1; 2; 3g, we can simply write dom1(f)^dom2(f) where c =
ffg (dom1 and dom2 are non-intensional) which has a stable model in the case that the
intersection of dom1 and dom2 is of size 1; e.g. fdom1(1); dom1(2); dom2(2); dom2(3); f =
2g is a stable model. Now the approach to capture this in the Cabalar semantics in
the previous example would write this ::dom1(f)^::dom2(f) which has no Cabalar
stable models.
It remains an open question whether this behavior can be captured in the Cabalar
semantics.
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10.7 Proofs
10.7.1 Proof of Theorem 21
Recall the denition: J c I if
 J and I have the same universe and agree on all constants not in c;
 pJ  pI for all predicate constants in c; and
 fJ() = u or fJ() = f I() for all function constants in c and all lists  of
elements in the universe.
As before, let d be a list of constants that is similar to c and is disjoint from
. The notion of Jcd [ I is straightforwardly extended to the case when J and I are
partial interpretations.
Lemma 32 For any partial interpretations I and J of signature , we have J c I
i Jcd [ I j=p d  c.
Proof. By denition of Jcd [ I, J and I have the same universe and agree on all
constants in  n c, which is the rst condition of J c I.
Recall the denition: d  c is
(dpred  cpred) ^ (dfunc  cfunc):
Jcd [ I j=p dpred  cpred i, for every predicate constant p in c,
Jcd [ I j=
p
8x(p(x)cd ! p(x));
which is equivalent to saying that (pcd)
Jcd[I  pJcd[I . Since I does not interpret any
constant from d and Jcd does not interpret any constant from c, this is equivalent to
(pcd)
Jcd  pI and further to pJ  pI , which is the second condition of J c I.
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Jcd [ I j=p (dfunc  cfunc) i, for every function constant f in c,
Jcd [ I j=
p
8x((f(x)cd 6= f(x)cd) _ (f(x)cd = f(x)));
which is equivalent to saying that fJ() = u or fJ() = f I() for all , the third
condition of J c I.
Lemma 33 For any partial interpretations I and J of signature , we have J c I
i Jcd [ I j=p d  c.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 32 since
 J c I i J c I and not I c J , and
 Jcd [ I j=p d  c i Jcd [ I j=p d  c and Jcd [ I 6j=p c  d.
Lemma 34 For any sentence F of signature  and any partial interpretations I and
J of  such that J c I,
(a) if Jcd [ I j=p F y(d), then I j=p F .
(b) if hJ; Ii j=
pht
F , then hI; Ii j=
pht
F .
Proof. Each of (a) and (b) can be proved by induction on F .
We will show only the case when F is an atomic sentence. The other cases are
straightforward:
Part (a): Let F be an atomic sentence. Assume Jcd [ I j=p F y(d), i.e., J j=p F .
 Subcase 1: F is of the form p(t). Since J c I, it follows that I j=
p
F .
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 Subcase 2: F is of the form t1 = t2. Since Jcd [ I j= F (d), tJ1 = tJ2 6= u. From
J c I, it follows that tI1 = tI2 6= u, i.e., I j=p F .
Part (b): Let F be an atomic sentence. Assume hJ; Ii j=
pht
F , i.e., hJ; Ii; h j=
pht
F
 Subcase 1: F is of the form p(t). Since J c I, it follows that hJ; Ii; t j=
pht
F .
 Subcase 2: F is of the form t1 = t2. Since hJ; Ii; h j=pht F , tJ1 = tJ2 6= u. From
J c I, it follows that tI1 = tI2 6= u, i.e., hJ; Ii; t j=pht F .
Lemma 35 Let F be a sentence of signature , and let I and J be partial interpre-
tations of  such that J c I. We have J j=
p
grI [F ]
I i hJ; Ii j=
pht
F .
Proof. By induction on F .
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. Clearly, grI [F ] is F .
 Subcase 1: I 6j=
p
F . Then grI [F ]
I is ?, which J does not satisfy. Further, since
hI; Ii 6j=
pht
F , by Lemma 34 (b), it follows that hJ; Ii 6j=
pht
F .
 Subcase 2: I j=
p
F . Then grI [F ]
I is F . It is clear that J j=
p
F i hJ; Ii j=
pht
F .
Case 2: F is G^H or G_H. The claim follows immediately from I.H. on G and H.
Case 3: F is G! H. Consider the following subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j=
p
G! H. grI [G! H]I is ?, which J does not satisfy. Further,
hI; Ii 6j=
p
G! H. By Lemma 34 (b), hJ; Ii 6j=
p
G! H.
 Subcase 2: I j=
p
G ! H. grI [G ! H]I is equivalent to grI [G]I ! grI [H]I .
Further, hJ; Ii j=
pht
G ! H is equivalent to hJ; Ii 6j=
pht
G or hJ; Ii j=
pht
H. Then
the claim follows from I.H. on G and H.
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Case 4: F is 8xG(x), or 9xG(x). By induction on G() for each  in the universe.
Theorem 21 Let F be a rst-order sentence of signature  and let c be a list
of intensional constants. For any partial interpretation I of , hI; Ii is a partial
equilibrium model of F i
 I j=
p
F , and
 for every partial interpretation J of  such that J c I, we have J 6j=
p
grI [F ]
I .
Proof. Clearly, I j=
p
F i hI; Ii j=
pht
F . By Lemma 35, for every partial interpretation
J of  such that J c I, J 6j=
p
grI [F ]
I i hJ; Ii 6j=
pht
F .
10.7.2 Proof of Theorem 22
Lemma 36 Let F be a sentence of signature , and let I and J be partial interpre-
tations of . We have Jcd [ I j=p F y(d) i hJ; Ii j=pht F .
Proof. By induction on F .
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. F y(d) is F (d). Jcd [ I j=p F (d) i J j=p F i
hJ; Ii; h j=
pht
F i hJ; Ii j=
pht
F .
Case 2: F is G ^H or G _H. Follows by I.H. on G and H.
Case 3: F is G! H. Consider the following subcases:
 Subcase 1: I 6j=
p
G! H. Clearly, Jcd [ I 6j=p G! H and hJ; Ii 6j=pht G! H.
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 Subcase 2: I j=
p
G ! H. Then Jcd [ I j=p (G ! H)y(d) i Jcd [ I j=p Gy(d) !
Hy(d). Further, hJ; Ii j=
pht
G ! H i hJ; Ii 6j=
pht
G or hJ; Ii j=
pht
H. Then the
claim follows from I.H. on G and H.
Case 4: F is 8xG(x), or 9xG(x). By induction on G() for each  in the universe.
Theorem 22 For any sentence F , a PHT-interpretation hI; Ii is a partial equilibrium
model of F relative to c i I j=
p
CBL[F ; c].
Proof. By denition, CBL[F ; c] is
F ^ :9bc(bcc ^ F y(bc)):
Clearly, I j=
p
F i hI; Ii j=
pht
F . From Lemma 33 and Lemma 36, it follows that
I j=
p
:9bc(bc c ^ F y(bc)) i there is no interpretation J of  such that J c I and
hJ; Ii j=
pht
F .
10.7.3 Proof of Theorem 23
Lemma 37 Assume that K and X are partial multi-valued interpretations of  and
Y is a propositional interpretation of prop which is a subset of X such that
K(c) = X(c) i either c = X(c) 2 Y or X(c) = undef:
We have that K j= FX (when we view F as a multi-valued formula of ) i Y j= FX
(when we view F as a propositional formula of prop).
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Proof. By induction on F. We show only the case of atoms. The other cases are
straightforward.
Let F be an atom c = v. If X j= c = v, then FX is F and it cannot be that
X(c) = undef . The claim follows from the assumption sinceK j= c = v i Y j= c = v.
If X 6j= c = v, then FX is ?, which neither K nor Y satises.
Theorem 23 Let F be a multi-valued formula of signature , which can be also
viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop.
(a) If a partial interpretation I of  is a partial multi-valued stable model of F ,
then I can be viewed as an interpretation of prop that is a propositional stable
model of F ^ UC  (in the sense of Ferraris (2005)).
(b) If an interpretation I of prop is a propositional stable model of F ^ UC  (in
the sense of Ferraris (2005)), then I can be viewed as a partial interpretation
of  that is a partial multi-valued stable model of F .
Proof. (a) Assume X of signature  is a partial multi-valued stable model of F .
This means X j= F and no partial multi-valued interpretation K that is a subset of
X satises FX . Now since X is a partial multi-valued intepretation, X j= UC. Then
clearly X j= F when viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop.
So, we wish to show that there is no interpretation Y of signature prop such that
Y  X when X is viewed as a set of propositional atoms and Y j= (F ^ UC)X
when viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop. To do so, we prove the
contrapositive. We will show that if there is an interpretation Y of signature prop such
that Y  X when X is viewed as a set of propositional atoms and Y j= (F ^ UC)X
when viewed as a propositional formula of signature prop, then there is a partial
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interpretation K that is a subset of X that satises FX when viewed as a multi-
valued formula of signature .
Given such an interpretation Y , we create K as follows. For each c 2 ,
K(c) =
8><>: v if c = v 2 Yundef : if c = v =2 Y for any v
Note that this no longer requires there to be two explicit elements in Dom(c)
Note that since Y  X, there is at least one c 2  and v 2 Dom(c) such that
c = v 2 X but c = v =2 Y . For this c, K(c) = undef 6= X(c) so K and X are
dierent. Further, when c = v 2 Y , then c = v 2 X and so X(c) = K(c), thus K is
a subset of X.
In addition, we have that K(c) = X(c) i c = X(c) 2 Y or X(c) = undef . Now,
since Y j= (F ^ UC)X , it follows that Y j= FX . Thus, from Lemma 37 it follows
that since Y j= FX , then K j= FX .
(b) Assume X of signature prop is a stable model of F ^ UC. This means that
X j= F ^UC and no interpretation Y such that Y  X satises (F ^UC)X . Since
X j= UC, then X can be viewed as a partial multi-valued interpretation. Then
clearly, X j= F .
Now, we wish to show that there is no partial interpretation K of signature  that
is a subset of X satisfying FX . To do so, we prove the contrapositive. We will show
that if there is a partial interpretation K of signature  that is a subset of X and
K j= FX , then there is an interpretation Y such that Y  X that satises (F^UC)X .
Now since we already have seen that X j= UC, then (UC)X is equivalent to > so
we need only show that there is an interpretation Y such that Y  X that satises
FX .
223
Given such an interpretation K, we create Y as follows. Let us view K as a set
of propositional atoms. We will take Y = X \K. Clearly Y  X. In addition, we
have that K(c) = X(c) i c = X(c) 2 Y or X(c) = undef . Thus, from Lemma 16 it
follows that since Y j= FX , then K j= FX .
10.7.4 Proof of Corollary 6
Corollary 6 For any multi-valued formula F of signature  and any partial
interpretation I, we have that I is a multi-valued stable model of F i I is a partial
multi-valued stable model of F ^ EC .
Proof. By Theorem 14, we have that the multi-valued propositional stable models of
F and the propositional stable models of F ^UEC  are in one-to-one correspondence.
On the other hand, Theorem 23 tells us that the partial multi-valued stable models
of F ^EC  and the propositional stable models of F ^EC  ^UC  are in one-to-one
correspondence. The corollary follows then by the fact that F ^EC ^UC  is exactly
F ^ UEC .
10.7.5 Proof of Theorem 24
Given a multi-valued interpretation I, we dene the partial rst-order interpreta-
tion Ipfo as follows:
 jIpfoj = fv j v 2 Dom(c) for some c 2 g;
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 Ipfo(v) = v for each v 2 Dom(c) for each c 2 ;
 Ipfo(c) = I(c) for each multi-valued constant c 2 .
Lemma 38 For any MVP-formula F of signature , and any partial
MVP-interpretation I of  whose multi-valued constants are c, I is a partial multi-
valued stable model of F i Ipfo is a partial stable model of F with respect to c viewed
as a rst-order formula of signature pfo.
Proof. ()) Consider any partial multi-valued stable model I of F . This means that
I satises F and no subset K of I satises F I . It is clear by induction that Ipfo j=p F ;
the base case is when F is an atomic formula c = v and clearly by denition of Ipfo,
we have I j= c = v i Ipfo j= c = v.
Thus, we must show that there is no J bfc Ipfo such that J j=p F I pfo . To do so,
we will show that if there is such a J , then we can create a partial MVP-interpreation
K such that K  I and K j=p F I .
Assume there is some J such that J bfc Ipfo and J j=p F I pfo . We create K from
J as follows. For each c 2 
K(c) =
8><>: I(c) if c
J = I(c)
u otherwise
We rst show that K  I. Since J bfc Ipfo, there must be some constant c 2 
such that cJ = u and cI
pfo 6= u. However, since cIpfo = I(c) by denition of Ipfo, we
have that cJ 6= I(c) and so K(c) = u but I(c) 6= u. Thus, K  I.
We now show that K j=p F I i J j=p F I pfo by induction on F . From this, we will
conclude that since we assume I is a partial multi-valued stable model, then no such
K exists and so it follows that no such J exists, which means Ipfo is a partial stable
model of F with respect to c.
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 Case 1: F is an MVP atom c = v. If I j=p F then by denition, Ipfo j=p F pfo
and so we have F I
pfo
and F I are both c = v. Then, by denition of J , we have
K j=p F I i J j=p F I pfo .
On the other hand, if I 6j=p F then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
 Case 2: F is G^H. If I j=p F then by denition, Ipfo j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are GI
pfo ^ HI pfo and GI ^ HI so the claim follows by induction
on GI , GI
pfo
and HI
pfo
, HI .
On the other hand, if I 6j=p F then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
 Case 3: F is G_H. If I j=p F then by denition, Ipfo j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are GI
pfo _ HI pfo and GI _ HI so the claim follows by induction
on GI , GI
pfo
and HI
pfo
, HI .
On the other hand, if I 6j=p F then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
 Case 4: F is G ! H. If I 6j=p G then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p Gpfo and so we
have F I
pfo
and F I are ? ! HI pfo and ? ! HI . Then we have K j=p F I and
J j=p F I pfo .
If I j=p H and I j=p G then by denition, Ipfo j=p Hpfo and Ipfo j=p Gpfo. Then
we have F I
pfo
and F I are GI
pfo ! HI pfo and GI ! HI so the claim follows by
induction on GI , GI
pfo
and HI
pfo
, HI .
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If I 6j=p H and I j=p G then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p Hpfo and Ipfo j= Gpfo. Then
we have F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so
in this case, the claim holds.
 Case 5: F is :G. If I j=p G then by denition, Ipfo j=p Gpfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
On the other hand, if I 6j=p G then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p Gpfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both :?. Then we have K j=p F I and J j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
(() Consider any partial stable model Ipfo of F . This means that Ipfo j= F and there
is no interpretation J such that J c Ipfo and J j= F I pfo . It is clear by induction that
I j=p F ; the base case is when F is an atomic formula c = v and clearly by denition
of Ipfo, we have I j= c = v i Ipfo j= c = v.
Then it only remains to be shown no partial MVP-interpretation K that is a
subset of I satises F I . To show this, we will show that if there is such a K, then we
can create an interpretation J such that J bfc Ipfo and J j= F I pfo .
Assume such a K exists and let J = Kpfo.
We rst show that J bfc Ipfo. Since K is a subset of I, there must be some
constant c 2  such that I(c) 6= u but K(c) = u. Then, by denition of J = Kpfo,
we have that cJ = u but cI
pfo 6= u. Thus, J bfc Ipfo.
We now show that K j=p F I i J j=p F I pfo by induction on F . From this, we will
conclude that since we assume Ipfo is a partial stable model with respect to c, then
no such J exists and so it follows that no such K exists, which means I is a partial
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multi-valued stable model of F .
 Case 1: F is an MVP atom c = v. If I j=p F then by denition, Ipfo j=p F pfo
and so we have F I
pfo
and F I are both c = v. Then, by denition of J , we have
K j=p F I i J j=p F I pfo .
On the other hand, if I 6j=p F then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
 Case 2: F is G^H. If I j=p F then by denition, Ipfo j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are GI
pfo ^ HI pfo and GI ^ HI so the claim follows by induction
on GI , GI
pfo
and HI
pfo
, HI .
On the other hand, if I 6j=p F then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
 Case 3: F is G_H. If I j=p F then by denition, Ipfo j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are GI
pfo _ HI pfo and GI _ HI so the claim follows by induction
on GI , GI
pfo
and HI
pfo
, HI .
On the other hand, if I 6j=p F then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p F pfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
 Case 4: F is G ! H. If I 6j=p G then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p Gpfo and so we
have F I
pfo
and F I are ? ! HI pfo and ? ! HI . Then we have K j=p F I and
J j=p F I pfo .
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If I j=p H and I j=p G then by denition, Ipfo j=p Hpfo and Ipfo j=p Gpfo. Then
we have F I
pfo
and F I are GI
pfo ! HI pfo and GI ! HI so the claim follows by
induction on GI , GI
pfo
and HI
pfo
, HI .
If I 6j=p H and I j=p G then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p Hpfo and Ipfo j= Gpfo. Then
we have F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so
in this case, the claim holds.
 Case 5: F is :G. If I j=p G then by denition, Ipfo j=p Gpfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both ?. Then we have K 6j=p F I and J 6j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
On the other hand, if I 6j=p G then by denition, Ipfo 6j=p Gpfo and so we have
F I
pfo
and F I are both :?. Then we have K j=p F I and J j=p F I pfo so in this
case, the claim holds.
Theorem 24 Let F be a multi-valued formula of signature .
(a) If an interpretation I of  is a partial multi-valued stable model of F , then Inone
is a multi-valued stable model of F ^Vc2 Big(c=none _ :(c=none).
(b) If an interpretation J of none is a stable model of F^Vc2 Big(c=none_:(c=
none)

then J = Inone for some partial multi-valued stable model I of F .
We rst note that by Theorem 14, we can view F^Vc2 c=none_:(c=none)
of signature none as a rst-order formula under the functional stable model semantics.
Similarly by Proposition 38, we can view F as a rst-order formula under the Cabalar
semantics. Then, by Theorem 28 the claim follows.
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10.7.6 Proof of Theorem 25
Lemma 39 Let F be a c-plain sentence of signature , let I, K be total interpreta-
tions of , and let J be a partial interpretation of  such that
 J c I and K <c I;
 pJ = pK for every predicate constant;
 fJ() = u i fK() 6= f I() for every function constant f and every  2 jIjn
where n is the arity of f .
We have K j= grI [F ]I i J j=p grI [F ]I .
Proof.
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence of the form p(t). Since F is c-plain, t contains no
constants from c, and by the assumption J c I and K <c I, we have tJ = tK = tI .
Since J and K agree on p, the claim holds.
Case 2: F is an atomic sentence of the form f(t) = t1.
 Subcase 1: I 6j= f(t) = t1. Then grI [F ]I is ?, so the claim holds.
 Subcase 2: I j= f(t) = t1. Then grI [F ]I is f(t) = t1. Further, from the
assumption that F is c-plain, t and t1 contain no constants from c, and by the
assumptions that J c I, K <c I and that I is total, we have tJ = tK = tI 6= u
and tJ1 = t
K
1 = t
I
1 6= u.
Either f(t)J 6= u or f(t)J = u. In the rst case, since J c I, we have
f(t)J = f(t)I . Also, by the assumption on K, f(t)K = f(t)I . Consequently,
J j= f(t) = t1 and K j= f(t) = t1.
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In the second case, J 6j= f(t) = t1. Also, by the assumption on K, f(t)K 6=
f(t)I = tI1 = t
K
1 , so K 6j= f(t) = t1.
The other cases are straightforward.
Recall the denitions: for two classical interpretations I,K of the same signature 
with the same universe and a list c of distinct predicate and function constants, we
write K <c I if
K and I agree on all constants in  n c, (10.3)
pK  pI for all predicates p in c, and (10.4)
K and I do not agree on c. (10.5)
Similarly, for two partial interpretations J and I of the same signature  over the
same universe jIj, and a set of constants c, J c I is equivalent to
J and I agree on all constants in  n c, (10.6)
pJ  pI for all predicates p in c, and (10.7)
J and I do not agree on c. (10.8)
with the additional requirement that
for every function constant f 2 c, and every  2 jIjn where n
is the arity of f , f I() = fJ() or fJ() = u.
(10.9)
If we drop (10.8), this is equivalent to J c I.
Lemma 40 Let F be a c-plain sentence of signature , and let I be total interpre-
tation of  that satises 9xy(x 6= y). There is a partial interpretation J such that
J c I and J j=
p
grI [F ]
I i there is a total interpretation K such that K <c I and
K j= grI [F ]I .
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Proof. Left-to-right: Let J be a partial interpretation such that J c I and J j=
grI [F ]
I . We construct the total interpretation K as follows. For each constant d not
in c, dK = dJ = dI . For each predicate constant p in c and each  2 jIjn where n is
the arity of p,
pK() = pJ() ;
and, for each function constant f in c and each  2 jIjn where n is the arity of f ,
fK() =
8><>: f
I() if fJ() 6= u;
m(f I()) otherwise
where m is a mapping m : jIj ! jIj such that 8x(m(x) 6= x) (note that such a
mapping requires I j= 9xy(x 6= y)).
We now show that K <c I. It is immediate from the assumption J c I and by
denition that (10.3) and (10.4) hold. Consider the following cases.
 Case 1: For every function constant f 2 c and every  2 jIjn where n is the arity
of f , fJ() = f I() (note that since I is total, these cannot be u). From (10.8),
it follows that there is at least one predicate constant p in c such that pJ  pI .
However, by denition of K, pK  pI and so (10.5) holds.
 Case 2: There is some function constant f 2 c and some  2 jIjn where n is
the arity of f such that fJ() 6= f I(). From (10.9), it follows that fJ() = u
and thus by denition of K, fK() = m(f I()) 6= f I() and so (10.5) holds.
By Lemma 39, the fact K j= grI [F ]I follows from the assumption J j=p grI [F ]I .
Right-to-left: Let K be a total interpretation such that K <c I and K j= grI [F ]I .
We construct the partial interpretation J as follows. For each constant d not in c,
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dK = dJ = dI . For each predicate constant p in c and each  2 jIjn where n is the
arity of p,
pJ() = pK() ;
and, for each function constant f in c and each  2 jIjn where n is the arity of f ,
fJ() =
8><>: f
I() if fK() = f I();
u otherwise.
We now show that J c I. It is immediate from the assumption that K <c I and
by denition that (10.6) and (10.7) hold. Consider the following cases.
 Case 1: For every function constant f 2 c and every  2 jIjn where n is the
arity of f , fK() = f I(). By denition of J , fJ() = f I() and so (10.9)
holds. Now since (10.5) holds, there is at least one predicate constant p such
that pK  pI . However, by denition of J , pJ  pI and so (10.8) holds.
 Case 2: There is some function constant f 2 c and some  2 jIjn where n is
the arity of f such that fK() 6= f I(). By denition of J , it must be that
fJ() = u and thus (10.9) and (10.8) both hold.
By Lemma 39, the fact J j=
p
grI [F ]
I follows from the assumption K j= grI [F ]I .
Theorem 25 For any c-plain formula F of signature , any list c of intensional
constants, and any total interpretation I of  satisfying 9xy(x 6= y), I j= SM[F ; c] i
I j=
p
CBL[F ; c].
Proof. We use Theorem 1 and Theorem 21 to refer to the grounding and reduct
based denitions rather than the second-order logic based denitions. The claim
follows from Lemma 40.
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10.7.7 Proof of Theorem 26
Theorem 26 For any sentence F of signature  in Clark Normal Form that is
tight on c, and any total interpretation I of  satisfying 9xy(x 6= y), I j= SM[F ; c]
i I j=
p
CBL[F ; c].
Proof.
By Corollary 7, I j=
p
CBL[F ; c] i I j= SM[UF c(F ); c], so it remains to check that
I j= SM[UF c(F ); c] i I j= SM[F ; c].
It is easy to check that the completion of UF c(F ) relative to c is equivalent to the
completion of F relative to c. By Theorem 2 from Bartholomew and Lee (2013a), we
conclude that SM[UF c(F ); c] is equivalent to SM[F ; c].
10.7.8 Proof of Theorem 27
Lemma 41 For any partial interpretation I and any atomic sentence p(t1; : : : ; tk)
and f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk,
(a) I j=
p
p(t1; : : : ; tk) i
I j=
p
9xn1 : : : xnj(p(t1; : : : ; tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^    ^ tnj = xnj)
where fn1; : : : ; njg  f1; : : : ; kg and p(t1; : : : ; tk)00 is obtained from p(t1; : : : ; tk)
by replacing each tni in p(t1; : : : ; tk) with xni.
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(b) I j=
p
f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk i
I j=
p
9xn1 : : : xnj((f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^    ^ tnj = xnj)
where fn1; : : : ; njg  f1; : : : ; kg and (f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk)00 is obtained from
f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk by replacing each tni in f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk with xni.
Proof. Consider the following cases.
Case 1: tIi = u for some i 2 fn1; : : : ; njg. Clearly, I 6j=p p(t1; : : : ; tk) and I 6j=p
f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk. It is also the case that I 6j=p ti =  for any  2 jIj so we have
I 6j=
p
9xn1 : : : xnj(p(t1; : : : ; tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^    ^ tnj = xnj) (10.10)
and
I 6j=
p
9xn1 : : : xnj((f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^    ^ tnj = xnj) : (10.11)
Case 2: tIi = u for some i 2 f1; : : : ; kg n fn1; : : : ; njg. Clearly, I 6j=p p(t1; : : : ; tk) and
I 6j=
p
f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk. Also, since ti remains in p(t1; : : : ; tk)00 and (f(t1; : : : ; tk) =
t)00, we have I 6j=
p
p(t1; : : : ; tk)
00 and I 6j=
p
(f(t1; : : : ; tk) = t)
00, from which (10.10) and
(10.11) follow.
Case 3: tIi 6= u for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg. Condition (a) clearly holds because it coincides
with classical equivalence. For Condition (b), consider two subcases:
 Subcase 1: f(t1; : : : ; tk 1)I 6= u. Clearly, Condition (b) coincides with classical
equivalence.
 Subcase 2: f(t1; : : : ; tk 1)I = u. Clearly, I 6j=p f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk. Now in
9xn1 : : : xnj((f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^    ^ tnj = xnj);
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there is only one set of values for xn1 : : : xnj that satises the last j con-
junctive terms|when xni is mapped to t
I
ni
. However, for this set of values,
((f(t1; : : : ; tk 1))00)I = f(t1; : : : ; tk 1)I = u (where (f(t1; : : : ; tk 1))00 is obtained
from f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) by replacing each tni with xni) so that
I 6j=
p
9xn1 : : : xnj((f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^    ^ tnk = xnk).
Lemma 42 Given a sentence F , a set of constants c, and a partial interpretation I,
we have I j=
p
F i I j=
p
UF c(F ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of unfolding that needs to be done.
More precisely, for any formula F , we dene NU c(F ) (\Needed Unfolding") as follows.
 NU c(p(t1; : : : ; tk)) =8><>: 0 if p(t1; : : : ; tk) is c-plain;max(NU c(t1 = x); : : : ;NU c(tk = x)) + 1 otherwise.
 NU c(f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk) =8><>: 0 if f(t1; : : : ; tk 1) = tk is c-plain;max(NU c(t1 = x); : : : ;NU c(tk = x)) + 1 otherwise.
 NU c(GH) = max(NU c(G);NU c(H)) + 1, where  2 f^;_;!g.
 NU c(QxG) = NU c(G) + 1, where Q 2 f8;9g.
Case 1: F is a c-plain atomic sentence. F is identical to UF c(F ) so the claim holds.
Case 2: F is p(t) where t contains at least one constant from c. Let tn1 : : : tnj be the
j terms in t containing at least one constant from c. Now UF c(F ) is
9xn1 : : : xnj(p(t1; : : : ; tk)00^UF c(tn1 = xn1)^  ^UF c(tnj = xnj)) where p(t1; : : : ; tk)00
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is obtained from p(t1; : : : ; tk) by replacing each tni in p(t1; : : : ; tk) with xni . Since
NU c(F ) > NU c(tni = 
) for each  2 jIj and each i 2 f1; : : : ; jg, by I.H. on
tni = 
, UF c(tni = xni) can be replaced by tni = xni so that I j=p UF c(F ) i
I j=
p
9xn1 : : : xnj(p(t1; : : : ; tk)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^    ^ tnj = xnj). By Lemma 41 the latter
is equivalent to I j=
p
F .
Case 3: F is f(t) = t1 where at least one of t and t1 contain at least one constant
from c. Let tn1 : : : tnj be the j terms in t and t1 containing at least one constant from
c. Now UF c(F ) is 9xn1 : : : xnj((f(t) = t1)00 ^UF c(tn1 = xn1)^    ^UF c(tnj = xnj)),
where (f(t) = t1)
00 is obtained from f(t) = t1 by replacing each tni in f(t) = t1 with
xni . Since NU c(F ) > NU c(tni = 
) for each  2 jIj and each i 2 f1; : : : ; jg, by
I.H. on tni = 
, UF c(tni = xni) can be replaced by tni = xni so that I j=p UF c(F ) i
I j=
p
9xn1 : : : xnj((f(t) = t1)00 ^ tn1 = xn1 ^    ^ tnj = xnj). By Lemma 41 the latter
is equivalent to I j=
p
F .
Case 4: F is GH for  2 f^;_;!g. By I.H. on G and H.
Case 5: F is QxF (x) for Q 2 f8;9g. By I.H. on F () for each  2 jIj.
Theorem 27 For any sentence F , any list c of constants, and any partial interpre-
tation I, we have I j=
p
CBL[F ; c] i I j=
p
CBL[UF c(F ); c].
Proof. By denition, CBL[F ; c] is
F ^ :9bc(bcc ^ F y(bc))
and CBL[UF c(F ); c] is by denition
UF c(F ) ^ :9bc(bcc ^ (UF c(F ))y(bc)):
Now, for any partial interpretation I of signature   c, by Lemma 42, I j=
p
F i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I j=
p
UF c(F ). It is sucient to show that, for any partial interpretation J , J
c
d [ I j=p
d  c ^ F y(d) i Jcd [ I j=p d  c ^ (UF c(F ))y(d).
Case 1: F is an atomic sentence. F y(d) is F (d), and UF c(F )y(d) is UF c(F )(d).
Jcd [ I j=p F (d) i J j=p F . Similarly, Jcd [ I j=p UF c(F )(d) i J j=p UF c(F ). By
Lemma 41, J j=
p
F i J j=
p
UF c(F ), so the claim follows.
Case 2: F is GH for  2 f^;_g. By induction on G and H.
Case 3: F is G ! H. F y(d) is (Gy(d) ! Hy(d)) ^ (G ! H) and (UF c(F ))y(d) is
(UF c(G))
y(d) ! (UF c(H))y(d)) ^ (UF c(G) ! UF c(H)). The equivalence between
the rst conjunctive terms (under partial satisfaction) is by I.H. on G and H, and
the equivalence between the second conjunctive terms (under partial satisfaction) is
by Lemma 42.
Case 4: F is QxG(x) for Q 2 f8;9g. By I.H. on F () for each  2 jIj.
10.7.9 Proof of Corollary 7
Corollary 7 For any sentence F , any list c of constants, and any total interpretation
I satisfying 9xy(x 6= y), we have I j=
p
CBL[F ; c] i I j=
p
CBL[UF c(F ); c] i I j=
SM[UF c(F ); c].
Proof. The equivalence between the rst and the second conditions is by Theo-
rem 27. The equivalence between the second and the third conditions is by Theo-
rem 25 since UF c(F ) is c-plain.
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10.7.10 Proof of Theorem 28
Lemma 43 Given a -plain formula G of signature , a partial interpretation I
satises G i Inone satises Gnone.
Proof. By induction on G.
 Case 1: G is a (-plain) ground atomic formula of signature  which is 
extended with object names from jIj (not including none). Gnone is the same
as G in this case.
{ G is p(). Note that since  are object names, I does not map any of
these to u. Thus, by denition of Inone, p()I
none
= p()I so certainly the
claim holds.
{ G is 1 = 

2 . The claim follows immediately from the fact that (

1)
I =
(1)
I none = 1 and (

2)
I = (2)
I none = 2.
{ G is f() = . Note that since  and  are object names, I does not
map any of these to u. Now if f()I = u, then by denition of Inone,
f()I
none
= none. In this case, neither I nor Inone satisfy G. On the
other hand, if f()I 6= u, then by denition of Inone, f()I none = f()I
so certainly the claim follows.
 Case 2: G is H1 H2 where  2 f^;_;!g. Gnone is (H1)none  (H2)none. By
I.H. on H1 and H2, the claim follows.
 Case 3: G is 9xH(x). Gnone is 9x(H(x)none ^ x 6= none).
()) Assume I j=
p
G. That means there is some  2 jIj such that I j=
p
H(). By
I.H. on H() for every  2 jIj, we then have that there is some  2 jIj such
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that Inone j= H()none. Since  6= none for all  2 jIj, we have that there is
some  2 jIj such that Inone j= H()none^ 6= none. Finally, since jIj  jInonej,
we further have that there is some  2 jInonej such that Inone j= H()none ^  6=
none, which is the denition of Inone j= Gnone.
(() Assume Inone j= Gnone. That means there is some  2 jInonej such that
Inone j= H()none ^  6= none. It then follows that there is some  2 jIj such
that Inone j= H()none. By I.H. on H() for every  2 jIj, it then follows that
there is some  2 jIj such that I j=
p
H(), which is the denition of I j=
p
G.
 Case 4: G is 8xH(x). Gnone is 8x(x 6= none! H(x)none).
()) Assume I j=
p
G. That means for every  2 jIj, we have I j=
p
H(). By I.H. on
H() for every  2 jIj, it follows that for every  2 jIj we have Inone j= H()none.
Since  6= none for all  2 jIj, we have that there is some  2 jIj such that
Inone j=  6= none ! H()none. Finally, since jIj  jInonej and since the
implication  6= none ! H()none is trivially satised when  = none, it
further follows that for every  2 jInonej we have Inone j=  6= none! H()none,
which is the denition of Inone j= Gnone.
(() Assume Inone j= Gnone. That means for every  2 jInonej we have Inone j=
 6= none ! H()none. Since jIj  jInonej, it certainly follows that for every
 2 jIj we have Inone j=  6= none ! H()none. Then, since  6= none is true
for every  2 jIj, it follows that for every  2 jIj we have Inone j= H()none.
Then by I.H. on H() for every  2 jIj it follows that for every  2 jIj we have
I j=
p
H(), which is the denition of I j=
p
G
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Note: the -plain assumption is only used for the atomic formulas t1 = t2 not
p(t).
Theorem 28 For any sentence F of signature ,
(a) If I is a Cabalar stable model of F relative to c, then Inone is a stable model of
(10.2), recalling that this is
(UF (F ))
none ^
^
f2c
8xhf(x) = nonei;
relative to c.
(b) If an interpretation J such that noneJ = none is a stable model of (10.2)
relative to c, then J = Inone for some Cabalar stable model I of F relative to
c.
We rst note that by Theorem 7 in Bartholomew and Lee (2013b), I is a Cabalar
stable model of F relative to c i I is a Cabalar stable model of UF(F ) relative to c
(the theorem is about UFc(F ) but the same proof should hold for UF(F )).
For notational simplicity, let G = UF(F ). We will prove the theorem in terms
of G. Further, we note that the Cabalar stable models of G are precisely the Cabalar
stable models of F by Theorem 7 in Bartholomew and Lee (2013b). That is, we will
show
(a) If I is a Cabalar stable model of G relative to c, then Inone is a stable model of
Gnone ^
^
f2c
8xhf(x) = nonei
relative to c.
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(b) If an interpretation J such that noneJ = none is a stable model of
Gnone ^
^
f2c
8xhf(x) = nonei
relative to c then J = Inone for some Cabalar stable model I of G relative to c.
Proof. (a) Assume that I is a Cabalar stable model of G relative to c. That is, I j=
p
G
and for every partial interpretation K such that K c I, we have K 6j=
p
grI [G]
I . We
wish to show that Inone is a stable model of Gnone^Vf2c 8xhf(x) = nonei relative to
c. That is, we wish to show that Inone j= Gnone^Vf2c 8xhf(x) = nonei and for every
interpretation L such that L <c Inone, we have L 6j= grInone(Gnone ^
V
f2c 8xhf(x) =
nonei)I none .
By Lemma 43, we have that since we assume I j=
p
G, we conclude that Inone j=
Gnone. Then, since
V
f2c 8xhf(x) = nonei is a tautology in classical logic, we have
Inone j= Gnone ^Vf2c 8xhf(x) = nonei.
We now show that if for every partial interpretation K such that K c I, we
have K 6j=
p
grI [G]
I then for any L such that L <c Inone, we have L 6j= grInone(Gnone ^V
f2c 8xhf(x) = nonei)I
none
. To do so, we prove the contrapositive; if there is some
L such that L <c Inone and L j= grInone(Gnone ^
V
f2c 8xhf(x) = nonei)I
none
, then
there is some partial interpretation K such that K c I and K 6j=
p
grI [G]
I . Given
such an L, we construct such a K as follows. First, let jKj = jIj. For every predicate
p 2 , we dene pK = pL. For every function f 2  of arity n and every tuple of
objects  from (jIj [ fug)n, we dene
fK() =
8>>>><>>>>:
fL() if fL()6=none, fL()=f Inone(),
and  2 jIjn;
u otherwise.
Assuming L <c Inone, we show that K c I. We rst show that K c I.
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 By denition, K and I both have the same universe.
 Since L and Inone agree on all constants not in c, it is easy to see by denition
of K and Inone that K and I agree on all constants not in c.
 Consider any predicate constant p 2 c and any tuple  from jIj. If p()K = 1,
then by denition of K, it must be that p()L = 1. Then, since pL  pI none ,
it must be that p()I
none
= 1. Finally, by denition of Inone, it follows that
p()I = 1. Thus it holds that pK  pI .
 Consider any function constant f 2 c of arity n and any tuple  from jIjn. We
have three cases and wish to show that fk() = u or fK() = f I().
{ If fL() = none, then by denition of K, fK() = u so in this case, the
claim follows.
{ If fL() 6= none and fL() = f Inone . Then by denition of K, fK() =
fL() = f I
none
(). Then, by denition of Inone, we have f I
none
() = f I()
and so fK() = f I() so in this case, the claim follows.
{ If fL() 6= none and fL() 6= f Inone . Then by denition of K, fK() = u
so in this case, the claim follows.
If fL() = f I
none
(), then by denition of K, fK() = fL() = f I
none
().
Then, by denition of Inone, we have fK() = f I(). On the other hand, if
fL() 6= f Inone(), then by denition of K, we have fK() = u. Therefore, it
holds for every function constant f 2  and every list  of elements from jIj
that fk() = u or fK() = f I().
Thus, we have K c I.
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We now show (I c K) does not hold and conclude that K c I. Since L <c
Inone, we consider two cases:
 Case 1: There is some predicate p 2 c of arity n and tuple  of objects from
jInonej such that p()L = 0 but p()I none = 1. We rst note that by denition
of Inone that if  is not in jIjn, then p()I none = 0 so it must be that  is in jIjn.
Then by denition of K, we have that p()K = 0 and by denition of Inone, it
follows that p()I = 1 so in this case (I c K) does not hold.
 Case 2: There is some function f 2 c of arity n and tuple  of objects from
jInonej such that f()L 6= f()Inone . We need to show that f()I 6= u and
f()K 6= f()I .
We show that for this to be the case, it must be that f()I
none 6= none. As-
sume to the contrary that f()I
none
= none, then since L j= grInone(Gnone ^V
f2c 8xhf(x) = nonei)I
none
, and in particular L j= grInone(
V
f2c 8xhf(x) =
nonei)I none , which contains a conjunctive term equivalent to f() = none_?
and so it must be that f()L = none which contradicts the assumption that
f()L 6= f()Inone .
Thus it must be that f()I
none 6= none. By denition of Inone, this means that
 is in jIjn and f I 6= u. However, by denition of K, since fL() = f Inone()
does not hold, fK() = u and so we have fK() 6= f I(). Thus in this case
(I c K) does not hold.
We now show by induction on G that K j=
p
grI [G]
I i L j= grInone(Gnone)I none and
then since we assume L j= grInone(Gnone^
V
f2c 8xhf(x) = nonei)I
none
then certainly
L j= grInone(Gnone)I none , and then we will conclude that K j=p grI [G]I .
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 Case 1: G is a (-plain) ground atomic formula of extended signature  which
is  extended with object names from jIj (not including none).
If I 6j=
p
G, then Inone 6j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
grInone(G
none)I
none
are both ?, which neither L nor K satisfy so in this case, the
claim holds.
If instead I j=
p
G, then Inone j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I
and grInone(G
none)I
none
are both G, so by denition of K, K j=
p
G i L j= G.
 Case 2: G is H1H2 where  2 f^;_;!g and so grI [G]I is grI [H1]IgrI [H2]I .
Gnone is (H1)
none  (H2)none.
If I 6j=
p
G, then Inone 6j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
grInone(G
none)I
none
are both ?, which neither L nor K satisfy so in this case, the
claim holds.
On the other hand, if I j=
p
G, then Inone j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so
grInone [G
none]I
none
is
grInone [(H1)
none]I
none  grInone [(H2)none]I none :
By I.H. on grI [H1]
I and grInone [(H1)
none]I
none
and grI [H2]
I and
grInone [(H2)
none]I
none
.
 Case 3: G is 9xH(x). Gnone is 9x(H(x)none ^ x 6= none).
If I 6j=
p
G, then Inone 6j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
grInone(G
none)I
none
are both ?, which neither L nor K satisfy so in this case, the
claim holds.
On the other hand, if I j=
p
G, then Inone j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so grI [G]I
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is
fgrI [H()]I :  2 jIjg_
and grInone [G
none]I
none
is
fgrInone [H()none]I none ^  6= none :  2 j(Inone)jg_:
Now we note that j(Inone)j = jIj [ fnoneg. Further, we note that since  6=
none is not satised when  = none, the latter reduct is equivalent to
fgrInone [H()none]I none ^  6= none :  2 jIjg_:
The further, we note that for all  2 jIj,  6= none is satised so that this is
further equivalent to
fgrInone [H()none]I none :  2 jIjg_:
Thus the claim follows by induction on grI [H(
)] and grInone [H()none] for
every  2 jIj.
 Case 4: G is 8xH(x). Gnone is 8x(x 6= none! H(x)none).
If I 6j=
p
G, then Inone 6j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
grInone(G
none)I
none
are both ?, which neither L nor K satisfy so in this case, the
claim holds.
On the other hand, if I j=
p
G, then Inone j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so grI [G]I
is
fgrI [H()]I :  2 jIjg^
and grInone [H
none]I
none
is
f 6= none! grInone [H()none]I none :  2 j(Inone)jg^:
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Now we note that j(Inone)j = jIj [ fnoneg. Further, we note that since  6=
none is not satised when  = none, the latter reduct is equivalent to
f 6= none! grInone [H()none]I none :  2 jIjg^:
The further, we note that for all  2 jIj,  6= none is satised so that this is
further equivalent to
fgrInone [H()none]I none :  2 jIjg^:
Thus the claim follows by induction on grI [H(
)] and grInone [H()none] for
every  2 jIj.
(b) We assume that J is an interpretation such that noneJ = none and J is a
stable model of Gnone ^8xhf(x) = nonei. We wish to show that J = Inone for some
Cabalar stable model I of G relative to c.
We will show this by constructing such an I from J . Let I = J invnone where
J invnone is the partial interpretation obtained from J as follows:
 jJ invnonej = jJ j n fnoneg.
 for every function constant f 2  and  2 jIjn where n is the arity of f ,
fJ
invnone
() =
8><>: f
J() if fJ() 6= none;
u otherwise;
 For every predicate p 2  and  2 jIjn where n is the arity of p, pJinvnone() =
pJ().
We now wish to show that I j=
p
G and for every partial interpretation K such that
K c I, we have K 6j=
p
grI [G]
I .
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Since we assume J j= Gnone ^ Vf2c 8xhf(x) it follows that J j= Gnone, then by
Lemma 43 (noting that Inone = (J invnone)none = J), we conclude that I j=
p
G.
We now show that if for any L such that L <c J , we have L 6j= grJ(Gnone ^V
f2c 8xhf(x)iJ , then for every partial interpretation K such that K c I, we have
K 6j=
p
grI [G]
I .
To do so, we prove the contrapositive; if there is some partial interpretation K
such that K c I and K 6j=
p
grI [G]
I , then there is some L such that L <c J and
L j= grJ(Gnone^
V
f2c 8xhf(x)iJ . Given such an K, we construct such a L as follows.
First, let jLj = jJ j. For every predicate p 2 , we dene pL = pK . For every function
f 2  of arity n and every tuple of objects  from (jJ j)n, we dene
fL() =
8><>: f
K() if fK() 6= u and  2 jIjn;
none otherwise.
Assuming K c I, we show that L <c J .
 By denition, L and J both have the same universe.
 Since K and I agree on all constants not in c, it is easy to see by denition of
L and J that L and J agree on all constants not in c.
 Consider any predicate constant p 2 c and any tuple  from jJ j. We rst note
by denition of L that if  has at least one none, then pL() = 0 so there is
nothing to be proven. Now we consider when  has no none. If pL() = 1, then
by denition of L, it must be that pK() = 1. Then, since pK  pI , it must be
that pI() = 1. Finally, by denition of I, it follows that pI() = 1 since  is
from jIj. Thus it holds that pL  pJ .
 We wish to show that L and J do not agree on c. We consider two cases
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{ There is some predicate p 2 c and some list of objects  from jIj such that
pK() = 0 and pI() = 1. By denition of I, we have pJ() = 1 and by
denition of L, we have pL() = 0 so in this case, the claim holds.
{ There is some function f 2 c and some list of objects  from jIj such that
f I() 6= u and fK() 6= f I(). In particular, since K c I, this means that
fK = u. Now since f I() 6= u, by denition of I, we have f I() 6= none
and by denition of L, we have fL() = none so in this case, the claim
holds.
Thus, we have L <c J .
To show that L j= grJ(
V
f2c 8xhf(x)iJ we rst note that grJ(
V
f2c 8xhf(x)iJ is
equivalent to the conjunction of f() = none for every f 2  and  from jJ j such
that fJ() = none. We see that by denition of I that it must be that f I() = u.
Then, since we assume that K c I, we have that fK() = u. Then, by denition of
L, we have fL() = none. Thus we have L j= grJ(
V
f2c 8xhf(x)iJ .
We now show by induction on G that K j=
p
grI [G]
I i L j= grJ(Gnone)J and then
since we assume K j=
p
grI [G]
I , we will conclude that L j= grJ(Gnone)J . Finally, since
we have already seen that L j= grJ(
V
f2c 8xhf(x)iJ , we will concluded further that
L j= grJ(Gnone ^
V
f2c 8xhf(x)iJ
 Case 1: G is a (-plain) ground atomic formula of extended signature  which
is  extended with object names from jIj (not including none).
If I 6j=
p
G, then J 6j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
grJ(G
none)J are both ?, which neither L nor K satisfy so in this case, the
claim holds.
If instead I j=
p
G, then J j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
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grJ(G
none)J are both G, so by denition of K, K j=
p
G i L j= G.
 Case 2: G is H1H2 where  2 f^;_;!g and so grI [G]I is grI [H1]IgrI [H2]I .
Gnone is (H1)
none  (H2)none.
If I 6j=
p
G, then J 6j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
grJ(G
none)J are both ?, which neither L nor K satisfy so in this case, the
claim holds.
On the other hand, if I j=
p
G, then J j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so grJ [Gnone]J
is
grJ [(H1)
none]J  grJ [(H2)none]J :
By I.H. on grI [H1]
I and grJ [(H1)
none]J and grI [H2]
I and grJ [(H2)
none]J .
 Case 3: G is 9xH(x). Gnone is 9x(H(x)none ^ x 6= none).
If I 6j=
p
G, then J 6j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
grJ(G
none)J are both ?, which neither L nor K satisfy so in this case, the
claim holds.
On the other hand, if I j=
p
G, then J j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so grI [G]I is
fgrI [H()]I :  2 jIjg_
and grJ [G
none]J is
fgrJ [H()none]J ^  6= none :  2 jJ jg_:
Now we note that jJ j = jIj [ fnoneg. Further, we note that since  6= none
is not satised when  = none, the latter reduct is equivalent to
fgrJ [H()none]J ^  6= none :  2 jIjg_:
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The further, we note that for all  2 jIj,  6= none is satised so that this is
further equivalent to
fgrJ [H()none]J :  2 jIjg_:
Thus the claim follows by induction on grI [H(
)] and grJ [H()none] for every
 2 jIj.
 Case 4: G is 8xH(x). Gnone is 8x(x 6= none! H(x)none).
If I 6j=
p
G, then J 6j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so the reducts grI [G]I and
grJ(G
none)J are both ?, which neither L nor K satisfy so in this case, the
claim holds.
On the other hand, if I j=
p
G, then J j= Gnone by Lemma 43 and so grI [G]I is
fgrI [H()]I :  2 jIjg^
and grJ [H
none]J is
f 6= none! grJ [H()none]J :  2 jJ jg^:
Now we note that jJ j = jIj [ fnoneg. Further, we note that since  6= none
is not satised when  = none, the latter reduct is equivalent to
f 6= none! grJ [H()none]J :  2 jIjg^:
The further, we note that for all  2 jIj,  6= none is satised so that this is
further equivalent to
fgrJ [H()none]J :  2 jIjg^:
Thus the claim follows by induction on grI [H(
)] and grJ [H()none] for every
 2 jIj.
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10.7.11 Proof of Corollary 8
Corollary 8 For any c-plain sentence F and any partial interpretation I that
satises 9xy(x 6= y), I is a stable model of F relative to c i I is a Cabalar stable
model of F ^ :: V
f2c
8x(f(x) = f(x)) relative to c.
Proof. First note that I j= :: V
f2c
8x(f(x) = f(x)) i I is complete. Then, the
claim follows by Theorem 5 from Bartholomew and Lee (2013b).
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Chapter 11
OTHER RELATED WORK
11.1 Loose Integrations with other Declarative Paradigms
We rst examine several formalisms that loosely integrate answer set programming
with declarative paradigms that view functions as in classical logic. While these
approaches address the grounding bottleneck present in answer set programming, they
do not address the inability to perform defeasible reasoning on functions. We provide
explicit relationships between these formalisms and ASPMT. Each is eectively a
special case of ASPMT where none of the functions are seen as intensional.
11.1.1 Clingcon
A constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) is a tuple (V;D;C), where V is a set of
constraint variables with the respective domains D, and C is a set of constraints that
specify legal assignments of values in the domains to the constraint variables.
A clingcon program  with a constraint satisfaction problem (V;D;C) is a set of
rules of the form
a B;N;Cn; (11.1)
where a is a propositional atom or ?, B is a set of positive propositional literals, N is
a set of negative propositional literals, and Cn is a set of constraints from C, possibly
preceded by not.
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Clingcon programs can be viewed as ASPMT instances. Below is a reformulation
of the semantics in terms of ASPMT. We assume that constraints are expressed by
ASPMT sentences of signature V [bg, where V is a set of object constants identied
with constraint variables V in (V;D;C), whose value sorts are identied with domains
in D; we assume that bg is disjoint from V and contains all values in D as object
constants, and other symbols to represent constraints, such as +, , and . In
other words, we represent a constraint as a formula F (v1; : : : ; vn) over V [ bg where
F (x1; : : : ; xn) is a formula of the signature 
bg and F (v1; : : : ; vn) is obtained from
F (x1; : : : ; xn) by substituting the object constants (v1; : : : ; vn) in V for (x1; : : : ; xn).
For any signature  that consists of object constants and propositional constants,
we identify an interpretation I of  as the tuple hIf ; Xi, where If is the restriction
of I on the object constants in , and X is a set of propositional constants in  that
are true under I.
Given a clingcon program  with (V;D;C), and an interpretation I = hIf ; Xi,
we dene the constraint reduct of  relative to X and If (denoted by X
If
) as the set
of rules a  B for each rule (11.1) is in  such that If j=bg Cn, and X j= N . We
say that a set X of propositional atoms is a constraint answer set of  relative to If
if X is a minimal model of X
If
.
Example 7 continued Recall the leaking bucket example. The rules
(amount1=Y ) _ :(amount1=Y )  amount0=Y +1
amount1=10  llUp
are identied with
?  not FillUp; not(Amount1+1 =$ Amount0)
?  FillUp; not(Amount1 =$ 10)
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under the semantics of clingcon programs. Consider I in Example 7, which can be
represented as hIf ; Xi where If maps Amount0 to 6, and Amount1 to 5, and X = ;.
X is the constraint answer set relative to If because X is the minimal model of the
constraint reduct relative to X and If , which is the empty set.
Similar to the way that rules are identied as a special case of formulas Ferraris
et al. (2011), we identify a clingcon program  with the conjunction of implications
B^N ^Cn ! a for all rules (11.1) in . The following theorem tells us that clingcon
programs are a special case of ASPMT, in which the background theory is specied
by (V;D;C), and intensional constants are limited to propositional constants only,
and do not allow function constants.
Theorem 29 Let  be a clingcon program with CSP (V;D;C), let p be the set of
all propositional constants occurring in , and let I be an interpretation hIf ; Xi of
signature V [p. Set X is a constraint answer set of  relative to If i I j=bg SM[;p].
Note that a clingcon program does not allow an atom that consists of elements
from both V and p. Thus the truth value of any atom is determined by either If or
X, but not by involving both of them. This allows loose coupling of an ASP solver
and a constraint solver. On the other hand, Gebser et al. (2009a) sketches a method
to extend clingcon programs to allow predicate constants of positive arity, possibly
containing constraint variables as arguments. This however leads to some unintuitive
cases under the semantics of clingcon programs, as the following example shows.
$domain ( 1 0 0 . . 1 9 9 ) . % O f f i c e numbers
myo f f i c e ( a ) . % a i s my o f f i c e number ,
:  myof f i c e (b ) . % and b i s not .
:  not a $==b . % Neverthe l e s s , a equa l s b .
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System clingcon does not notice that this set of assumptions is inconsistent. This
is because symbols a and b in ASP atoms and the same symbols in the constraint are
not related. On the other hand, ASPMT, which allows rst-order signatures, does
not have this anomaly; there is no stable model under ASPMT.
11.1.2 Lin and Wang's Logic Programs with Functions
11.1.3 Lin-Wang Programs
Lin and Wang (2008) extended answer set semantics with functions by extending
the denition of a reduct, and also provided loop formulas for such programs. We
can provide an alternative account of their results by considering the notions there
as special cases of the denitions presented in this paper. For simplicity, we assume
non-sorted languages. 1 Essentially, they restricted attention to a special case
of non-Herbrand interpretations such that object constants form the universe, and
ground terms other than object constants are mapped to object constants. According
to Lin and Wang (2008), an LW-program P consists of type denitions and a set of
rules of the form
A B1; : : : ; Bm; not C1; : : : ; not Cn (11.2)
where A is ? or an atom and Bi, where 1  i  m and Cj, where 1  j  n are
atomic formulas.
Type denitions introduce the domains for a many-sorted signature consisting of
1Lin and Wang (2008) considers essentially many-sorted languages. The result of this section can
be extended to that case by considering many-sorted SM Kim et al. (2009).
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some object constants, and includes the evaluation of each function symbol of positive
arity that maps a list of object constants to an object constant. Since we assume here
non-sorted languages, we consider only a single domain (universe). We say that an
interpretation I is a P -interpretation if the universe is the set of object constants
specied by P , object constants are evaluated to itself, and ground terms other than
object constants are evaluated conforming to the type denitions of P .
The reduct of a ground program P with respect to a P -interpretation I is denoted
P I and is obtained from P by
1 replacing each functional term f(t1; : : : ; tn) with c where f
I(t1; : : : ; tn) = c;
2 removing any rule with an atomic formula Bi that contains an equality and is
not satised by I;
3 removing any remaining equalities from the remaining rules;
4 removing any rule containing not A in the body of the rule where AI = t;
5 removing any remaining conjunctive term form not A.
A P -interpretation I is an answer set of P in the sense of Lin and Wang (2008) if I
satises every rule in P and the set of atoms in I is precisely the set of atoms in the
minimal model of P I .
Theorem 30 Let P be an LW-program and let F be the FOL-representation of the
set of rules in P . The following conditions are equivalent to each other:
(a) I is an answer set of P in the sense of Lin and Wang (2008);
(b) I is a P -interpretation that satises SM[F ;p] where p is the list of all predicate
constants occurring in F .
Thus the denition does not allow functions to be intensional.
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11.1.4 ASP(LC) Programs
Liu et al. (2012) considers logic programs with linear constraints, or ASP(LC)
programs, comprised of rules of the form
a B;N;LC (11.3)
where a is a propositional atom or ?, B is a set of positive propositional literals, and
N is a set of negative propositional literals, and LC is a set of theory atoms|linear
constraints of the form ni=1(ci xi) ./ k where ./ 2 f;;=g, each xi is an object
constant whose value sort is integers (or reals), and each ci, k is an integer (or real).
An ASP(LC) program  can be viewed as an ASPMT formula whose background
theory bg is the theory of integers or the theory of reals. Let p denote the set of
all propositional atoms occurring in  and f denote all object constants occurring
in  that do not belong to the background signature. Theory atoms are essentially
ASPMT formulas of signature f [ bg. We identify ASP(LC) program  with the
conjunction of ASPMT formulas B ^N ^ LC ! a for all rules (11.3) in .
An LJN-intepretation is a pair (X;T ) where X  p and T is a subset of theory
atoms occurring in  such that there is some interpretation I of signature f such
that I j=bg T [ T , where T is the set of negations of each theory atom occurring in 
but not in T . An LJN-interpretation (X;T ) satises an atom b if b 2 X, the negation
of an atom not c if c =2 X, and a theory atom t if t 2 T . The notion of satisfaction is
extended to other propositional connectives as usual.
The LJN-reduct of a program  with respect to an LJN-interpretation (X;T ),
denoted by (X;T ), consists of rules a  B for each rule (11.3) such that (X;T )
satises N ^LC. (X;T ) is an LJN-answer set of  if (X;T ) satises , and X is the
smallest set of atoms satisfying (X;T ).
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The following theorem tells us that there is a one-to-many relationship between
LJN-answer sets and the stable models in the sense of ASPMT.
Theorem 31 Let  be an ASP(LC) program, and p and f are dened as above.
(a) If (X;T ) is an LJN-answer set of , then for any interpretation hIf ; Xi of
signature p [ f such that If j=bg T [ T , we have hIf ; Xi j=bg SM[;p].
(b) For any interpretation I = hIf ; Xi of signature p[f , if hIf ; Xi j=bg SM[;p],
then an LJN-interpretation (X;T ) where
T = ft j t is a theory atom in  such that If j=bg tg
is an LJN-answer set of .
Example 32 Let F be
a x z>0: b x y0:
c b; y z0:  not a:
b c:
The LJN-interpretation L = hfag; fx z > 0gi is an answer set of F since f(x z >
0;:(x y 0);:(y z 0)g is satisable (e.g. take xI =2; yI =1; zI =0) and the set
fag is the minimal model satisfying the reduct FL = (> ! a) ^ c! b. On the other
hand the interpretation I such that xI =2; yI =1; zI =0; aI = t; bI =f ; cI =f satises
I j=bg SM[F ; abc].
As with clingcon programs, ASP(LC) programs are more restrictive than ASPMT.
ASP(LC) programs do not allow theory atoms in the head of a rule, and like clingcon
programs, cannot express intensional functions.
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11.2 Other Approaches to Intensional Functions
In Chapter 10, we explored the relationship between our semantics and the Cabalar
semantics in depth. In this section, we present three other denitions of intensional
functions{Nonmonotonic Causal Logic from Giunchiglia et al. (2004), IF-Programs
from Lifschitz (2012), and the Balduccini semantics Balduccini (2012). We show that
IF-Programs exhibit some undesirable characteristics not present in the either the
stable model semantics or the functional stable model semantics. We then show that
the Balduccini semantics is essentially a special case of the Cabalar semantics.
11.2.1 Relation to Nonmonotonic Causal Logic
A (nonmonotonic) causal theory is a nite list of rules of the form
F ( G
where F and G are formulas. We identify a rule with the universal closure of the
implication G! F . A causal model of a causal theory T is dened as the models of
the second-order sentence
CM[T ;f ] = T ^ :9bf(bf 6= f ^ T y(bf))
where f is a list of explainable function constants, and T y(bf) denotes the conjunction
of the formulas e8(G! F (bf)) (11.4)
for all rules F ( G of T .
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By a denite casual theory, we mean the causal theory whose rules have the form
either
f(t) = t1 ( B (11.5)
or
?( B; (11.6)
where f is an explainable function constant, t is a list of terms that does not contain
explainable function constants, and t1 is a term that does not contain explainable
function constants. By Tr(T ) we denote the theory consisting of conjunction of the
following formulas: e8(::B ! f(t) = t1) for each rule (11.5) in T , and e8:B for each
rule (11.6) in T . The causal models of such T coincide with the stable models of
Tr(T ).
Theorem 32 For any denite causal theory T , I j= CM[T ;f ] i I j= SM[Tr(T );f ].
For non-denite ones, they do not coincide.
Example 33 Consider the following non-denite causal theory T :
:(f = 1)( >
:(f = 2)( >
An interpretation I where jIj = f1; 2; 3g and f I = 3 is a causal model of T . However,
the corresponding formula Tr(T ) is equivalent to
:(f = 1) ^ :(f = 2)
which has no stable models.
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11.2.2 IF-Programs
Reduct-based Characterization of IF-Programs
We rst present a reformulation of IF-Programs in terms of reduct.
For any ground formula F , F I is a formula obtained from F by replacing every
maximal negated formula :G with
 > if I j= :G, and
 ? if I 6j= :G.
Let  be a ground IF-program. The IF-reduct I of an IF-program  relative to
an interpretation I consists of rules
HI  BI
for every rule H  B in .
Theorem 33 Let F be the FOL-representation of a ground IF-program of signature 
and let f be a list of intensional function constants. For any interpretation I of ,
I j= IF[F ;f ] i
 I satises , and
 no interpretation J of  that disagrees with I only on f satises I .
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Comparison
The denition of the IF operator above looks close to our denition of the SM opera-
tor. However, they often behave quite dierently. Neither semantics is stronger than
the other.
Example 34 Let F be the following program
d = 2 c = 1;
d = 1
and let I be an interpretation such that jIj = f1; 2g, I(c) = 2 and I(d) = 1. I is a
model of IF[F ; cd], but not a model of SM[F ; cd].
Example 35 Let F be the following program
(c = 1 _ d = 1) ^ (c = 2 _ d = 2)
and let I1 and I2 be interpretations such that jI1j = jI2j = f1; 2; 3g and I1(c) = 1,
I1(d) = 2, I2(c) = 2, I2(d) = 1. I1 and I2 are models of SM[F ; cd]. On the other
hand, IF[F ; cd] has no models.
Example 36 Let F be c 6= 1  > and let F1 be ?  c = 1. Under our semantics,
they are strongly equivalent to each other, and neither of them has a stable model.
However, this is not the case with IF-programs. For instance, let I be an interpretation
such that jIj = f1; 2g and I(c) = 2. I satises IF[F1; c] but not IF[F ; c].
While ?  F is a constraint in our formalism, in view of Theorem 3, the last
example illustrates that ?  F is not considered as a constraint in the semantics
of IF-programs. Indeed, the denition of a constraint given in Lifschitz (2012) is
stronger than ours.
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Example 36 illustrates that a model of an IF-program may map a function to
a value that does not even occur in the program. For the stable model semantics,
syntactic conditions on variables ensure that the universe has no impact on the sta-
ble models whereas for IF-programs, even variable-free programs may have dierent
stable models for dierent universes.
Let T be an IF-program whose rules have the form
f(t) = t1  ::B (11.7)
where f is an intensional function constant, t and t1 do not contain intensional func-
tion constants, and B is an arbitrary formula. We identify T with the corresponding
rst-order formula.
Theorem 34 I j= SM[T ;f ] i I j= IF[T ;f ].
11.2.3 Balduccini Semantics
Relationship to the Cabalar Semantics
It turns out that the Balduccini semantics presented in Section 3.7 is closely related
to the Cabalar semantics. This is shown by reformulating the Balduccini semantics
using the notion of partial interpretations and partial satisfaction. We identify a
consistent set of seed literals I with a partial interpretation that maps all object
constants in  n c to themselves. For example, for signature  = ff; g; 1; 2g where
f; g 2 c, we identify the consistent set of seed literals I = ff = 1g with the partial
interpretation I such that f I = 1; gI = u; 1I = 1; 2I = 2.
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The following theorem states that, in the absence of strong negation, Balduccini
semantics can be viewed as a special, ground case of the Cabalar semantics.
Theorem 35 For any ASPffg program  with intensional constants c and any con-
sistent set I of seed literals, if  contains no strong negation, then I is a Balduccini
answer set of  i I j=
p
CBL[; c].
Theorem 35 can be extended to full ASPffg programs that contain strong nega-
tion. Since the language in Cabalar (2011) does not allow strong negation, this
requires us to eliminate strong negation. It is well known that strong negation in
front of standard atoms can be eliminated using new atoms.
In order to eliminate strong negation in front of t-atoms, by # we denote the
program obtained from  by replacing (f = g) with (f = f) ^ (g = g) ^ :(f = g).
As we noted earlier, this formula is true i f I and gI are dened, and have dierent
values. This is the same understanding as the construct f#g in Cabalar (2011).
Theorem 36 For any ASPffg program  with intensional constants c and any con-
sistent set I of seed literals, I is a Balduccini answer set of  i I is a Balduccini
answer set of #.
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11.3 Proofs
11.3.1 Proof of Theorem 29
Theorem 29 Let  be a clingcon program with CSP (V;D;C), let p be the set of
all propositional constants occurring in , and let I be an interpretation hIf ; Xi of
signature V [p. Set X is a constraint answer set of  relative to If i I j=bg SM[;p].
Proof.
We wish to show thatX is a constraint answer set of  relative to If i hIf ; Xi j=bg
SM[;p]. That is, we wish to show that there is no set Y that is smaller than X
such that Y j= X
If
i hIf ; Xi j=bg  ^ :9bp(bp < p ^ (FOL)(bp)). In the case that
hIf ; Xi 6j=bg , we have that XIf is equivalent to ? and so for this case, the claim
holds. Thus, we only need to show that in the case that hIf ; Xi j=bg , there is no set
Y that is smaller than X such that Y j= X
If
i hIf ; Xi j=bg :9bp(bp < p^(FOL)(bp)).
Equivalently, we can show that there is a set Y that is smaller than X such that
Y j= X
If
i hIf ; Xi j=bg 9bp(bp < p ^ (FOL)(bp)).
()) Assume that there is a set Y that is smaller than X such that Y j= X
If
. We
wish to show that hIf ; Xi j=bg 9bp(bp < p ^ (FOL)(bp)). We will consider another
interpretation of the a signature 0 that extends  = V [ p with a list q that is the
same length as p. This interpretation will be I 0 = hIf ; Y [ Y pq i where Y pq denotes
the interpretation obtained from Y by replacing each p 2 p with the corresponding
q 2 q. Then, wish to show that I 0 j=bg (q < p ^ (FOL)(q)).
We rst verify that I 0 j=bg q < p. Since we assume Y that is smaller than X,
it must be the case that for every p 2 p, pY  pX and there is some p 2 p such
that pY ( pX . That is, there is some tuple  from jhIf ; Xij such that p() 2 X and
p() =2 Y . It is immediate from the denition of q and the fact that for every p 2 p,
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pY  pX that I 0 j=bgj= q  p. Then, since p() 2 X and p() =2 Y , by denition of q,
we have that I 0 j=bg q < p and so we conclude that I 0 j=bg q < p.
We now show that I 0 j=bg (FOL)(q). Since  is a conjunction of implications
of the form a  B;N;Cn, we simply need to show this to be the case for any such
implication. We consider the possible cases.
 If 6j=bg Cn. In this case the rule has no corresponding presence in the reduct
X
If
so certainly Y satises this part of the reduct. In this case
((a B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) is equivalent to a(q) B(q) ^N ^ Cn Now, since
If 6j=bg Cn, it follows that I 0 6j=bg Cn and so I 0 trivially satisies the implication
((a B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) and so in this case, the claim holds.
 X 6j=bg N . In this case the rule has no corresponding presence in the reduct XIf
so certainly Y satises this part of the reduct. In this case
((a B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) is equivalent to a(q) B(q) ^N ^ Cn Now, since
X 6j=bg N , it follows that I 0 6j=bg N and so I 0 trivially satisies the implication
((a B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) and so in this case, the claim holds.
 If j=bg Cn, X j=bg N , and X 6j=bg B. In this case, the corresponding implication
in the reduct X
If
is a  B. Now since B is a conjunction of propositional
literals, and Y is a subset of X, it follows that Y 6j=bg B and so Y trivially
satises the implication. In this case ((a B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) is equivalent to
a(q)  B(q) ^ N ^ Cn. Thus, since I 0 j=bg B(q) i Y j=bg B, I 0 trivially
satisies the implication ((a B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) and so in this case, the claim
holds.
 If j=bg Cn, X j=bg N , X j=bg B, and X 6j=bg a. In this case, the corresponding
implication in the reduct X
If
is a  B. Now since a is a propositional literal
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or ?, and Y is a subset of X, it follows that Y 6j=bg a and so Y satises the
implication i Y j=bg B. In this case ((a B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) is equivalent to
a(q)  B(q) ^ N ^ Cn. Now I 0 j=bg B(q) i Y j=bg B and I 0 j=bg a(q) i
Y j=bg a, the claim immediately follows.
 If j=bg Cn, X j=bg N , X j=bg B, and X j=bg a. In this case, the corresponding
implication in the reduct X
If
is a B. In this case, Y satises the implication
i Y 6j=bg B or Y j=bg a. In this case ((a  B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) is equivalent to
a(q)  B(q) ^ N ^ Cn. Now I 0 j=bg B(q) i Y j=bg B and I 0 j=bg a(q) i
Y j=bg a, the claim immediately follows.
(() Assume that hIf ; Xi j=bg 9bp(bp < p ^ (FOL)(bp)). That is, there is some
interpretation I 0 of the extended signature 0 =  [ q such that I 0 j=bg (q < p ^
(FOL)(q)). Let this signature be hIf ; X [ Y where If is the interpretation of
functions from 0, X is the interpretation of propositional literals in p and Y is the
interpretation of propositional literals in q. We will show that Y is smaller than X
and Y j= X
If
.
We rst show that Z = Y qp is smaller than than X. We assume that I
0 j=bg q < p.
From this it is immediate that for any q 2 q, qI0 is a subset of pI0 for the corresponding
p 2 p and so Z is not a superset of X. Then, since I 0 j=bg q < p there must be some
q 2 q and some tuple in jI 0j such that q()I0 = 0 but p()I0 = 1 for the corresponding
p 2 p. From this, it follows that Z is strictly smaller than X.
We now show that Z j=bg XIf . Since  is a conjunction of implications of the form
a  B;N;Cn, we simply need to show this to be the case for any such implication.
We consider the possible cases.
 If 6j=bg Cn. In this case the rule has no corresponding presence in the reduct
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X
If
so certainly Z satises this part of the reduct.
 X 6j=bg N . In this case the rule has no corresponding presence in the reduct XIf
so certainly Z satises this part of the reduct.
 If j=bg Cn and X j=bg N . In this case, the corresponding implication in the
reduct X
If
is a  B. In this case ((a  B;N;Cn)FOL)(q) is equivalent to
aq  B(q) ^N ^ Cn. Since we assume If j=bg Cn, X j=bg N , I 0 satises the
implication i I 0 j=bg a(q) B(q). Now, since I 0 j=bg B(q) i Y j=bg B and
I 0 j=bg a(q) i Y j=bg a, the claim immediately follows.
11.3.2 Proof of Theorem 30
Lemma 44 Let P be a LW-program, F be the rst-order representation of P , I be
a P -interpretation of the signature  of P such that I is a model of P . and p be the
list of all predicates in . For any interpretation J such that J <p I and any set of
atoms K such that for any atom A, we have A 2 K i AJ = 1, then J j= F I i K
satises P I .
Proof.
Since F is comprised of a conjunctions of the form
B1 ^    ^Bm ^ (: C1) ^    ^ (: Cn)! A
F I is by denition a conjunction of
(B1 ^    ^Bm ^ (: C1) ^    ^ (: Cn)! A)I
and so we will consider each conjunctive subformula Gi of F separately. Each con-
junctive term Gi corresponds to a rule ri in P of the form
A B1; : : : ; Bm; not C1; : : : ; not Cn:
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and so we simply need to show that for any conjunctive subformula Gi of F and the
corresponding rule ri, we have J j= GIi i K j= rIi . In the context of this comparison,
we note that when a rule is removed in P I , this is equivalent to replacing the rule with
>. We consider the following cases for a rule r and the corresponding conjunctive
subformula G in F .
 Case 1: There is some atomic formula Bi in r such that Bi contains an equality
and is not satised by I.
In this case rI is replaced with > and so K j= rI . In GI , it may be the case
that some (: Ck) is replaced by ? but Bi will certainly remain as a conjunctive
term in the precedent of the implication G and so since J agrees with I on all
functions, we have J 6j= Bi and so J j= GI .
 Case 2: There are no atomic formulas Bi in r such that Bi contains an equality
and is not satised by I, but there is a conjunctive term not Ck in r such that
CIk = 1.
In this case rI is replaced with > and so K j= rI . In GI , (: Ck) will be replaced
with ? and so J j= GI .
 Case 3: There are no atomic formulas Bi in r such that Bi contains an equality
and is not satised by I, and there is no conjunctive term not Ck in r such that
CIk = 1.
In this case, rI is obtained from r by replacing each f(t1; : : : ; tm) with c where
f I(t1; : : : ; tm) = c and from removing all conjunctive terms containing equality.
On the other hand, there are two cases for GI : is either ? if I 6j= G or GI is
precisely G otherwise. However, the assumption that I is a model of P means
that the former case cannot arise and so GI is precisely G.
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Now, since J and I agree on all functions, we have that J j= GI i J j= H where
H is obtained from GI by replacing f(t1; : : : ; tm) with c where f
I(t1; : : : ; tm) =
c. Also since J and I agree on all functions, and since we assumed in this
case that I satises all conjunctive terms containing equality, we have J j= H
i J j= H 0 where H 0 is obtained from H by removing all conjunctive terms
containing equality. Now the only remaining dierence between H 0 and rI is
that every remaining conjunctive term not A in H 0 is absent in rI . Note that
since we assumed for this case that there is no conjunctive term not Ck in r
such that CIk = 1, it must be that every such conjunctive term is such that
AI = 0. However, since we have that J <p I, it must be that AJ = 0 and so
J j= :A. Thus, J j= H 0 i J j= H 00 where H 00 is obtained from H 0 by removing
all conjunctive terms of the form not A. Now H 00 is exactly the rst-order
representation of rI and since J and K agree on all predicates, it is clear that
J j= GI i K j= rI .
Theorem 30 Let P be an LW-program and let F be the FOL-representation of the
set of rules in P . The following conditions are equivalent to each other:
(a) I is an answer set of P in the sense of Lin and Wang (2008);
(b) I is a P -interpretation that satises SM[F ;p] where p is the list of all predicate
constants occurring in F .
Proof. We will use the reduct-based characterization of the SM semantics in this
proof. When programs are restricted
()) Let us assume I is an answer set of P in the sense of Lin and Wang (2008).
We wish to show that I satises SM[F ;p] where p is the list of all predicate constants
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occurring in F . That is, we assume I satises every rule in P and there is no subset
K of atoms in I such that K is a model of P I and we wish to show that I j= F
and no interpretation J such that J <p I satises F I . Since I is an answer set of
P , Isatises every rule of P and so it immediately follows that I j= F . So it only
remains to be shown that if there is no subset K of atoms in I such that K is a model
of P I , then there is no interpretation J such that J <p I satises F I . To show this,
we will consider the contrapositive; we assume there is some interpretation J such
that J <p I satises F I and will show that there is a subset K of the atoms in I such
that K is a model of P I .
We rst note that since J <p I, J and I dier only predicates so that Jpred is a
subset of Ipred. Thus, we will take K = Jpred so that K is a subset of the atoms in I
and show that K is a model of P I . Then the claim follows by Lemma 44.
(() Let us assume I satises SM[F ;p] where p is the list of all predicate constants
occurring in F . We wish to show that I is an answer set of P in the sense of Lin and
Wang (2008). That is, we assume I j= F and no interpretation J such that J <p I
satises F I and we wish to show that I satises every rule in P and there is no subset
K of atoms in I such that K is a model of P I . Since we assume I j= F , then it
follows that Isatises every rule of P . So it only remains to be shown that if there is
no interpretation J such that J <p I satises F I , then there is no subset K of atoms
in I such that K is a model of P I . To show this, we will consider the contrapositive;
we assume there a subset K of the atoms in I such that K is a model of P I and we
will show that there is some interpretation J such that J <p I satises F I .
We will take J such that J and I agree on all functions and such that for any
atomic formula A, we have AJ = 1 i A 2 K. It is clear that since K is a subset of
the atoms in I, that J <p I. The claim then follows by Lemma 44.
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11.3.3 Proof of Theorem 31
Lemma 45 Given an ASP(LC) program , for any LJN interpretation (X;T ) and
any interpretation I = hIf ; Y i, the following are equivalent:
 (a) I j=bg T [ T ,
 (b) (X;T ) j= t i I j=bg t for every t occurring in .
Proof.
(a) Assume I j=bg T [ T .
()) Assume (X;T ) j= t for some t occurring in . This means t 2 T and so by the
condition on I, I j=bg t.
(() Assume I j=bg t for some t occurring in . By the condition on I, t 2 T and so
(X;T ) j= t.
(b) Assume (X;T ) j= t i I j=bg t for every t occurring in .
By denition of (X;T ) j= t, t 2 T i I j=bg t for every t occurring in . Thus I j=bg T
and I j=bg T so I j=bg T [ T .
Lemma 46 Given an ASP(LC) program , two LJN-interpretations (X;T ) and
(Y; T ) where (X;T ) j=  and Y  X, two interpretations I = hIf ; Xi and J = hIf ; Y i
such that
 I j= ,
 If j=bg T [ T ;
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we have Y j= (X;T ) i J j= I .
Proof.
()) Assume Y j= (X;T ). This means that Y satises every rule in the reduct
(X;T ). For any rule r of the form (11.3) in , there are two cases:
 Case 1: (X;T ) j= N ^ LC.
In this case, the corresponding rule in the reduct (X;T ) is
a B:
On the other hand, rI has two cases:
{ Subcase 1: I j= B.
Since we assume I j= , it must be that I j= a. By Lemma 45, since
(X;T ) j= t for all t in LC, so too does I and so I j= LC. In this case, rI is
a B;>; : : : ;>; LCI :
Since I and J interpret object constants in the same way and I j= LCI ,
J j= LCI . Thus by denition of J , it follows that J j= B i Y j= B and
J j= a i Y j= a, so the claim holds.
{ Subcase 2: I 6j= B. The reduct rI is either a ? or ?  ? and in either
case, J j= rI .
 Case 2: (X;T ) 6j= N ^ LC.
By the condition of I and by Lemma 45, I 6j= N ^LC so rI is a ? or ?  ?
depending on whether I j= a. Thus, J trivially satises rI .
(() Assume J j= I . This means that J satises every rule in I . For any rule
r of the form (11.3) in 
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 Case 1: I 6j= N ^ LC.
By the condition of I and by Lemma 45, (X;T ) 6j= N ^ LC. Thus the reduct
(X;T ) does not contain a corresponding rule so there is nothing for Y to satisfy.
 Case 2: I j= N ^ LC
{ Subcase 1: I j= :B.
By the condition of I and by Lemma 45, (X;T ) j= N ^ LC so the reduct
r(X;T ) is a  B. Now by the condition of I, X 6j= B and since Y  X,
Y 6j= B. Thus, Y j= r(X;T ).
{ Subcase 2: I j= B
By the condition of I and by Lemma 45, (X;T ) j= N ^ LC so the reduct
r(X;T ) is a  B. Now, since I j= , it must be that I j= a so the reduct
rI is a  B ^ LCI . Now since J and I agree on every object constant
and since I j= LCI , J j= LCI . Thus, since J j= rI i J j= a  B so
J j= a B. Now by denition of J , it follows that Y j= r(X;T ).
Theorem 31 Let  be an ASP(LC) program, and p and f are dened as above.
(a) If (X;T ) is an LJN-answer set of , then for any interpretation hIf ; Xi of
signature p [ f such that If j=bg T [ T , we have hIf ; Xi j=bg SM[;p].
(b) For any interpretation I = hIf ; Xi of signature p[f , if hIf ; Xi j=bg SM[;p],
then an LJN-interpretation (X;T ) where
T = ft j t is a theory atom in  such that If j=bg tg
is an LJN-answer set of .
Proof.
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In this proof, we use Theorem 1 and refer to the reduct characterization.
(a) Assume (X;T ) is an LJN-answer set of . Take any interpretation I = hIf ; Xi
such that If j=bg T [ T .
Now for any atom p, by the condition of I, I j= p i (X;T ) j= p. Similarly, for
any theory atom t occuring in , by the condition of I and by Lemma 45, I j= t i
(X;T ) j= t. Thus, since (X;T ) j= , I j= .
We must now show that there is no interpretation J such that J <p I and
J j= I . Take any J <p I. That is, J = hIf ; Y i such that Y  X. By Lemma 46,
J j= I i Y j= (X;T ) but since (X;T ) is an LJN-answer set of , Y 6j= (X;T ) and
thus J 6j= I so I is a stable model of .
(b) Assume I = hIf ; Xi is a stable model of .
Now for any atom p, by denition of (X;T ), (X;T ) j= p i I j= p. Similarly, for
any theory atom t occuring in , by the condition of I and Lemma 45, (X;T ) j= t i
I j= t. Thus, since I j= , (X;T ) j= .
We must now show that there is no set of atoms Y such that Y  X and Y j=
(X;T ). Take any Y  X. By Lemma 46, Y j= (X;T ) i J j= I where J = hIf ; Y i.
Since J <
p
I and I is a stable model of , J 6j= I . Thus Y 6j= (X;T ) and so (X;T )
is an LJN-answer set of .
11.3.4 Proof of Theorem 32
Theorem 32 For any denite causal theory T , I j= CM[T ;f ] i I j= SM[Tr(T );f ].
Proof. Assume that, without loss of generality, the rules (11.5){(11.6) have no free
variables. It is sucient to prove that under the assumption that I satises T , for
276
every rule (11.5), Jfg [ I satises
B ! g(t)= t1
i Jfg [ I satises
(::B)(g) ! g(t)= t1 ^ f(t)= t1:
The claim follows since both B is equivalent to (::B)(g), and I satises B.
11.3.5 Proof of Theorem 33
Theorem 33 Let F be the FOL-representation of a ground IF-program of signa-
ture  and let f be a list of intensional function constants. For any interpretation I
of , I j= IF[F ;f ] i
 I satises , and
 no interpretation J of  that disagrees with I only on f satises I .
Proof. First we prove that, for any implication-free formula F , Jcd[I satises F (d)
i J j= F I . This proof is easy by induction.
 Case 1: F is a formula :G. Then F (d) is :G. Now, since the members of c
are exclusive to I and are not interpreted by Jcd, J
c
d [ I j= (:G)(d) i I j= :G,
We consider two cases for the reduct F I :
{ Subcase 1: I 6j= G. Then F I is > and so J j= F I . In this case, I j= :G,
which we saw was equivalent to Jcd [ I j= (:G)(d) so for this subcase, the
claim holds.
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{ Subcase 2: I j= G. Then F I is ? and so J 6j= F I . In this case, I 6j= :G,
which we saw was equivalent to Jcd [ I 6j= (:G)(d) so for this subcase, the
claim holds.
 Case 2: F is ?. Then, F (d) is ? and F I is ?. Since both Jcd [ I 6j= F (d) and
J 6j= F I , the claim holds in this case.
 Case 3: F is an atomic formula A not in the scope of any negation. Then F (d)
is A(d). F I is A. Now, since the members of c are exclusive to Jcd and are
not interpreted by I, Jcd [ I j= A(d) i Jcd j= A(d), which we can rewrite as
Jcd [ I j= A(d) i J j= A. Then it is clear that the claim holds in this case.
 Case 4: F is a formula GH where  2 f^;_g that is not in the scope of any
negation. Then F (d) is G(d)H(d). F I is GH. The claim holds by I.H.
on G and H.
The claim then follows since Jcd [ I satises B ! H i J satises HI  BI .
11.3.6 Proof of Theorem 34
Let T be an IF-program whose rules have the form
f(t) = t1  ::B (11.8)
above is (11.7)) where f is an intensional function constant, t and t1 do not contain
intensional function constants, and B is an arbitrary formula. We identify T with the
corresponding rst-order formula.
Theorem 34 I j= SM[T ;f ] i I j= IF[T ;f ].
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Proof.
We wish to show that I j= T^:9bf(bf < f^F (bf)) i I j= T^:9bf(bf 6= f^F (bf)).
The rst conjunctive terms are identical and if I 6j= T then the claim holds.
Let us assume then, that I j= T . By denition, bf < f is equivalent to bf 6= f .
What remains to be shown is the correspondence between F (bf) and F (bf).
Consider any list of functions g of the same length as f . Let I = I [ Jfg be from
an extended signature 0 = [g where J is an interpretation of  and J and I agree
on functions not occurring in f .
Consider any rule f(t) = t1  ::B from T . The corresponding rule in F (g) is
equivalent to
f(t) = t1 ^ g(t) = t1  B:
The corresponding rule in F (g) is equivalent to
g(t) = t1  B:
Now we consider cases
 I 6j= B. Clearly, both versions of the rule are vacuously satised by I.
 I j= B. Then, since I j= T it must be that I j= f(t) = t1 and so the corre-
sponding rule in F (g) is further equivalent to
g(t) = t1  B
which is equivalent to the corresponding rule in F (g) and so certainly I is
satises both corresponding rules or neither.
Thus, I j= F (g) i I j= F (g) and so the claim holds.
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11.3.7 Proof of Theorem 35
Given a program , by FOL we denote the FOL representation of .
Lemma 47 Consider a signature  and a set of constants c. Given an ASPffg
program  of signature  not containing strong negation,
(a) For any partial interpretation I of signature  that maps every constant in  nc
to itself, there is a consistent set S of seed literals such that I j=
p
FOL i S j=
b
.
(b) For any consistent set of seed literals S, there is a partial interpretation I such
that I j=
p
FOL i S j=
b
.
Proof. Part (a): Given a partial interpretation I, let S be the set ff(v) = w :
f(v)I = wg [ fp(v) : p(v)I = 1g. We note that this is a consistent set of seed literals
since a partial interpretation maps f(v) to at most one object constant.
We also note that by the denition of S, for any atomic sentence A, we have
I j=
p
A i S j=
b
A. Now, consider any rule r from . I j=
p
rFOL i I j=
p
head(r)FOL or
I 6j=
p
body(r)FOL. By the previous observation, this is equivalent to S j=
b
head(r) or
S 6j=
b
body(r) since body(r) is a conjunction of atomic formulas. This is precisely the
denition of S j=
b
rFOL.
Part (b): Given a consistent set of seed literals S, let I be the partial interpretation
dened as follows:
 for every object constant v 2  n c, we have vI = v.
 for every predicate constant p 2 c and every list of object constants v, we have
p(v)I = 1 i p(v) 2 S.
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 for every function constant f 2 c and every list of object constants v, we have
f(v)I = u if S does not contain f(v), and f(v)I = w if f(v) = w is in S.
We note that the last bullet is well-dened since S is a consistent set of seed literals
so that there cannot be two distinct object constants a and b such that f(v) = a 2 S
and f(v) = b 2 S.
We also note that by denition of I, for any atomic sentence A, we have I j=
p
A
i S j=
b
A. Now, consider any rule r from . S j=
b
r i S j=
b
head(r) or S 6j=
b
body(r).
By the previous observation, this is equivalent to I j=
p
head(r)FOL or I 6j=
p
body(r)FOL
since body(r) is a conjunction of atomic formulas. This is precisely the denition of
I j=
p
r.
The proof of Lemma 47 tells us that a consistent set of seed literals can be identied
with a partial interpretation.
Lemma 48 For consistents sets of seed literals J and I of the same signature, J is
a proper subset of I i J c I when we view them as partial interpretations.
Proof. We rst note that since consistent sets of literals map every object constant
in  n c to itself, the partial interpretation view does the same which corresponds to
the rst condition for J c I. The second condition of J c I is pJ  pI for all
predicate constants in c, which corresponds exactly to the predicate part of J being
a subset of the predicate part of I. Finally, the third condition of J c I is fJ() = u
or fJ() = f I() corresponds to the function part of J being a subset of the function
part of I since we identify a partial interpretation mapping an element to u to the
absence of that element in the set.
Theorem 35 For any ASPffg program  with intensional constants c and any
consistent set I of seed literals, if  has no strong negation, then I is a Balduccini
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answer set of  i I j=
p
CBL[; c].
Proof. By denition and by using the equivalent reformulation presented and jus-
tied in Lemma 48 and Lemma 47, I is a Balduccini answer set of a program  i
I j=
p
 and for any partial interpretation J such that J c I, we have J 6j=
p
I . Since
this denition uses the same reduct and same notion of satisfaction, this is equivalent
to the reduct reformulation of the Cabalar semantics. Further, this is equivalent to
I j=
p
CBL[FOL; c] by Theorem 21.
11.3.8 Proof of Theorem 36
Theorem 36 For any ASPffg program  with intensional constants c and any
consistent set I of seed literals, I is a Balduccini answer set of  i I is a Balduccini
answer set of #.
Proof. First, we show that I j=
b
(f = g) i I j=
b
(f = f) ^ (g = g) ^ :(f = g).
Left-to-right: Asssume I j=
b
(f = g). By denition, I contains both f=c1 and g=c2
for some object constants c1 and c2 such that c1 6= c2. Clearly, each of I j= f = f ,
I j= g = g and I 6j= f = g holds.
Right-to-left: I j=
b
(f = f) ^ (g = g) ^ :(f = g). Since I j=
b
f = f and I j= g = g,
it follows that I contains f = c1 and I contains f = c2 for some c1 and c2. Further,
since I j= :(f = g), it must be that c1 6= c2, from which the claim follows.
From this it is not dicult to check that I is equivalent to (#)I , from which
the claim follows.
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Chapter 12
CONCLUSION
Reasoning about real-world domains faces several challenges among which are
performing defeasible reasoning and ecient computation in the presence of large
domains. Answer Set Programming, based on the stable model semantics, addressed
the issue of defeasible reasoning for predicates only but due to grounding based com-
putation, large domains preclude ecient computation in ASP.
Recent proposals have loosely integrated ASP with other declarative paradigms
including constraint programming, satisability modulo theories, and mixed integer
programming. These proposals have resulted in systems such as ACSOLVER Mel-
larkod et al. (2008), CLINGCON Gebser et al. (2009b), EZCSP Balduccini (2009),
IDP Marien et al. (2008), and MINGO Liu et al. (2012) that have partially alleviated
the grounding bottleneck. However, the functions there were treated as in rst-order
logic so that defeasible reasoning could only be performed on predicates and not
functions.
On the other hand, several recent formalisms Cabalar (2011); Lifschitz (2012);
Balduccini (2012) extend the stable model semantics to support intensional functions
so that defeasible reasoning can be performed on both functions and predicates. How-
ever, these approaches focused on rich modeling and did not address the grounding
bottleneck.
This research is a novel framework that tightly integrates ASP and SMT in order
to address the grounding bottleneck faced by ASP while still supporting defeasible
reasoning on both functions and predicates for which SMT is unsuitable. This frame-
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work is based on the newly-introduced functional stable model semantics.
The prototype implementations presented in this dissertation serve as a proof-of-
concept for this framework. We are able to perform defeasible reasoning on func-
tional uents directly with functions rather than with predicates. This is not simply
syntactic sugar however; the ASPMT2SMT system is able to avoid the grounding
bottleneck in some domains and dramatically outperform the state-of-the-art ASP
systems. While more mature systems that loosely couple ASP with other declara-
tive paradigms are able to achieve slightly better performance, these systems lack
the ability to perform defeasible reasoning in a suitable way. The advantages of the
ASPMT2SMT system were leveraged to create a non-monotonic spatial reasoning
system described in Walega et al. (2015).
We have investigated many properties of the rst-order stable model semantics
and have shown that analogous properties hold for the functional stable model seman-
tics. By dening our semantics in the style of the rst-order stable model semantics
and studying the relationship between these two semantics, we were able to establish
a body of results that other formalisms would need to establish using dissimilar termi-
nology and concepts. However, by establishing formal relationships between dierent
denitions of intensional functions, we have been able to establish results for these
other denitions such as the generalization of the unfolding process in Theorem 1
in Cabalar (2011).
We expect that future research in this area will establish further results for the
functional stable model semantics analogous to the useful results that have made the
stable model semantics successful. We also expect that future implementations of
ASPMT will achieve similar performance improvements to those elicited by SMT for
the SAT community.
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